本文旨在探索威權國家中，分配衝突形成個人式威權的過程，以及透過跨國資料驗證分配衝突對個人式威權的影響。在理論上從童涵浦老師的威權制度替代性假設出發，當威權政治菁英其他條件不變情況下，若面對社會的革命威脅升高時，會選擇予以社會攏絡制度投資來減少社會革命的推翻風險，然而，獨裁者面對政治菁英的權力分享因此而減少，使得威權政體往個人式威權的方向移動。本文近一步實證的解釋「社會流動」與「經濟不平等」這兩個分配衝突的來源，對個人式威權的影響，使用1980-2010年104個威權國家的時間序列橫斷面資料，結果顯示，社會流動相較於經濟不平等，對政體個人式威權影響較大，其中社會流動程度對個人式威權分數有負向影響，而當經濟不平等程度很高且社會流動程度很低時，會影響個人式威權分數升高，經濟不平等不會單獨影響個人式威權的升高。

There is a paucity of literature regarding personalism and redistributive conflict in dictatorships. This paper explores the possible link between redistributive conflict and personalism in dictatorships. Specifically, based on SAI hypothesis (Tung, 2017), dictators invest in social co-optation institutions would squeeze power-sharing institutional investments. When redistributive conflict increase, dictators invest in social co-opting institutions by undermining the investment in power-sharing institutions, that is, regimes become more personalist. Empirically, I posit that social mobility increase the level of personalism and the effects of inequality is conditional on low social mobility level. Based on a number of statistical models, the empirical evidences support social mobility increase the level of personalism. On the other hand, high inequality and low social mobility together increase the level of personalism. Taken together, the results can be interpreted as inequality doesn''t present revolutionary threat to dictators but social mobility from the disenfranchised does, redistributive conflict as a source of personalism in dictatorships.

目 錄 1
圖表目次 3
第一章 緒論 5
第一節 研究動機 5
第二節 研究問題與研究目的 6
第二章 文獻回顧 9
第一節 制度變遷理論 9
第二節 威權制度及其變遷 11
第三節 分配衝突與民主化 16
第三章 研究架構 23
第一節 分配衝突與威權制度變遷 24
第四章 研究設計 29
第一節 資料的測量 29
第五章 研究結果 35
第一節 主要模型 35
第二節 穩健度檢查 39
第六章 結論 43
參考文獻 45
附錄一　社會流動指標使用問題 55
附錄二　國家歷年表 56
附錄三　敘述性統計 58

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