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研究生:趙怡惠
研究生(外文):CHAO, YI-HUI
論文名稱:經理人過度自信對CEO被迫離職之影響 ─以台灣上市公司為例
論文名稱(外文):The Effect of CEO Overconfidence on the Forced Turnover: An Example from Taiwan
指導教授:林卓民林卓民引用關係張民忠張民忠引用關係
指導教授(外文):LIN, CHO-MINCHANG, MING-CHUNG
口試委員:郭玟秀
口試委員(外文):KUO, WEN-SHIU
口試日期:2018-06-06
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:靜宜大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2018
畢業學年度:106
語文別:中文
論文頁數:30
中文關鍵詞:經理人過度自信CEO被迫離職控制股東
外文關鍵詞:CEO overconfidenceforced CEO turnovercontrol-affiliated directors
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本文主要探討經理人(CEO)的過度自信是否會提高CEO被解雇的機率。一般來說,過度自信的經理人容易有過度投資的現象,且其投資決策經常出現價值減損的投資,造成過度自信的經理人面臨被解雇的機率較高。另外,台灣上市公司普遍存在所有權集中與控制股東,因此本文進一步觀察控制股東占董事會席次高低是否會影響CEO被迫離職的機率。本文以台灣上市公司為研究對象,樣本來自台灣經濟新報財務資料庫(TEJ)以及台灣證交所資訊公開觀測站,研究期間從2008年至2016年,採用Cox半參數比例風險模型來估計CEO被強迫離職的可能性與經理人過度自信之間的關係。實證結果顯示,經理人過度自信對CEO被迫離職為顯著正相關,表示經理人若有過度自信,則越容易被解雇;而控制股東占董事會席次越高,代表公司治理較弱,因此CEO較不容易被解雇,此為本文的主要貢獻。

This paper focuses on whether the CEO's overconfidence will increase the chances of the CEO being fired. In general, overconfident managers are prone to overinvestment, and their investment decisions often have devalued investments, which invite higher likelihood of being fired. In addition, Because of concentrated ownership and controlling shareholders are common in Taiwanese listed companies, it is further observed whether the board affiliations of controlling shareholders will affect the chances that the CEO will be forced to resign. This paper takes Taiwanese listed companies as the sample firms, which are from TEJ and MOPS over the sample period of 2008-2016. The Cox semi-parametric proportional hazards model is used to investigate the relationship between the possibilities of forced CEO turnover and CEO overconfidence. The empirical results show that managers' overconfidence is significantly positively correlated with the CEO forced turnover. In addition, the high control-affiliated director account for lower forced CEO turnover since weaker corporate governance. The paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the relationship between forced CEO turnover and control-affiliated directors.

摘要 I
Abstract II
目錄 III
表目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
第壹章、前言 1
一、研究動機 1
二、研究目的 2
三、研究流程 3
第貳章、文獻回顧及假說 4
一、高階管理者過度自信與CEO被迫離職 4
二、控制股東與CEO被迫離職 5
三、經理人能力與CEO被迫離職 7
第參章、研究方法 8
一、研究樣本與實證模型 8
二、變數定義 9
(一)被解釋變數:CEO離職(TURNOVER) 9
(二)解釋變數 10
(三)控制變數 13
第肆章、實證結果 14
一、敘述統計性分析 14
二、雙變量分析 15
三、迴歸分析 16
第伍章、結論 26
參考文獻 28

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