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研究生:陳幸君
研究生(外文):CHEN,HSING-CHUN
論文名稱:薪酬委員會品質與高階經理人薪酬對公司經營績效之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Influence on the Quality of the Remuneration Committee on the Compensations of High-level Managers and the Company's Operating Performance
指導教授:黃劭彥黃劭彥引用關係
指導教授(外文):HUANG,SHAIO YAN
口試委員:蔡垂君邱安安吳東憲
口試委員(外文):TSAI, CHUI-CHUNCHIU, AN-ANWU, TUNG-HSIEN
口試日期:2020-06-14
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:會計與法律數位學習碩士在職專班
學門:法律學門
學類:專業法律學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:32
中文關鍵詞:薪酬委員會薪酬誘因經營績效
外文關鍵詞:remuneration committeecompensation incentivesoperating performance
相關次數:
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薪酬委員會的職責在於設計、執行且監督薪酬政策,相關利害關係人希望藉由良好的薪酬誘因以降低高階經理人為企業績效努力的意願,以期確保經理人薪資結構的合理性。

過去文獻指出具有激勵效果的薪酬合約能提升高階經理人薪酬與企業績效之連結性,惟作為激勵高階經理人努力的薪酬誘因不可無限上綱,一昧地增加不但無法發揮激勵效果提高企業績效,過多的分紅反而將使企業績效降低,進而使得高階經理人薪酬失去相對的合理性,故設立良好的監督機制相當重要。

本研究並以臺灣上市櫃公司為樣本,探討薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬與企業經營績效之影響。實證發現,薪酬委員會品質與高階經理人薪酬交乘項變數與企業經營績效呈顯著負相關,顯示薪酬委員會品質越佳,對高階經理人薪酬誘因與企業經營績效之影響越小,故支持本研究假說。
  







關鍵詞:薪酬委員會、薪酬誘因、經營績效

The responsibility of the remuneration committee is to design, implement and supervise the remuneration policy. The relevant stakeholders hope to reduce the willing of high-level managers to strive for corporate performance through good compensation incentives in order to ensure the rationality of the remuneration structure of managers.
In the past literature, it has been pointed out that compensation contracts with incentive effects can improve the connection between high-level managers' compensation and corporate performance. On the contrary, excessive dividends will reduce the performance of the enterprise, and then make the compensation of high-level managers lose their relative rationality, so it is very important to establish a good supervision mechanism.
This study also uses Taiwan listed counter companies as a sample to explore the impact of the quality of the compensation committee on the compensation of high-level managers and business performance. The empirical findings show that the quality of the compensation committee and the variables of the senior manager’s salary multiplier are significantly negatively correlated with the company’s operating performance, indicating that the better the quality of the compensation committee, the smaller the impact on the senior manager ’s salary incentives and the company’s operating performance.



Keywords: remuneration committee、compensation incentives、operating performance

目錄

目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究問題 2
第三節 研究架構 3
第一節 薪酬委員會品質 4
第二節 高階經理人薪酬與企業績效之連結性 5
第三節 薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人誘因薪酬與企業經營績效之影響 7
第參章 樣本及研究方法 10
第一節 研究樣本與資料來源 10
第二節 研究模型與變數 10
第肆章 實證結果分析 17
第一節 敘述性統計 17
第二節 薪酬委員會品質與高階經理人薪酬對企業經營績效之影響 21
第伍章 結論與建議 23
第一節 研究結論 23
第二節 研究限制與建議 25
參考文獻 26


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