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研究生:李彥彤
研究生(外文):Yen-Tung Lee
論文名稱:身體擁有感的跨領域研究
論文名稱(外文):An Interdisciplinary Study of Body Ownership
指導教授:梁益堉梁益堉引用關係
指導教授(外文):Caleb Liang
口試委員:嚴如玉林映彤
口試委員(外文):Karen YanYing-Tung Lin
口試日期:2018-07-09
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:哲學研究所
學門:人文學門
學類:哲學學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:107
語文別:中文
論文頁數:84
中文關鍵詞:身體擁有感身體覺察前反思自我意識身體防衛假說前反思情動理論
DOI:10.6342/NTU201900067
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身體擁有感(the sense of body ownership)作為一種將身體感受為屬於自己的主觀經驗,是意識哲學與認知科學的重要議題。藉由大量經驗研究構築而成的模型,科學家們對於身體擁有感在心智運作的表現方式已有相當顯著的進展。然而身體擁有感到底是什麼、是否承認它的形上學地位,哲學家們至今仍爭論不休。膨脹論者(Inflationists)將身體擁有感視作不可被化約的主觀經驗內容。而緊縮論者(Deflationists)否認這種看法,認為身體擁有感可被化約為其他種類的身體經驗、或僅僅只是認知判斷的結果而已。本論文聚焦於這個爭論。第一章討論本論文關心的研究議題與使用的研究方法。在第二章,筆者論證緊縮論面臨的困難。筆者針對三個主流的緊縮論版本分別論證以駁斥:第一,三個版本的緊縮論內部各有不能被接受的前提使其結論無法成立。第二,緊縮論無法解釋關於身體擁有感的多面向的主觀現象。筆者討論數個關於身體擁有感的經典研究,並論證緊縮論無法解釋這些研究中經驗主體關於身體擁有感的錯誤表徵,進而駁斥所有版本的緊縮論。第三章將討論膨脹論及其限制。以「前反思意識理論」與「身體防衛假說」為代表,兩個理論對於身體擁有感的刻劃較緊縮論恰當。然而,該二理論在面對關於身體擁有感多面向的經驗研究可解釋範圍亦有不足。在第四章筆者提出新版本的膨脹論:「前反思情動理論」。此理論解決「前反思意識理論」無法建立關於身體的「我的」的困難,以及修正「身體防衛假說」無法解釋關於第三人稱身體擁有感現象的問題。透過增補及結合兩個舊有理論,此一新版本的理論將能夠更全面的理論來刻劃身體擁有感。
The sense of body ownership is a subjective feeling that one experiences a body as one’s own. Its nature is one of controversial issues in philosophy and cognitive science. Although scientists have developed several models to explain the relevant phenome-nology, what exactly is such experience remains unsolved. The center of debate lies in the inquiry on whether there is a positive feeling, a.k.a. quale, of body ownership un-derlying the relevant phenomenology. The philosophers holding inflationist conception consider the sense of body ownership as an irreducible experiential component, where-as the deflationists deny this view and contend that the sense of body ownership can be reduced to either fundamental bodily awareness or cognitive judgments. This thesis deals with this debate. In chapter 1, I will introduce the issue and the methodology. In chapter 2, I will argue against deflationism. I will analyze M. G. F. Martin’s, J. L. Bermúdez’s, and A. Alsmith’s deflationist arguments, respectively. I will then argue that neither succeeds to conclude that no sense of body ownership exists. Moreover, ever if the deflationist arguments were true, they could not explain the diverse phe-nomenology revealed by the empirical studies. Then, in chapter 3, I will examine two inflationist views on body ownership, the pre-reflective view and the bodyguard hy-pothesis. I argue that this party is better addressing the issue, though some anomalies may challenge them. The pre-reflective view correctly analyzes the constitution of phenomenal experience, but it fails to apply the constitutive component –the myness– to the bodily self-awareness. The bodyguard hypothesis successfully characterizes the nature of the sense of body ownership. However, it is limited when accommodating relevant phenomenology. In chapter 4, I will propose my own view, based on these two inflationist views mentioned in chapter 3. By combining, revising, and augmenting them, the new account, the Pre-reflective Affective Account, can best characterize the sense of body ownership and accommodate comprehensively the relevant phenome-nology. I will argue that this new account can not only provide perfect answer to the nature of the sense of body ownership, but also help examine its relationship with self-awareness. Therefore, it is appropriate for the sense of body ownership to be con-sidered as an irreducible experiential component. Inflationist views of the sense of body ownership is more successful.
目錄
口試委員會審定書 i
中文摘要 ii
英文摘要 iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 什麼是身體擁有感? 1
第二節 身體經驗的現象學描述 4
第三節 論文架構 6
第二章 身體擁有感的緊縮論及其困難 9
第一節 化約為空間覺察的緊縮論 9
2.1.1. 單一對象觀點 9
2.1.2. 該理論的困難 13
2.1.3. 小結 17
第二節 化約為認知判斷的緊縮論 18
2.2.1.「身體擁有感只是哲學的想像!」 18
2.2.2. 該理論的困難 25
2.2.3. 小結 28
第三節 化約為心理想像的緊縮論 28
2.3.1. 命題式想像 28
2.3.2. 該理論的困難 31
2.3.3. 小結 32
第四節 結論:緊縮論的困難 32
第三章 身體擁有感的膨脹論 35
第一節 前反思自我意識理論 35
3.1.1. 身體擁有感的前反思理論 35
3.1.2. 該理論的限制 41
3.1.3. 小結 42
第二節 作為防衛性感情經驗的身體擁有感 43
3.2.1. 身體防衛假說 43
3.2.2. 該理論的限制 46
3.2.3. 小結 54
第三節 結論:膨脹論的優點與限制 56
第四章 身體擁有感的經驗性基礎 57
第一節 第三人稱觀點的身體擁有感 57
4.1.1. 自我指認 vs. 主觀經驗 57
4.1.2. 雙身體擁有感 62
第二節 前反思情動理論 68
4.2.1. 關於身體的「我的」 68
4.2.2. 擴展至第三人稱身體的擁有感 71
第三節 結論:更全面的身體擁有感理論 75
第五章 結論 77
參考文獻 81
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