臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在全球經濟變化快速的時代，研發與創新成功已成為企業為獲取利潤、取得競爭優勢的來源。經理人必需使公司處於競爭優勢及有效配置企業資源，透過不斷的創新來穩定市場地位，進而創造企業價值達到永續經營的願景。依據高層梯隊理論(upper-echelons theory)說明，高層經理人的特質會影響公司的決策與營運成果。根據資源配置理論(resource allocation theory)，在有限的資源配置下，企業必須妥善分配所持有的資源，為公司創造價值。在代理理論(agency theory)下，經理人為了自利，可能選擇放棄高風險的投資活動。然創新投資是否成功為企業創新成長的關鍵，尤其對資訊變化快速的電子業。本研究以台灣2010年至2017年度上市上櫃電子產業為研究樣本，探討經理人能力與公司創新投資、創新成功、創新價值之關係，得以驗證高能力經理人對公司重大營運決策與成果之影響。
本研究實證結果發現，高能力經理人對研發投資、取得專利權數無顯著關係。但在公司所關注的市場價值上有顯著正相關，亦即經理人能力越高，公司創新價值越高。高能力經理人不在追求多的專利權數，而是能使創新投資所投入的研發費用產出較優質的專利權，使公司產品在市場上能得到較佳的評價及好的績效，且為公司產出更高的創新價值。

In the global economy rapidly changing age, the success of R&D and innovation has become a source of profit for the company and a competitive advantage. Managers must position the company to be competitive and effectively allocate corporate resources, stabilize market position through continuous innovation, and then create a vision of corporate value to achieve sustainable business. According to the upper-echelons theory, the characteristics of top managers affect the company's decision-making and operational outcomes. According to resource allocation theory, under limited resource allocation, companies must properly allocate their resources to create value for the company. Under agency theory, managers may choose to abandon high-risk investment activities for self-interest. Whether innovation investment is the key to innovation and growth of the company, especially for the electronics industry with rapid information changes. This study takes Taiwan's 2010-2017 listed on the electronics industry as a research sample, explores the relationship between manager's ability and innovation investment, innovation success and innovation value, and verifies the impact of high-capacity managers on the company's major operational decisions and results.
The empirical results of this study found that high-capacity managers have no significant relationship with R&D investment and patent rights. However, there is a significant positive correlation between the market value of the company's concern, that is, the higher manager's ability, the higher the company's innovation value. The higher ability managers are not pursuing more patents, but can make the RD expenses invested by innovative investment produce higher-quality patent rights, so that the company's products can get better evaluation and good performance in the market,bringing higher innovation value to the company.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的與貢獻 2
第三節 研究架構 3
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 5
第一節 經理人與公司決策 5
第二節 經理人與公司創新 6
第三節 研究假說 7
第三章 研究方法 8
第一節 資料包絡分析法 8
第二節 經理人能力之衡量 9
第三節 創新成功與創新價值之衡量 12
第四章 實證分析 17
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源 17
第二節 實證結果 21
第五章 敏感性分析 41
第六章 結論與建議 49
第一節 研究結論 49
第二節 研究限制與建議 50
參考文獻 51

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