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研究生:鍾念倫
研究生(外文):CHOONG AARON
論文名稱:關係性價值與規範性
論文名稱(外文):Relational Value and Normativity
指導教授:許漢許漢引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsu, Hahn
口試委員:祖旭華鄭光明
口試日期:2020-07-28
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:哲學系研究所
學門:人文學門
學類:哲學學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:74
中文關鍵詞:歸屬價值規範性價值的穩定性
外文關鍵詞:J.J. Thomsonattributive goodnormativitystability of value
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本文旨在探討價值與規範的關聯。假如兩者真有關聯,一個恰當的價值理論需要有能力說明價值-規範性關係的穩定性,因為規範涉及強制力,這不可能是任意的,自然地,價值也需要具備一定程度的穩定性才可以和規範對接。有兩大方向值得考慮:Moore的內在價值理論,和Thomson的歸屬價值理論。Moore非關係性內在價值的說法雖然可以為保證價值最大程度的穩定性,但缺乏足夠理由支持其說法。我認為,應該從關係性價值的觀念著手,Thomson的歸屬價值觀念是一個不錯的思考起點。歸屬價值的理論主張,某個東西的價值可以被其所屬類別的自有標準決定。在Thomson的版本中,卻有過於依賴語言推論的問題,沒有探討門檻式評價,以及我所謂的標準難題(standard problem)等問題。本文提出相應的修正建議,希望能使之成為一個更合理的價值主張。最後,我也討論歸屬價值在實踐理性中,如何提供主體理由有價值的事。
This thesis is an investigation of the relation between value and normativity. Suppose they are truly related, a proper account of value should be able to explain the stability of value-normativity relationship. The reason is that normativity involves a certain kind of force which is not arbitrary. So, value will incorporate or require a certain degree of stability in order to “connect” with normativity. Two approaches to this account of relationship are worthy of considering: Moore’s theory of intrinsic value and Thomson’s theory of attributive good. Although Moore’s idea of intrinsic value, which is a kind of non-relational value, promises the highest degree of stability, it actually does not has enough reasons to support such a strong claim. In my opinion, Thomson’s attributive good, which is a kind of relational value, is a better way out. However, there are minor problems that need to be fixed. For instance, Thomson seems to heavily rely on her linguistic argument; also, a needed account of threshold valuation is not provided by Thomson. And more important, her theory does not address what I called Standard Problem. I revise Thomson’s theory with respect to these problems with the wish of making it a better account. Finally, I will discuss the relation of attributive good and practical reason on the issue of how goodness of an action provides a reason for an agent to act on it.
前言 1
第壹章、Moore的內在價值 5
1.1 價值是什麼? 5
1.2 Moore的價值論 9
1.3 內在價值的啟示 14
第貳章、Thomson的關係性價值 21
2.1 外在價值的意涵 21
2.2 Thomson的歸屬價值 25
2.3 Thomson的語言進路 30
2.4 Thomson的形上學進路 36
第叁章 歸屬價值與規範 44
3.1 指引原則 45
3.2 標準難題 49
3.3 從價值到規範 54
第肆章 實踐理性 58
4.1 休謨主義 58
4.2 康德主義 61
4.3 亞里斯多德主義與Thomson 64
結論 68
參考書目 71
Almotahari, Mahrad & Hosein, Adam. 2015. “Is Anything Plain Good?”, Philosophical Studies 172: 1458-1508.

Byrne, Thomas. 2016. “Might Anything be Plain Good?”, Philosophical Studies 173: 3335-3346.

Brennan, Jason. 2016. Against Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cullity, Garrett & Gaut, Berys. 1997. Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. “Are There Organic Unities?” Ethics, Vol. 113, No. 3, pp. 629-
650.

Darwall, Stephen. 1998. Philosphical Ethics, Colorado: Westview Press.

Ewing, A. C. 1959. Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD.

Finlay, Stephen and Schroeder, Mark. 2017. “Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2017 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/reasons-internal-external/

Harold, James. 2005. “Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value” Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 85-105.

Hume, David. 1896. Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jacobson, Daniel. 2011. "Fitting Attitude Theories of Value", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2011 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/fitting-attitude-theories/

Kant, Immanuel. 2002. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Kraut, Richard. 2009. What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well Being, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
───. 2011. Against Absolute Goodness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
───. 1922. “The Conception of Intrinsic Value”, Philosophical Studies

Rabinowicz, Wlodek & Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni. 2004. “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-attitudes and Value” Ethics, Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 391-423.

Rowland, Richard. 2016. “In Defence of Good Simpliciter”, Philosophical Studies 173: 1371-1391.

Scanlon, T. M. 2014 Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tappolet, Christine. 2015. “Value and Emotions” in Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olsen (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 80-95.

Thomson, J. J. 2008. Normativity. Chicago: Open Court.

Wiggins, David. 1987. Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, Oxford: Blackwell.

Williams, Bernard. 1981. Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zimmerman, M. J. 1999. “Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 59, No. 3: 653-666.

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