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研究生:謝榕真
研究生(外文):XIE,RONG-ZHEN
論文名稱:何種類型董事較會解除股權設質以恢復投票權?
論文名稱(外文):What Types of Directors would Revoke Pledge Shares for Restoring the Voting Rights?
指導教授:黃劭彥黃劭彥引用關係鍾宇軒鍾宇軒引用關係
指導教授(外文):HUANG,SHAIO-YANCHUNG,YU-HSUAN
口試委員:黃劭彥鍾宇軒卓佳慶洪嘉聲
口試委員(外文):HUANG,SHAIO-YANCHUNG,YU-HSUANCHO,CHIA-CHINGHUNG,CHIA-SHENG
口試日期:2019-07-02
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:會計與資訊科技研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:107
語文別:中文
論文頁數:48
中文關鍵詞:公司法股權質押法人董事
外文關鍵詞:Company ActPledge of Stock RightsCorporate Representatives Directors
相關次數:
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  • 下載下載:3
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
雖然董事股權設質以獲取短期需求之資金是實務上的普遍作法,但股權設質也相對是趨動財務危機的因素之一。臺灣立法機關2011年即修訂公司法要求公司董事股權設質超過選任當時所持有之公司股份數額二分之一時,其超過之股份不得行使表決權。因此,本研究乃探討何種董事類型較會透過解除股權設質,以恢復投票權來避免法規之限制。本研究之實證結果發現自然人董事、非控制董事及非家族董事較會在股東會停止過戶日前解除股權設質。再者,本研究進一步發現當董事有解除股權設質的動機時,法人董事、控制董事以及家族董事會有較高的解質幅度,亦會有迎合與超越投票權限制之門檻。
While director share pledging is common practice to raise short-term capital, share pledging is one key driver of financial distress. In 2011, The Taiwanese Congress passed an amendment of Company Act to require a director of a company whose pledged shares are more than half of the company’s shares being held at the time he/she is elected, the voting power of the excessive portion of shares shall not be exercised. Thus, this study investigates what types of directors would revoke pledge shares for restoring his/her voting rights. The empirical results show that natural person directors, non-controlling directors, and non-family directors are more likely to revoke the pledged shares before the date on which share transfer registration of a regular shareholders’ meeting. Furthermore, this study also finds that corporate representatives directors, controlling directors and family directors have higher levels on the redemption of pledge shares and intend to meet and exceed the limited voting power threshold as the directors have incentives to revoke pledge shares.
圖 目 錄 v
表 目 錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻探討 5
一、董事角色與代理問題 5
1、董事之角色問題 5
2、董事會之代理問題 7
二、董事股權質押與解質 8
1、公司法197-1條 8
2、董事質押 8
3、董事解質 9
第三章 文獻探討 13
一、類型的解質可能性 13
二、董事類型與解質幅度 14
三、董事類型與解質之門檻 15
第四章 研究方法 17
一、樣本選取與資料蒐集 17
二、實證模型與變數定義 18
1、主要測試變數 18
2、控制變數 19
第五章 實證結果與分析 21
一、敘述性統計 21
二、相關係數分析 22
三、迴歸分析 25
1、董事類型之解質迴歸分析 25
2、董事類型與解質幅度之迴歸分析 25
3、董事類型與解質門檻之迴歸分析 28
四、敏感性分析 30
1、敏感性分析-股東會進行改補選 30
1、敏感性分析-董事是否會為了增加投票權而增加其持股 30
第六章 結論與建議 33
參考文獻 36
附錄 40
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