臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

Armstrong (2006) 指出雙邊市場 (two sided markets) 平台定價取決於跨端的網路外部性程
度大小，平台收費的結構 固定收費或論件收費 ，首先於獨占平台 (Mo n opoly platform) 環
境下，平台任何一端之定價取決於此端 ( 帶給另一端 ( 網路外部性的大小，網路外部
性越大定價越低，若網路外部性規模具一定程度，將導致此端定價為免費， 本研究 分析雙邊
市場之平台其品質與兩端定價結構的關係，發現當品質高低直接影響某一端使用者的效用函
數時，平台兩端定價的結構將有顯著的變化，當品質高低會直接影響第二端使用者效用函
數，此時若平台品質越高，將導致每個第一端使用者帶給第二端使用者更 高的跨端網路外部
性，平台將因此補貼第一端使用者更大的程度，本文亦 發現，若品質未直接影響任一端使用
者將不會改變平台對兩端定價結構模型，當進入跨端網路外部性影響時，是否仍會影響平台
兩端的定價結構。

Armstrong (2006) indicates the determinants of equilibrium price are (i) the magnitude of the cross-group externalities, (ii) whether fees are levied on a lump-sum or per-transaction basis, where one group’s benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform. If the network externalities effect states a certain level, it will value the site as free of charge. The research is to analyze the relationship between quality and pricing structure of on both site in the platform of two-sided markets. If a member of group 1 exerts a large positive externality on each member of group 2, then group 1 will be targeted aggressively by platforms. In broad terms, and especially in competitive markets, it is group 1’s benefit to the other group that determines group 1’s price, not how much group 1 benefits from the presence of group 2. Thus, the platform will subsidize more to the users at the A site. Also, if the quality does not directly affect to users at any site, it will not change the pricing structure model of the platform. When entering the influence of network externality effect, will it affect both sites of the pricing structure in the platform?

1.緒論 1
2.文獻探討 2
3.模型設定與分析 5
3.1平台使用者效用函數與平台利潤函數................5
3.2模型分析:極大化社會福利........................5
3.3模型分析:平台的利潤極大分析....................6
3.4平台品質未影響跨端網路外部性程度大小............7
4.結論 8
5.數學附錄 9
6.參考文獻 13

邱奕閤(2009)，網路外部性及外部規模經濟效果，國立中正大學博士論文。
Armstrong, M. (2006). “Competition in two-sided markets.” RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), pp. 668-691.
Eisenmann,T. R., Parker ,G. G. and Van Alstyne, M. (2006). “Strategies for two-sided markets.” Harvard Business Review, pp.92-101.
Rochet, J.-C. and Tirole, J. (2003). “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets.” Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol.1, pp.990-1029.
Schmalensee, R. (2011). “Jeffrey Rohlfs’ 1974 Model of Facebook: An Introduction with A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service.” Competition Policy International, Vol. 7(1)