本文主要探討長期激勵對管理者薪酬對併購決策的影響。先前的許多研究表明，併購確實會在短期內為目標公司創造價值，但併購公司的回報卻很差，並且併購公司CEO薪酬已大大增加。 Ramaswamy和Wagelein（2013）表明，CEO的長期激勵薪酬與併購的後續績效呈正相關。因此，我們嘗試使用長期激勵薪酬來考察收購方的長期或短期績效的表現。研究結果表明，薪酬激勵期的長短將成為合併後績效的主要驅動力。薪酬激勵旨在從長遠來看向高管人員支付更多報酬，因此併購後的長期績效會更好，併購後的短期業績與激勵計劃無關，這與我們所設之假設:長期薪酬是會對CEO的併購決策造成影響是一致的。本文的貢獻為:使用薪酬期間來做為衡量公司長期激勵的變數以判斷併購後績效，並從績效看出CEO薪酬長短將與其所作之併購決策有相關性。關鍵字: 併購、薪酬設計

This thesis mainly explores the impact of long-term incentives on managerial compensation on M & A decisions. Many previous researches show that mergers and acquisitions will indeed create value for target firm in the short term, but the returns of the acquiring firms are very poor, and the top executive compensation of the CEO of the acquiring firms have increased significantly, resulting in short-termism M & A issues. Ramaswamy and Wagelein (2013) show that the long-term incentive compensation of CEO is positively related to the subsequent performance of M & A. Thus, we try to use long term incentive compensation to examine the effect on acquirers’ long term or short term post acquisition performance. The research results show that the length of the compensation incentive period will be the main driving force for post-merger performance. Compensation incentive aims to pay executives more compensation in the long run, so the long-term performance after M&A will be better. And the short-term performance after the M&A doesn't have related with the incentive plan, which is consistent with our conclusion. Our contribution is: This article uses incentive duration as a variable to measure the company's long-term incentives to determines post-merger performance. And from the performance, it can be seen that the length of CEO compensation is related to the M&A decision made.Key words: M&A, Compensation Structure

Table of Content
Title Page i
Letter of approval……………………………………………………………………...ii
Abstract in Chinese iii
Abstract in English iv
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................v
Table of Content............................................................................................................vi
List of Table.................................................................................................................vii
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 4
Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 7
3.1: Data 7
3.2: Methodology........................................................................................................7
3.3: Model: 8
3.4: Variable definition ...9
Chapter 4: Empirical results 11
4.1: Descriptive statistics 11
4.2: Correlation on coefficient: 13
4.3: Regression analysis 15
Chapter 5:Conclusion 22
Chapter 6: Reference 23
 
List of Table

Table 1 Descriptive statistics 12
Table 2 Correlation matrix 14
Table 3 OLS regression result using BHR3 as the dependent variable 18
Table 4 OLS regression result using ROA3 as the dependent variable 19
Table 5 OLS regression result using BHR1 as the dependent variable 20
Table 6 OLS regression result using ROA1 as the dependent variable 21

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