在台灣，各個產業都有知名的原始設計製造商（Original Design Manufacturer），其不僅成本低廉、效率高，且技術含量也高，因此獲得許多知名品牌大廠的喜愛，如PC產業的廣達及紡織業的聚陽。ODM研發並製造產品，賣給下游的品牌商，再由品牌商賣給終端顧客。許多ODM會爭取與知名大廠合作的機會，以確保銷售量而犧牲毛利。然而有些ODM則選擇與小廠合作，以獲得較高的毛利。在本研究中存在一個ODM及兩個下游廠商，而ODM欲選擇兩個廠商之一議價並透過該廠商販售其商品。兩廠商中，其中一個廠商為領導廠商，相比於另一廠商擁有較大的市場份額，因此擁有較高的議價能力。我們考量此為一個兩期的賽局，在第一期ODM會與大廠合作，而在第二期ODM會在大廠及小廠之間做選擇，且ODM及廠商在議價時會考量到未來的利潤。因此，本篇論文旨在研究ODM會在第二期如何在大廠與小廠間選擇、除了議價能力跟銷售量外還有哪些因素會影響ODM的選擇，及第二期的選擇又將如何影響第一期ODM與大廠的議價。我們發現，當小廠商的議價能力越高時，對小廠商自身不見得是好事。ODM有可能因小廠商議價能力過高而得到的利潤低於與大廠合作，因而與大廠合作使小廠失去合作機會。此外，我們也發現儘管第二期ODM與大廠合作的額外成本提高，對ODM也不見得是壞事。因為期會將該額外成本轉嫁至大廠身上，進而提高批發價格，因此ODM的總體利潤可能會因為額外成本的提高而提高。

In Taiwan, there are lots of ODMs in the different industries, like MTK in the IC industry and Quanta in the PC industry. They design and manufacture products and sell them to the downstream branded vendors. In the study, we want to capture the interaction between the ODM and the downstream retailers (firms) and find out the optimal retailer selection strategy of the ODM. We assume there are one ODM and two downstream firms in our model and consider the game as a two-period game. In the first period, the ODM collaborates and negotiates with the larger firm but in the second period, the ODM has the choice to switch to the smaller firm. The larger firm is the market leader with a larger market share in the industry, and thus acquires a larger bargaining power compared to the smaller firm. The ODM will consider the trade-off between the bargaining power and the order quantity when selecting firm in the second period. Also, when the ODM negotiates with the bigger firm in the first period, both of them consider the expected profit in the second period. Finally, the study find out that the increase of the bargaining power of the smaller firm is not always beneficial for itself. When bargaining power increases, the ODM more likely stick to the bigger firm in the second period. Thus, the smaller firm may consequently lose the chance to collaborate with the ODM. In addition, although the additional cost that incur when the ODM stick to the larger firm in the second period increases, the total profit of the ODM will probably increase. The ODM tends to transfer the additional cost to wholesale price, and thus increases its total profit.

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Research plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Literature review 5
2.1 Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Supply chain competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Model Setting 12
4 Analysis 19
4.1 Second period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 First period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3 Special Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5 Numerical Study 39
6 Conclusions and future works 48
6.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.2 Future works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
References 51
Appendix A Proofs of lemmas and propositions 54

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