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研究生:黃詩涵
研究生(外文):Shih-Han Huang
論文名稱:獨立董事變動與債務資金成本之關聯性
論文名稱(外文):The Relationship between Independent Directors’ Turnover and Cost of Debt
指導教授:廖珮真廖珮真引用關係
口試委員:林世銘顏如君
口試日期:2019-07-08
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:107
語文別:中文
論文頁數:62
中文關鍵詞:獨立董事變動辭任債務資金成本公司治理
DOI:10.6342/NTU201903127
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本研究以2010年至2017年已設置獨立董事且在臺灣證券交易所或櫃檯買賣中心交易之上市櫃公司為研究樣本,利用普通最小平方法(OLS),探討獨立董事變動對公司債務資金成本之影響。獨立董事變動之情形可分為三類,分別為改選、解任以及辭任,前兩類屬於非主動辭任,而第三類為獨立董事主動要求辭任。本研究在主要實證研究中,探討獨立董事變動與公司債務資金成本之關聯,並於額外測試中,探討投資人對於獨立董事變動之看法,亦即研究獨立董事變動與權益資金成本的關聯性,另外,探討獨立董事變動是否具有遞延效果,亦即是否會影響公司次期債務資金成本。
研究結果顯示,獨立董事主動辭任使公司債務資金成本上升,在資訊不對稱之情況下,債權人因對公司內部真實情形不瞭解而產生不確定性,進而使公司債務資金成本上升,此外,亦發現債權人在接收獨立董事主動辭任之訊息時,會將辭任原因納入考量,進而影響公司債務資金成本。而在探討獨立董事之特質時發現,若變動之獨立董事為女性時,會使公司債務資金成本下降;若主動辭任之獨立董事具有財經會計背景時,會使公司債務資金成本上升,顯示獨立董事變動的類型不同時,債權人在乎的特質亦不相同,因而對公司債務資金成本產生不同的影響。
在額外測試中發現,市場投資人對獨立董事變動以及主動辭任的反應與債權人並不相同,市場投資人較重視更換不適任之獨立董事所帶來之效益,而獨立董事主動辭任所隱含之資訊則對權益資金成本無顯著影響。此外,本研究亦發現,獨立董事主動辭任會影響公司次期債務資金成本,顯示獨立董事主動辭任可能含有公司未來績效惡化之資訊,使得債權人於次期要求較高之借款利率。綜上所述,本研究顯示獨立董事變動會影響債權人對該公司之看法,進而影響公司之債務資金成本。
This thesis takes companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) or Taipei Exchange (TPEx) from 2010 to 2017 as research samples, and uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to explore the impact of changes in independent directors on the cost of debt. The types of changes in independent directors can be divided into three categories, namely re-election, dismissal, and resignation. The first two are passive departures, and the third is voluntary resignation. In the main empirical research, this thesis investigates the relationship between the changes in independent directors and the cost of debt. In additional test, this thesis explores investors’ view on the changes in independent directors, as well as whether the changes in independent directors would have deferred effect, namely whether it would affect the cost of debt in the next period.
The results show that voluntary resignation of independent directors would increase the cost of debt. In the presence of information asymmetry, creditors are uncertain about the true state of the company, which would lead to an increase in the cost of debt. Also, creditors would take into account the reasons for the voluntary resignation of independent directors. Regarding the characteristics of the independent directors, if the independent director is a female, the cost of debt would reduce; if the voluntarily resigned independent director has finance or accounting background, the cost of debt would rise. The results show that the types of changes in independent directors and the characteristics of the independent directors would result in different impacts on the cost of debt.
In additional test, the results show that the investors are more concerned with the benefits brought by replacing the unsuitable independent directors than the information implied by the act of voluntary resignation of independent directors. In addition, voluntary resignation of independent directors would affect the cost of debt in the next period. This result indicates that voluntary resignation of independent directors may imply that the future performance of the company could deteriorate, which could cause creditors to require higher debt interest rates in the next period. In conclusion, the results show that changes in independent directors would affect the views of creditors on the company, which in turn would affect the cost of debt of the company.
口試委員會審定書 i
謝辭 ii
中文摘要 iii
ABSTRACT iv
目錄 vi
表目錄 vii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究貢獻 4
第四節 論文架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧及假說建立 5
第一節 獨立董事 5
第二節 獨立董事變動與債務資金成本 6
第三節 獨立董事特質和債務資金成本 9
第三章 研究方法 13
第一節 樣本選取與分析 13
第二節 實證模型與變數定義 17
第四章 實證結果 27
第一節 敘述性統計 27
第二節 實證結果 37
第三節 額外測試 44
第五章 研究結論及建議 57
第一節 研究結論 57
第二節 研究建議 59
參考文獻 60
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