為順應各國重視集團財務報表查核的趨勢，「財團法人會計研究發展基金會」於2012年發佈審計準則公報第54號「集團財務報表查核之特別考量」（以下稱54號公報）取代行之有年的審計準則公報第15號「採用其他會計師之查核工作」(以下稱15號公報)。修訂準則的過程中，本擬接軌IAASB所發布之國際審計準則600號（IAS 600）「集團財務報表查核之特別考量」，但ISA 600規定，「集團主辦會計師」原則上不可出具「責任分攤式查核報告」，此一情形與國內實務有重大差異，因此在54號公報草案開始對外徵詢意見時，引起許多執業會計師的反對，最後經多方徵詢意見後，改以接軌AICPA所發布的AU-C section 600「集團財務報表查核之特別考量」，以作為主要修改的依據。AICPA考量認為各集團各組成個體的營運性質、規模大小、組織結構可能存在極大的異質性，集團可能對於組成個體會計師的選任有完全的決策權，因此AU-C600規定在特定條件下仍可出具「責任分攤式查核意見」。
從過去國內文獻中發現被出具「責任分攤式查核報告」的公司，其盈餘品質似乎較差，而54號審計公報之修訂，亦是針對集團財務報表的查核，作了全面性的修訂，其中對於「集團主辦會計師」出具「責任分攤式查核報告」的條件，作了更嚴格的限制。因此本研究即試圖檢視54號公報對「責任分攤式查核報告」的審計品質是否有有所改善，此乃本文的主要研究動機。另從PCAOB近年來的年會愈來愈重視審計技術的創新對審計品質的影響與Tawei Wang, Shi-Ming Huang (2019)在International Journal of Computer Auditing在創刊號中也特別明白的指出，新科技的使用將幫助審計人員更為聚焦問題的判斷與評估，並提升審計品質來看。足以證明審計查核環境已走向資訊化，但許多的研究仍顯示會計師在審計查核過程中使用資訊科技上仍有一段落差， 因此引發本研究另一動機，亦即希望探討會計師的資訊科技認知程度對審計品質的影響。
本論文強調從債權人角度，探討54號公報實施後集團企業被出具「分攤式查核意見」對審計品質的影響，同時從會計師的科技認知角度出發，探討會計師在執行審計程序過程中，對資訊科技的應用可能影響審計品質之相關構面。綜合本研究之具體目的如下：（一） 檢視54號公報實施後，集團企業被出具「責任分攤式查核意見」對審計品質之影響較實施前是否有顯著改善。（二） 檢視會計師的科技認知程度對集團企業和會計師事務所資訊環境控制的提升是否對審計品質有顯著正相關。

本研究實證結果可以歸納得到下列幾項結論：
一、54號公報實施之後，信評機構相信被出具「責任分攤式查核報告」的集團企業，會計資訊品質有所提升，進而提升其債信評等。但若以當年度新增債務資金的加權平均成本作為審計品質的替代變數，銀行等貸款機構相信54號公報有助於被出具「責任分攤式查核報告」的集團企業審計品質的提升，使得被出具「責任分攤式查核報告」的集團企業利率下降，然而此項結果，在以委外查核權重的實驗變數並未有明顯的結果，因此從債權人的觀點檢視其對54號公報的影響，僅獲得部分的證據支持。
二、從會計師抑制被出具「責任分攤式查核報告」集團企業的裁決性應計數，檢視54號公報對審計品質的影響。實證結果並未發現54號公報有助於被出具「責任分攤式查核報告」集團企業的審計品質。由此可見，本實證研究結果部份支持研究目的（一）。
三、在調查研究方面，研究結果發現，會計師的科技認知與企業資訊環境控制具有顯著正相關，且企業資訊環境控制與審計品質具有顯著正相關，顯示會計師科技認知愈高且企業資訊環境控制程度愈高，則審計品質愈好；另會計師的科技認知與會計師事務所環境控制具有正相關，但不顯著，而會計師事務所環境控制與審計品質具有顯著正相關，顯示會計師事務所資訊環境控制愈高，審計品質愈好，然會計師的科技認知愈高會計師願意投入事務所資訊環境控制建置的意願並沒有相對提升，此一結果比較詭異，因為現階段應用科技查核成本已經不再像過去般昂貴，但許多會計師事務所仍不願投入資訊科技環境控制的建置，這是否與會計師心理對資訊科技的抗拒或可能擔心應用資訊科技查核，萬一偵測出更多無法解釋的現象，導致出具查核報告時的困難度增加有關，此一部份有待後續研究者進一步的驗證；最後企業資訊環境控制與會計師事務所資訊環境控制具有顯著正相關，顯示企業資訊環境控制的建置會影響會計師事務所對於資訊環境控制的建置。
關鍵字：集團企業、54號公報、責任分攤式查核報告、審計品質、資訊科技認知

In response to the global trend of emphasis on the auditing of group financial statements, the Accounting Research and Development Foundation for Financial Institutions (ARDF) issued an audit report in 2012. Statement of Standard No. 54, "Special Considerations for Audits of Group Financial Statements" (SAS No. 54) replaces the Statement of Standard No. 15, "Accounting for Audits Using Other Accountants" (SAS 15), which has been in place for years. In the process of amending the standard, we intend to adopt International Auditing Standard No. 600, "Auditing Group Financial Statements," issued by the IAASB. However, under ISA 600, the Group's lead accountant may not, in principle, issue a "shared responsibility audit report". This situation differs significantly from domestic practice, as a result, prompted many practice groups to seek external comments on draft Release 54 when it began. In the end, after much consultation, the AICPA's AU-C section was changed to align with the AICPA's AU-C section. The AICPA considers that there may be significant heterogeneity in the nature of operations, size, and organizational structure of each group's constituent entities. The Group may have full decision-making authority over the selection of the individual accountants that make up the Group, and therefore AU-C600 provides that under certain conditions, the Group may still Issue a "Shared Audit Reports".
From past domestic literature, it appears that the quality of surplus of companies issued with responsibility-sharing audit reports is of poorer quality than that of audit 54. The amendments to the report also address the audit of the Group's financial statements and are comprehensive in nature, including the amendments to the Group's audited financial statements issued by the Group's presiding accountant. The conditions for responsibility-sharing audit reports are more restrictive. Therefore, this study attempts to examine whether the audit quality of responsibility-sharing audit reports has improved as a result of SAS No. 54, which is the subject of this paper. Key research motivations. In addition, the PCAOB's annual conferences in recent years have placed increasing emphasis on the impact of innovation in audit technology on audit quality and Tawei Wang, Shi-Ming Huang (2019) in International The Journal of Computer Auditing has also made it clear in its inaugural issue that the new The use of technology will help auditors to make more focused judgments and evaluations, and improve the quality of their audits. Although the audit environment has become more information-based, many studies still show that accountants use IT in the audit process. This study is motivated by the fact that there is still a gap between the IT awareness level of accountants and the auditing profession, which leads to another motivation of this study, namely to explore the impact of IT awareness on the auditing profession. The Impact of Quality.
This paper focuses on the impact of the apportioned audit opinion issued by a group company on the quality of the audit from the creditor's perspective after the implementation of SAS No. 54. In addition, we will explore the application of information technology in the auditing process from the perspective of the accountant's awareness of the technology. Relevant aspects affecting audit quality. The specific objectives of this study are as follows: (1)To review the apportionment of responsibility among group companies for the implementation of SAS No. 54 and to assess the impact of the implementation of SAS No. 54 on the Group's auditing standards. And whether the impact on the quality of the audit has improved significantly as compared to that before the implementation of the audit. (2) To review whether the improvement in the CPA's technological knowledge and control over the information environment of the Group's enterprises and accounting firms has any significant impact on the audit quality. There is a significant positive correlation between quality.
The empirical findings of this study can be summarized in the following conclusions.
1. After the implementation of SAS No. 54, the credit rating agencies believe that the quality of accounting information for group companies issued with a responsibility-sharing audit reports the credit rating of banks and other lending institutions is further enhanced by the improvement in the cost of new debt funds. However, if the weighted average cost of new debt funds in the current year is used as a proxy variable for audit quality, banks and other lending institutions believe that SAS No.54 will contribute to the improvement of the audit quality of group companies issued with responsibility-sharing. The reported decline in group corporate rates, however, is not evident from the experimental variables weighted by the external checks. Therefore, examining the impact of SAS No. 54 from a creditor's perspective is only partially supported by the evidence.
2. This dissertation examines "SAS No. 54" in the context of the accountant's efforts to suppress the accrual of determinations made by group companies that have been issued a shared responsibility audit report which may impact on Audit Quality. The results of the empirical evidence do not indicate that SAS No. 54 is beneficial to the audit quality of the entities subject to the shared responsibility audit report. Thus, the results of this empirical study partially support objective (1) of the study.
3. In terms of the survey research, the results of the study found that the technology awareness of accountants has a significant positive correlation with the control of corporate information environment and the control of corporate information environment has a significant positive correlation with audit quality, indicating that the higher the technology awareness of accountants and the higher the level of corporate information environment control, the better the audit quality. Besides, there is a positive, but not significant, correlation between the CPA's knowledge of technology and the firm's environmental controls, and a significant positive correlation between the firm's environmental controls and audit quality, indicating that the higher the firm's environmental controls, the better the quality of the audit. However, the willingness of accountants to invest in a firm's environmental controls has not increased as their technology awareness has increased. This is an odd result because the cost of applying technology to audits is no longer as expensive as it once was, yet many accounting firms are still reluctant to invest in IT environmental controls. Whether this result is related to the accountant's psychological resistance to IT, or the possible fear that the use of IT in checking may detect more unexplained phenomena and make it more difficult to issue audit reports, is partly to be verified by the follow-up researchers. Finally, there is a significant positive correlation between enterprise information environment control and the firm's information environment control, indicating that the establishment of enterprise information environment control will affect the establishment of the firm's information environment control.
Key Words: Group Companies, SAS No. 54, Shared Responsibility Audit Report, Audit Quality, Information Technology Awareness

目錄
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 4
1.3 研究架構 5
第二章 文獻回顧與假說之建立 7
2.1 文獻回顧 7
2.2 假說的建立 12
第三章　實證研究- 「責任分攤式查核意見」對審計品質之影響 15
3.1　研究方法 15
3.2　研究樣本與期間 19
3.3　實證結果與分析 20
3.4　小結 36
第四章 調查研究-會計師的科技認知與資訊科技環境對審計品質之影響 38
4.1　研究方法 38
4.2　問卷設計 38
4.3　資料分析 44
4.4　小結 49
第五章　結論與建議 50
5.1 結論 50
5.2 對學術界的影響 51
5.3 對產業界的影響 52
5.4 對管理當局的影響 52
5.5 未來研究建議 52
參考文獻 53
附錄：資訊環境控制影響審計品質問卷 61

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