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研究生:魏進彥
研究生(外文):WEI, CHIN-YEN
論文名稱:公司治理、實質選擇權與權益資金成本
論文名稱(外文):Corporate Governance, Real Option, Cost Of Equity
指導教授:姜家訓姜家訓引用關係
指導教授(外文):Jiang, Jia-Xun
口試委員:陳宇紳高銘淞
口試日期:2019-06-20
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:輔仁大學
系所名稱:會計學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:107
語文別:中文
論文頁數:106
中文關鍵詞:公司治理權益資金成本實質選擇權
外文關鍵詞:Corporate GovernanceReal OptionCost of Equity
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本研究以2006年至2017年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本,探討資訊透明度、公司治理品質與權益資金成本之關係,另外本研究以公司所屬產業之景氣循環階段衡量實質選擇權之型態,本研究推論資訊透明度(公司治理品質)較佳之公司,在產業景氣循環成長階段,擁有更多成長選擇權,故於所屬產業景氣處於成長階段,資訊透明度(公司治理品質)較佳之公司,其權益資金成本高於同產業資訊透明度(公司治理品質)較差之公司。反之,資訊透明度(公司治理品質)較佳之公司,在產業景氣循環縮減階段,擁有更多縮減選擇權,故於所屬產業景氣處於縮減階段,資訊透明度(公司治理品質)較佳之公司,其權益資金成本低於同產業資訊透明度(公司治理品質)較差之公司(Li and Li 2018)。
本研究採用台灣證券期貨交易所於2006~2014年(第三屆到第十二屆)公布之資訊揭露評鑑分數衡量資訊透明度,以及台灣證券交易所公司治理中心於2014~2017年(第一屆到第四屆)公布之公司治理評鑑分數衡量公司治理品質,權益資金成本之衡量則採用隱含權益資金成本(Gebhardt et al. 2001(GLS);Claus and Thomas 2001(CT);Gordon and Gordon 1997(GG))與Penman and Zhu(PZ模式) (2017)所發展之模式,實證結果如下:
(一)關於資訊透明度與權益資金成本之關係,其結果若以GLS模式與ICC 綜合指標模式(GLS模式、CT模式、GG模式之平均)衡量的權益資金成本,本研究發現,資訊透明度較佳之公司相較於資訊透明度較差之公司,其權益資金成本較低;惟若以PZ模式估計權益資金成本,其結果則反是。
(二)關於公司治理品質與權益資金成本之關係,其結果若以GLS模式、ICC 綜合指標模式與PZ模式估計權益資金成本,本研究發現,公司治理品質與權益資金成本之關係不顯著。
(三)關於以公司所屬產業之景氣循環階段衡量實質選擇權之型態,本研究發現,在產業景氣循環成長階段,資訊透明度(公司治理品質)較佳之公司,其在GLS模式、ICC 綜合指標模式與PZ模式下衡量的權益資金成本高於同產業資訊透明度(公司治理品質)較差之公司;在產業景氣循環縮減階段,資訊透明度(公司治理品質)較佳之公司,其在GLS模式、ICC 綜合指標模式與PZ模式衡量的權益資金成本低於同產業資訊透明度(公司治理品質)較差之公司。
整體而言,資訊透明度較佳之公司相較於資訊透明度較差之公司,其權益資金成本較低,但公司治理品質與權益資金成本之關係則不顯著。而本研究以公司所屬產業之景氣循環階段衡量實質選擇權之型態,其結果與本研究推論一致。

This thesis examines the effect of information transparency and corporate governance strength on cost of equity capital, respectively. In addition, this study examines whether the relationship between company's industry business cycle and type of real option is affected by information transparency (corporate governance). This study post that during periods with abundant investment options, defined as booms, the company with stronger information transparency (corporate governance) has more growth option. Therefore, if company's industry is in economic growth, companies with stronger information transparency (corporate governance) have lower cost of equity capital. On the contrary, during periods with scarce investment options but ample divestiture options, defined as busts, companies with stronger information transparency (corporate governance) have more divestiture options. Therefore, if company's industry is in economic divestiture, companies in the same industry with stronger information transparency (corporate governance) have lower cost of equity capital than those with weaker information transparency (corporate governance).
This study measure information transparency based on the Securities and Futures Institute set up “Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System” proxied by scores in 2006~2014. This study also measures corporate governance based on the Securities and Futures Institute set up “Corporate Governance Evaluation System” proxied by scores in 2014~2017. The cost of equity capital is measured by the implied cost of equity capital (Gebhardt et al. 2001(GLS);Claus and Thomas 2001(CT);Gordon and Gordon 1997(GG)) and the model developed by Penman and Zhu (2017) (PZ model), while the implied cost of equity capital includes the GLS model. The empirical results are summarized as follows.
1.Regarding the relationship between information transparency and the cost of equity capital, if the cost of equity capital is measured by GLS model and ICC comprehensive model (the average of GLS model, CT model and GG model), this study finds that companies with stronger information transparency have lower cost of equity than companies with weaker information transparency. However, if using PZ model to estimated cost of equity, the result is reversed.
2.Regarding the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity capital, if the cost of equity capital is measured by GLS, PZ and ICC comprehensive model, this study found that the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity capital is not significant.
3.Regarding the relationship between company's industry business cycle and type of real option, this study found that in the same industry companies with stronger information transparency (corporate governance) have higher cost of equity capital, under GLS, PZ and ICC comprehensive model, than those with weaker information transparency (corporate governance) during boom. And in the same industry companies with stronger information transparency (corporate governance) have lower cost of equity capital, under GLS, PZ and ICC comprehensive model, than those with weaker information transparency (corporate governance) during bust.
In general, companies with stronger information transparency have lower cost of equity than weaker with weaker information transparency. However, the relationship between corporate governance and cost of equity capital is not significant. In this study, regarding the relationship between company's industry business cycle and type of real option, the results are consistent with the inference.
目錄
頁次
第一章 緒論-----------------------------------1
第一節 研究動機-----------------------------------1
第二節 研究目的-----------------------------------8
第三節 論文架構-----------------------------------10
第二章 文獻探討-----------------------------------11
第一節 台灣公司治理評鑑與資訊揭露評鑑-----------------------------------11
第二節 資訊透明度與權益資金成本之關係-----------------------------------17
第三節 公司治理品質與權益資金成本之關係-----------------------------------20
第三章 研究設計-----------------------------------23
第一節 研究假說之發展-----------------------------------23
第二節 變數衡量-----------------------------------30
第三節 模型之建立-----------------------------------42
第四節 樣本選取-----------------------------------48
第四章 實證結果與分析-----------------------------------51
第一節 敘述統計量-----------------------------------51
第二節 單變量分析-----------------------------------56
第三節 多元迴歸分析-----------------------------------61
第四節 敏感性分析-----------------------------------74
第五章 結論-----------------------------------97
第一節 研究結果之彙總-----------------------------------97
第二節 研究限制-----------------------------------99
參考文獻-----------------------------------100


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