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研究生:曾瀞儀
研究生(外文):Chin-Yi Tseng
論文名稱:公司治理評鑑結果與關鍵查核事項關係之研究
論文名稱(外文):Research on the Relationship between Corporate Governance Evaluation Results and Key Audit Matters
指導教授:劉若蘭劉若蘭引用關係
指導教授(外文):Jo-Lan Liu
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺中科技大學
系所名稱:會計資訊系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:107
語文別:中文
論文頁數:33
中文關鍵詞:公司治理評鑑關鍵查核事項無形資產減損
外文關鍵詞:corporate governance evaluationkey audit mattersintangible assets impairment
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:6
  • 點閱點閱:246
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
本研究主要探討公司治理評鑑結果與關鍵查核事項揭露之關聯性,選取2016-2017年的上市櫃公司,以有列入「公司治理評鑑系統」的受查公司為研究對象,分析公司治理評鑑良窳是否會影響會計師提及關鍵查核事項的內容項次的數目,以及關鍵查核事項的類型。實證結果發現公司治理評鑑等級愈高者,會計師於年度查核報告中提及關鍵查核事項的內容項次數目會愈少,提及關鍵查核事項的總字數也相對較少。再者,公司治理評鑑等級愈高,會計師將無形資產減損認為是本期最為重要的查核項目之一的機會亦較低。本研究證據支持公司治理評鑑結果可以做為會計師執行查核工作與訂定查核風險的參考依據。
This study examines the relationship between the corporate governance evaluation results and the audit report with the number of the communicate firms’ key audit matters (KAMs) items. I use sample of firms listed on the “Corporate Governance Evaluation System” for the 2016-2017 period to investigate whether the level of corporate governance evaluation could affect the number of the communicating KAMs items. The results show that the higher level of corporate governance evaluation, the CPAs disclosure the less items/words that addressed in the KAMs paragraphs. Moreover, there is a lower likelihood of intangible assets impairments that addressed in the KAMs paragraphs if firm has better grade of corporate governance assessment. The empirical results support the level of corporate governance evaluation can be used as a reference for performing audit work and doing audit risk judgement by the CPAs.
摘要 i
目次 iii
圖目次 v
表目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究流程 3
第二章 文獻探討 4
第一節 公司治理評鑑制度 4
第二節 公司治理評鑑與關鍵查核事項 8
第三章 研究方法 12
第一節 研究期間、樣本蒐集與來源 12
第二節 實證模型之建立 14
第三節 變數說明 15
第四章 實證結果分析 19
第一節 敘述性統計 19
第二節 相關係數分析 21
第三節 實證結果分析 23
第四節 額外測試 26
第五章 結論與建議 28
第一節 結論 28
第二節 研究限制與未來研究建議 28
參考文獻 29
一、中文文獻 29
二、英文文獻 31
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