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研究生:楊舒涵
研究生(外文):Shu-Han Yang
論文名稱:中國上市公司獨立董事的政治連結、資本結構與公司績效關係之探討
論文名稱(外文):Politically connected independent directors, capital structure and corporate performance of Chinese listed firms
指導教授:洪榮華洪榮華引用關係
指導教授(外文):Jung-Hua Hung
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中央大學
系所名稱:企業管理學系在職專班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:107
語文別:中文
論文頁數:48
中文關鍵詞:獨立董事的政治連結資本結構公司績效
外文關鍵詞:politically connected independent directorscapital structurecorporate performance
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本文研究目的為探討獨立董事的政治連結、資本結構與公司績效之間的關係,以 2008年到 2016年股票市場的中國上市公司作為研究對象,取樣 11,294個觀察值,並將上市公司分為中央政府控制國有企業、地方政府控制國有企業以及非國有企業。本研究採用Panel data analysis 驗證假說。實證研究發現,國有企業引進獨立董事的政治連結對公司績效具有負面影響,而非國有企業引進獨立董事的政治連結對公司績效與資本結構皆具有正面影響,但無論國有企與非國有企業皆未發現資本結構對獨立董事的政治連結與公司績效的關係具有調節效果。
This study examines the relationship among political connection of independent directors, capital structure and corporate performance. Utilizing panel data analysis and a sample with 11,294 observations from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges of China for the period of 2008–2016, this study investigates whether this relationship is different among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the central government and those controlled by local governments as well as non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs). The empirical results show that the political connection of independent directors in SOEs has a negative impact on corporate performance. However, this impact is positive for Non-SOEs. Furthermore, capital structure has no moderating effect on the relationship between political connection of independent directors and corporate performance for both SOEs and Non-SOEs.
中文摘要 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… i
英文摘要 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ii
目錄 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………iii
圖目錄 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… iv
表目錄 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… iv
第一章 緒論………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1
1-1 研究動機與目的………………………………………………………………………………………… 1
1-2 研究架構與流程………………………………………………………………………………………… 2
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立………………………………………………………………………………… 4
2-1 獨立董事的政治連結與公司績效之關係………………………………………… 4
2-2 獨立董事的政治連結與資本結構之關係………………………………………… 7
2-3 資本結構對獨立董事政治連結與公司績效之關係的影響……… 8
第三章 研究方法………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11
3-1 資料來源及樣本篩選………………………………………………………………………………… 11
3-2 研究模型………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 11
3-3 研究方法………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18
第四章 實證結果與分析………………………………………………………………………………………… 18
4-1 敘述性統計分析及相關性分析…………………………………………………………… 18
4-2 多變量分析…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23
4-3 穩健性回歸分析………………………………………………………………………………………… 29
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 33
5-1 研究結論………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 33
5-2 研究限制與建議………………………………………………………………………………………… 34
參考文獻 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 35
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