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研究生:田育瑄
研究生(外文):TIEN,YU-HSUAN
論文名稱:政治關聯對創新投入影響
論文名稱(外文):The influence of political connections on innovation investments
指導教授:翁鶯娟翁鶯娟引用關係
指導教授(外文):WONG,YING-JYUAN
口試委員:李振宇王崇昱翁鶯娟
口試委員(外文):LI,JHEN-YUWANG,CHONG-YUWONG,YING-JYUAN
口試日期:2019-06-08
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄科技大學
系所名稱:企業管理系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:107
語文別:中文
論文頁數:44
中文關鍵詞:研發投入政治關聯過度自信股權集中度
外文關鍵詞:Innovation InvestmentPolitical ConnectionOverconfidenceOwnership Concentration
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對於企業來說,技術創新能力是企業的核心競爭力,對企業的成長和發展至關重要,研發投資是提高技術創新能力的關鍵因素,因此研發投入決策是創新企業中最重要的決策之一。而提升企業創新能力的關鍵因素,除了公司或領導者特性外,公司對外關係例如政治連結也是影響公司創新投入重要因素,故本研究探討企業與政府所建立之密切關係如何影響創新。
研發投資對於科技產業來說至關重要,因此本研究以本研究以2007-2016年台灣上市高科技公司為樣本,利用迴歸分析來探討政治關聯對企業創新之影響,並進一步探討CEO過度自信與股權集中度如何干擾政治關聯對企業創新的影響。研究實證結果顯示,政治關聯對企業創新投入為負向影響,亦即若政治關聯越高,對創新投入的負向影響越大,而CEO過度自信則可減緩政治關聯對企業創新投入的負向影響,股權集中度則無顯著干擾效果。
關鍵字:研發投入、政治關聯、過度自信、股權集中度

Technological innovation capability is an important core competitiveness of a company, which helps a firm to pursuit its future growth and prospect. R&D investment is a key factor to enhance a firm’s technological innovation capability. Therefore, R&D investment is one of the most important decisions in innovative enterprises. The key factors to enhance a company's innovative ability are not only technological breakthroughs, or leadership style of business leaders but also the relationship between the government and a firm.
This study thus investigates how political connections between a company and the government affect a firm’s innovation investments. In addition, CEO characteristics and a firm’s ownership structure have critical effects on a firm’s innovation investments. This study further examines how an overconfident CEO and ownership concentration of a firm influence the relationship stated above.

This study examines the hypotheses by using a sample set of Taiwan-listed high-tech companies from 2007 to 2016, and adopts multiple regression analysis to explore the influence of political connections on innovation investments. Political connections are measured by the numbers of founders, boards of directors, and managers who have held the positions in government agencies, or join political parties. R&D is crucial innovation investments in high-tech industries. Therefore, this study uses the research and development expense ratio as a proxy of innovation investment. The empirical results show that political connections have a negative impact on innovation investments. That is, the higher the political connection, the lower the R&D investment. Furthermore, CEO overconfidence mitigates the negative impact of political connections on R&D investment. While ownership concentration did not have a moderating effect on the negative relationship between political connections and innovation investment.
Key Words:Innovation Investment、Political Connection、Overconfidence、Ownership Concentration

目錄
中文摘要 ......................................................... i
英文摘要 ........................................................ ii
誌謝 ........................................................... iii
目錄 ............................................................ iv
表目錄 ........................................................... v
圖目錄 .......................................................... vi
第一章 緒論 ...................................................... 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 ...................................... 1
第二節 研究目的 ............................................ 4
第三節 研究流程 ............................................ 5
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 ........................................ 6
第三章 研究設計與方法 ........................................... 18
第一節 研究架構 ........................................... 18
第二節 研究樣本、研究對象及資料來源 ....................... 19
第三節 研究變數定義與衡量 ................................. 19
第四章 實證結果 ................................................. 23
第五章 結論與建議 ............................................... 27
第一節 研究結論 ........................................... 27
第二節 研究貢獻與管理意涵 ................................. 29
第三節 研究限制與建議 ..................................... 31
參考文獻 ........................................................ 33
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