跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(44.201.97.138) 您好!臺灣時間:2024/09/09 10:11
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:江宛玲
研究生(外文):Wan-LingChiang
論文名稱:兩岸航空貨運主要航空公司間競爭分析—以台北-上海航線為例
論文名稱(外文):Competition Analysis among Major Air Carriers in Cross-Strait Airfreight Market: The case of Taipei-Shanghai route
指導教授:沈宗緯沈宗緯引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chung-Wei Shen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立成功大學
系所名稱:交通管理科學系
學門:運輸服務學門
學類:運輸管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:107
語文別:中文
論文頁數:67
中文關鍵詞:兩岸航線航空公司競爭賽局理論航空貨運
外文關鍵詞:Cross-straitAirlines competitionGame theoryAirfreight
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:170
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本研究為探討兩岸航空公司在運價管制下的航空貨運競爭行為,近年來由於電子資訊產品占兩岸貿易比重日益增加,促使航空貨運往來日益熱絡,由於海峽兩岸特殊環境下,班次及運價是影響航空貨運之重要因素,將採取實際數據應用於市場競爭分析中。
本研究之目的主要有二項,一、針對具有運價及班次上限的寡占航空貨運市場,分析運價及班次變化對於航空貨運公司個別營收或對航線整體營收之影響,進而瞭解對於航空貨運業者的可能衝擊及因應之道,二、希望協助政府作為兩岸航線未來管理及營運策略參考,同時達到航空貨運永續發展的願景及滿足市場需求的航線班次,以獲得航空公司各自利潤最大化。
羅吉特模式(Logit Model)適合分析業主運具的挑選行為,且此項方法已被廣泛應用於多項研究中,本論文為計算效用函數,第一步驟為「航空公司選擇模式」,接著針對航空公司的成本與飛行班次數而建立「成本關係式」,最後將「單航線航空公司間競爭模式」作為競爭分析模型,將航空公司的收入扣除成本而獲得最大利潤。
藉由各項情境結果,本研究藉由情境結果設計四種情境,進行敏感度分析及情境分析,分析不同係數如何影響均衡運價與班次,其中以兩種情境可將航空公司維持原有之利潤甚至獲得更多利潤,情境1為班次減少、運價不變時,各家航空公司可以獲得更多利潤;情境3班次略微減少、運價降低時,也能保持各家公司原有之預設值的利潤,從中分析航空公司的運價與班次數變動對航線市場所造成的影響,可讓政府作為未來價格及班次規劃的調整。
This study aims to market competition among air carriers under cross-strait airfreight freight rates regulations. In recent years, the increasing proportion of cross-strait trade in electronic products, air cargo has become increasingly popular. Due to the special environment of cross-strait, service frequency and freight rates are important factors affecting air cargo. This study will be applied to actual data in market competition analysis.
The two main purposes of this research are: One, to against the market environment under Cross-Strait Airfreight Regulations and to analyze the impact of freight rates and frequencies of service changes on airline revenues. And then we could understand the possible impacts and responses to the airfreight. Two, to optimize the application of Cross-Strait Airfreight Regulations in order to achieve both a sustainable aviation market and a flight schedule that meets the market’s need. The airlines would make the maximum profit.
Review literature focusing on Logit Model is a suitable method for discussing Consignors' Mode Choice Behavior and has been widely used. First of all, we discuss the Consignors' Mode Choice Behavior in the transportation market. Then, the cost relation is established for the cost of the airline and the frequencies of service. Finally, the Market Competition Model among single-route is used as a competitive analysis model. The airline's income minus the cost and then we could get the maximum profit.
Through various scenarios results, this study designs four scenarios and uses the original preset results to find Outliers equilibrium results. Analysis of the changes in freight rates and frequencies of service. And then we could find that the two scenarios are the ideal state of this study. In the case of scenario 1, when the number of service frequencies is reduced and the freight rates are maintained, each airline can obtain more profits. If we choose scenario 3, when the frequencies of service are slightly reduced and the freight rates are reduced, we could maintain the original preset profit of each company. From this, it analyzes the impact of airline freight rates and frequencies of service on the route market. The government can be used as an adjustment to future Airfreight regulations.
誌謝 vi
目錄 vii
表目錄 ix
圖目錄 x
符號說明 xi
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 5
1.3 研究流程 6
1.4 研究內容 7
第二章 文獻回顧 9
2.1 市場競爭下之策略規劃 9
2.1.1 航空自由化-開放與管制的市場 9
2.1.2 航空公司競爭行為相關研究及資料 9
2.2 賽局理論簡介及應用 13
2.2.1 賽局理論之基本概念 13
2.2.2 納許均衡Nash equilibrium 15
2.2.3 航空公司運輸業應用賽局理論之相關研究 15
2.2.4 賽局於本研究之運用 17
2.3 兩岸航線貨運相關沿革及資料 20
2.4 小結 23
第三章 研究方法 24
3.1 運具選擇行為 24
3.2 單航線之航空公司間競爭模式 28
3.3 小結 32
第四章 實例應用與分析 33
4.1 現況之均衡分析 33
4.2 參數敏感度與假設情境分析 41
4.3 綜合分析 53
第五章 結論與建議 57
5.1 結論 57
5.2 建議 59
參考文獻 60
附錄1台北至大陸主要城市公告運價 64
附錄2桃園機場兩岸貨量2016年全年資料 65
附錄3 燃油附加費調整通知 66
附錄4桃園到上海的客貨運班機時刻表 67
參考文獻
1.謝淑貞,賽局理論,初版,雙葉書廊,台北,民國84年。
2.陳建良譯 ,賽局理論,初版,台北:智勝文化事業有限公司,民國95年。
3.民航運輸統計,交通部民用航空局,民國106年。
4.彭美珠 (2000),「海運複合運輸公司提供快速運送之服務策略與市場分析」,國立交通大學運輸工程與管理研究所碩士論文。
5.張孟竹 (2003),「海運託運人選擇航商之敘述偏好模式研究」,長榮大學經營管理研究所碩士論文。
6.馮正民、邱裕鈞(2004),研究分析方法,新竹市:建都文化事業股份有限公司。
7.徐業良(2005),「第四章最佳化條件與擴展的單調性原則」,元智大學機械工程研究所課程教材。
8.陳國元(2007),「不同貨主海空運選擇模式之研究」,國立高雄海洋科技大學航運管理研究所碩士論文。
9.蕭國洲(2011),「國際航空貨運業在亞洲市場競爭模式之構建」,國立交通大學交通運輸研究所博士論文。
10.許弘毅(2012),「在價格管制下國內航空公司之競爭行為分析」,國立交通大學交通運輸研究所碩士論文。
11.李榕芳、邱裕鈞(2014),「考量航空公司競爭行為之國內航線運價管制策略」,運輸計劃季刊,第四十三卷第二期,頁265-291。
12.湯慶輝、管炳學(2014),「考量競爭行為下航空公司班表規劃之研究」,運輸學刊,第二十六卷第二期,頁173-202。
13.黃靖軺、嚴力行、葉博榮(2015),「以賽局理論設計MANET最大獨立集合自我穩定協定」,理工研究國際期刊,第五卷第一期,頁1-10。
14.陳以宸(2016),「航空公司貨運聯盟之航網規劃」,淡江大學運輸管理學系運輸科學碩士班碩士論文。
15.Alder, N. (2001), “Competition in a deregulated air transportation market, European Journal of Operation Research, Vol. 129, pp. 337-345.
16.Ben-Akiva, M. and Lerman, S. (1985), “Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and Application to Travel Demand, The MIT Press, Boston.
17.Boeing Current Market Outlook 2016-2035.,Boeing,2016
18.Dobson, G. and Lederer, J. P. (1993), “Airline Scheduling and Routing in a Hub-and-Spoke System, Transportation Science, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 281-297.
19.Encaoua, D., Moreaux, M., and Perrot, A. (1990), “Compatibility and competition in airlines demand side network effects, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 14, pp. 701-726.
20.Hansen, M. (1990), “Airline competition in a hub-dominated environment: an application of non-cooperative game theory, Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Vol. 24 (1), pp. 27-43.
21.Hong, S. and Harker, P.T. (1992), “Air traffic network equilibrium: toward frequency, price and slot priority analysis, Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Vol. 26 (4), pp. 307-323.
22.Hsu, C.I, Liao, P., Yang, L.H. and Chen, Y.H. (2005), “High-Tech Firms’ Perception and Demand for Air Cargo Logistics Services, Journal of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 2868-2880.
23.Hsu, C.I., Li, H.C., Liao, P., and Hansen, M.H. (2009), “Responses of air cargo carriers to industrial changes, Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol. 15(6), pp. 330-336.
24.Hwang, C.C. and Shiao, G.C. (2010), “The Competition of Combination and All-cargo Airlines in a Deregulated General Air Cargo Market, Journal of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies, Vol. 8, pp. 2211-2226.
25.Karush, W. (1939), “Minimum of Functions of Several Variables with Inequalities as Side Conditions, Traces and Emergence of Nonlinear Programming, pp. 217-245.
26.Kuhn, H. W. and Tucker, A. W. (1951), “Nonlinear Programming. In Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, pp. 481-492.
27.Nash, J. (1951) , “Non-Cooperative Game, Annuls of Mathematics, Vol. 54, pp. 286-295
28.Oum, T. H. and Yu, C. (1998), “Cost competitiveness of major airlines: an international comparison, Transportation Research A: Policy and Practice, Vol. 32(6), pp. 407-422.
29.Reis, V. and Silva, J. (2016), “Assessing the air cargo business models of combination airlines, Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol. 57, pp. 250-259.
30.Strang, G. (1980), “Linear Algebra and Its Applications (2nd ed.), Academic Press, New York.
31.Sheffi, Y. (1985), “Urban Transportation Networks: Equilibrium Analysis with Mathematical Programming Methods, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
32.Shyr, O.F. and Lee, Y.L. (2005), “Pricing and scheduling strategies for air cargo carriers: a non-cooperative game approach, Proceedings of the 16th Mini - EURO Conference and 10th Meeting of EWGT, pp. 76-81.
33.Schipper et al. (2007), “Deregulation and welfare in airline markets: An analysis of frequency equilibria, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 178, pp. 194-206.
34.Shiao, G. C. and Hwang, C. C. (2013), “Analyzing competition of international air cargo carriers in the Asian general air cargo markets, Transport Policy, Vol. 27, pp. 164-170.
35.Takebayashi, M. and Kanafani, A. (2005), “Network Competition in air transportation Markets: Bi-level Approach, Research in Transportation Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 101-119.
36.Wei, W. and Hansen, M. (2007), “Airlines’ competition in aircraft size and service frequency in duopoly markets, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Vol. 43 (4), pp. 409-424.
37.Zito, P., Salvo, G. and Franca, L. L. (2011), “Modelling Airlines Competition on Fares and Frequencies of Service by Bi-level Optimization, Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 20, pp.1080-1089.
38.Zhang, A. and Zhang, Y. (2002a), “A model of air cargo liberalization: passenger vs. all cargo carriers, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Vol. 38 (3-4), pp. 175-191.
39.Zhang, A. and Zhang, Y. (2002b), “Issues on liberalization of air cargo services in international aviation, Journal of Air Transport Management, Vol. 8, pp. 275-287.
40.Zhang, A., Lang, C., Hui, Y.V. and Leung, L. (2007), “Intermodal alliance and rivalry of transport chains: the air cargo market, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review ,Vol. 43 (3), pp. 234-246
41.交通部民用航空局,https://www.caa.gov.tw/big5/index.asp
42.長榮航空公司,https://www.evaair.com/zh-tw/index.html#
43.中華航空公司,https://www.china-airlines.com/tw/zh/#
44.中國國際航空公司,https://www.airchina.com.tw/
45.中國貨運航空公司,https://www.ckair.com/index.html
46.中國東方航空公司,https://tw.ceair.com/hk/
47.桃園國際機場,https://www.taoyuan-airport.com/chinese
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
無相關期刊