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Since 2004, four times of amendments to the statutory maximum for insider trading addressed in Act 171 of Republic of China’s (R.O.C.) Securities and Exchange Act have passed for the purpose of increasing the statutory maximum, which currently is imprisonment for a term of ten years. The statutory maximum for insider trading in R.O.C. is exceptionally severe when compared to other countries which also prohibits insider trading; take Germany for instance, its statutory maximum is imprisonment for a term of five years. Currently, the severity of the statutory maximum for insider trading in R.O.C. could be deemed to jeopardize the protection of legal interest. Even the penalty is severe in R.O.C., still, cases of insider trading are not uncommon; apparently the efforts to prevent the crime are not fruitful. Moreover, with such severe statutory maximum, the only consideration to reach a verdict in court is objective elements of a crime without considering the level of intention of an actor. This is an issue needed to be addressed. On the other hand, from the criminology perspective, simply emphasizing the severity of penalties is not the best means of preventing a crime; instead, an efficient and effective enforcement of penalty after a crime is reported is a better solution. In the current system of R.O.C., the only means of penalty on insider trading is a criminal penalty; no sorts of other penalties are applicable. This system not only is rigid and inflexible, but also lacks both timely and punitive measures neither to effectually impose curbs on the speculation of opportunistic criminals nor to satisfy the society’s expectations for justice. Furthermore, much research indicates that the issue that the current conviction rate of insider trading in R.O.C. remains low is for the reason that the fact that the courts in R.O.C. have inconsistent standards in convicting insider trading, which further resulting in a low legal stability and predictability. Also, this often leads to years of lengthy lawsuits; which not only wastes many of courts’ resources and services, but also affects the smooth operation of enterprises and undermines the people’s faith in the justice system. What’s worse, the system in R.O.C. lacks the regulations restricting juristic persons to be involved in insider trading as well as preventing a profitable crime of insider trading committed by means of insider information collected via a criminal action. Therefore, in order to produce a comprehensive solution for the above-mentioned issues, this thesis focuses on subjective elements of a crime. Through reexamining the legislative intent and the theories of insider trading regulations, referencing to insider trading laws in other jurisdictions, exploring from the criminology perspective, analyzing the current doctrines in insider trading and the disputes over theory and practice in courts as well as reviewing the attempts to introduce exemption clauses in the rules governing insider trading in R.O.C., the thesis will put forward suggestions for amending rules on criminal penalties and introducing administrative penalties to overcome the deficiencies in criminal penalties in the hope of contributing to the reformation of the justice system.
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