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研究生:呂紹煒
研究生(外文):Shao-Wei Lyu
論文名稱:分析師關注度、公司治理與過度投資的關係:以中國企業為例
論文名稱(外文):Analyst coverage, corporate governance and overinvestment: Evidences from Chinese corporations
指導教授:李彥賢李彥賢引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yen-Hsien Lee
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中原大學
系所名稱:財務金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:107
語文別:中文
論文頁數:45
中文關鍵詞:分析師關注度公司治理過度投資
外文關鍵詞:analyst coveragecorporate governanceoverinvestment
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本研究探討2006至2016年分析師關注度、公司治理與過度投資的關係,並以中國企業為例。透過實證結果,本研究發現當分析師關注度越高時,會使得公司越容易過度投資。而當公司分析師關注較高而發生過度投資時,公司可以透過公司治理抑制分析師關注度增加過度投資的效果。除此之外,本研究也採納了分量的方法,發現在不同分量下,分析師皆會造成過度投資,但只有在較高的分量下,公司治理才會發揮抑制的效用。本研究使用了Yu(2008)工具變數法來解決內生性的問題,並發現上述同樣的現象。最後,本研究採用了差異中的差異法來探討治理面的改革是否有效,實證結果發現在配對前實驗組與控制組不存在顯著差異,在配對後實驗組與控制組存在顯著差異,而配對前的差異與配對後的差異呈現顯著差異,說明治理面的改革是有效的。
In this thesis, we examine the relationship among analyst coverage, corporate governance and over-investment from 2006 to 2016 using samples of Chinese listed firms. The empirical findings demonstrate that higher analyst coverage increases over-investment. When the firms of higher analyst coverage over-invest, the firms can diminish the effect of analyst coverage by corporate governance. In addition, using quantile experiment ,we find that analyst coverage causes over-investment in different quantile, but corporate governance reduces the effect of analyst coverage only in higher quantile. We find the same evidences as above using the instrumental variable by Yu (2008). Finally, we use the approach of difference-in-difference to explore whether the reform of the governance is effective.
目錄
摘要 I
Abstract II
謝辭 III
目錄 IV
表目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第二章 文獻回顧 6
第一節 分析師與資訊仲介的相關文獻 6
第二節 分析師與市場壓力的相關文獻 7
第三節 過度投資、分析師與公司治理的發展 8
第三章 研究方法 9
第一節 研究樣本與資料來源 9
第二節 變數定義 10
第三節 實證模型設定 13
第四章 實證結果分析 18
第一節、基本統計量 18
第二節、估計結果分析 19
第三節、準實驗設計 28
第四節、穩健性檢定 30
第五章 結論 33
參考文獻 35

表目錄
表1變數定義 12
表2基本統計量 18
表3分析師關注度、公司治理與過度投資迴歸模型結果 21
表4工具變數法兩階段迴歸估計結果 24
表5分量迴歸估計結果 27
表6傾向分數配對結果 29
表7差異中的差異法結果 30
表8高分析師關注度之傾向分數配對結果 30
表9高分析師關注度之差異中的差異法 31
表10過度投資之傾向分數配對結果 32
表11過度投資之差異中的差異法結果 32
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