臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　本研究以2008年至2017年國內上市上櫃公司為研究對象，主要探討公司投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險與企業風險的關係，本研究以整年度的日報酬標準差作為企業風險的代理變數，進一步分析產品市場競爭程度是否影響董監責任險與企業風險兩者之間的關係。研究發現當公司投保董監責任險時，公司的管理階層將會採取較不保守的公司政策，提高公司的風險承擔，進而增加企業風險，顯示公司投保董監責任險會為公司帶來管理機會主義。重要的是，產品市場競爭程度能減緩董監責任險與企業風險之間的正向關係，說明當公司所在的產品市場競爭程度愈高，其能降低公司投保董監責任險所衍生的管理機會主義，而能減少代理衝突。本研究結果能夠提供國內上市櫃公司投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險，並作為有效管理公司治理機制的參考。

　　This thesis mainly explores the relationship between the insured directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) and firm risk, and takes the annual standard deviation of daily stock return as the proxy variable of firm risk, and it examines whether the product market competition affects the relationship between the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and firm risk. The sample includes the listed companies from 2008 to 2017 in Taiwan. The empirical results find that the company with directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, the managers will adopt less conservative company policies to increase risk-taking behavior and firm risk, indicating D&O insurance will bring the managerial opportunism. Importantly, the product market competition can reduce the positive relationship between D&O insurance and firm risk. The firms with higher market competition have lower managerial opportunism due to D&O insurance and less agency conflicts. The results can provide the public listed companies with D&O insurance as the reference of the effective governance mechanism.

摘 要 i
ABSTRACT ii
致謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第貳章 文獻探討 4
第一節 董監事暨重要職員責任保險 4
第二節 企業風險 11
第三節 產品市場競爭程度 14
第四節 研究假說 16
第參章 研究設計 18
第一節 研究樣本與資料來源 18
第二節 變數的定義與衡量 22
第三節 實證模型 25
第肆章 實證結果分析 28
第一節 描述統計分析 28
第二節 D&O 保險與企業風險之關係 36
第三節 產品市場競爭程度對 D&O 保險與企業風險兩者關係之影響 42
第四節 穩健性分析 45
第伍章 研究結論與建議 55
第一節 研究結果 55
第二節 結論與建議 56
參考文獻 57

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