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研究生:邱顯智
研究生(外文):Hsien-Chih Chiou
論文名稱:幻覺:實在論和超驗觀念論的觀點
論文名稱(外文):Hallucination:Views from Realism and Transcendental Idealism
指導教授:卞拓蒙
指導教授(外文):Thomas Benda
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立陽明大學
系所名稱:心智哲學研究所
學門:人文學門
學類:哲學學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:107
語文別:英文
論文頁數:118
中文關鍵詞:幻覺表徵論關係論選言論超驗觀念論
外文關鍵詞:HallucinationRepresentationalismRelationalismDisjuntivismTranscendental idealism
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依實在論的觀點,我支持,知覺是知覺關係,也有知覺內容的主張。
因為幻覺沒有外部客體,所以幻覺是沒有知覺關係,但幻覺是有知覺內容的。
依不同的內容理論,有不同的幻覺內容的理論,只是幻覺內容是不正確的,或是空式內容。
我主張,依胡塞爾的知覺理論和超驗觀念論,更佳可以說明幻覺現象。
超驗觀念論主張,我們的心靈,構成我們所認知的現實。
我以胡塞爾超驗觀念論對知覺的理論,來說明幻覺現象,並提出幻覺的七個特徵:
一、幻覺狀態是有意向性,亦即,有感覺質料、有意向內容、及意向客體。
二、幻覺狀態,既不是填滿的意向,也不是空的意向。
三、雖然內省下無法區分幻覺和真知覺,但有兩個方法可以用來否證幻覺:跨感官形式之方法、和相互主體性之方法。
四、幻覺的客體,是被投射在外部的。
五、幻覺的客體,是在意識中構成的。
六、幻覺的客體,總是推定的。
七、幻覺的客體,是多樣態中的同一物。
In realism, I agree with the view that perception is both relational and contentful.
There is no external object in hallucination, therefore hallucination is non-relational.
Depending on different theories of content, there are different types of content of hallucination.
Although hallucination is contentful, the content of hallucination is inaccurate, empty or gappy.
I think that Husserl’s theory of perception and his transcendental idealism are the better framework to explain the phenomena of hallucination than realism.
The theses I defend are that (1) the hallucinatory state is intentional;
(2) the hallucinatory state is neither a filled nor empty intention;
(3) there are two ways to falsify the veridicality of hallucination — the method of cross-modality, and the method of inter-subjectivity;
(4) the object of hallucination is projected outside;
(5) the object of hallucination is constituted in consciousness;
(6) the object of hallucination is always presumptive;
and (7) the object of hallucination is an identity in manifolds.
Chinese Abstract ------------------------------------------------------------ i
English Abstract ------------------------------------------------------------ xii
Table of Contents ----------------------------------------------------------- xiii
Introduction ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Chapter 1 Hearing Voices ---------------------------------------------------- 6
1.1 The Daemon of Socrates ------------------------------------------------- 7
1.2 Early Modern Theories of Sense Perception ------------------------------ 8
1.3 Medicalization of Hallucination ---------------------------------------- 11
1.4 The Argument from Hallucination ---------------------------------------- 19
Chapter 2 Philosophy of Perception in Realism ------------------------------- 21
2.1 Sense Datum Theories --------------------------------------------------- 22
2.2 Adverbial Theories ----------------------------------------------------- 23
2.3 Belief Acquisition Theories -------------------------------------------- 23
2.4 Intentional Theories --------------------------------------------------- 24
2.5 Disjunctive Theories --------------------------------------------------- 27
2.6 Some Reflections ------------------------------------------------------- 28
Chapter 3 Husserl’s Phenomenology ------------------------------------------ 30
3.1 Intentionality --------------------------------------------------------- 30
3.2 Intentional Act -------------------------------------------------------- 31
3.3 Hyle and Apprehension -------------------------------------------------- 32
3.4 Intentional Object ----------------------------------------------------- 36
3.5 Intentional Content ---------------------------------------------------- 39
3.6 Transcendental Idealism ------------------------------------------------ 42
3.7 Intersubjectivity ------------------------------------------------------ 44
Chapter 4 Mulligan on Husserl’s Theory of Perception ----------------------- 47
4.1 To Perceive is to Perceive either simply or propositionally ------------ 47
4.2 What We Perceive ------------------------------------------------------- 48
4.3 To Perceive is to Have Sensations -------------------------------------- 49
4.4 To Perceive is to Interpret Sensations --------------------------------- 50
4.5 Interpretation, Constancy and Profiles --------------------------------- 52
4.6 Dynamic Content: How to Perceive --------------------------------------- 54
4.7 To Perceive a Penny is to
Perceive a coloured Shape and its Behaviour --------------------------- 55
Chapter 5 Hallucination in Representationalism ------------------------------ 56
5.1 Representationalism ---------------------------------------------------- 59
5.2 Gappy Content ---------------------------------------------------------- 63
5.3 Objections to Content Thesis ------------------------------------------- 70
Chapter 6 Hallucination in Disjunctivism ------------------------------------ 73
6.1 Disjunctivism ---------------------------------------------------------- 73
6.2 Introspectively Indiscriminable ---------------------------------------- 78
6.3 Objections to Disjunctivism -------------------------------------------- 83
Chapter 7 Hallucination versus Perception ----------------------------------- 87
7.1 Perception is both relational and contentful --------------------------- 87
7.2 Hallucination in Husserl’s Theory of Perception ----------------------- 93
7.3 The Object of Hallucination -------------------------------------------- 101
7.4 Husserl, Conjunctivism and Disjunctivism ------------------------------- 106
Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------ 110
References ------------------------------------------------------------------ 114
Abbreviations for Husserl’s works
DR : Ding und Raum.
Hua : The Husserliana edition
Ideas 1 : Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology.
Ideen I : Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phänomenologie. Husserliana III.
LI : Logical Investigations.
LU : Logische Untersuchungen.

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