本篇研究主要針對2009年至2018年臺灣金融控股公司為研究對象，參考Hill and Hansen (1989)、林佳慶與董珮珊(2017)之薪酬分類進行分析，藉以探討高階經理人技能對薪酬關係之影響。實證結果發現，臺灣金融控股公司中高階經理人在總薪酬、非誘因性薪資以及誘因性報酬三種不同種類之薪酬，皆與教育程度變數、多工變數以及信譽變數三項技能，具顯著正相關，表示具碩士學歷、兼職一份職務以上與獲得商業評論排名之高階經理人，其總薪酬、非誘因性薪資以及誘因性報酬皆具有正向影響。
本研究進一步分析高階經理人不同技能對於非誘因性薪資及誘因性報酬佔總薪酬比例部分，發現具有碩士學歷者以及多工性變數之高階經理人，其薪酬增加主要以誘因性報酬為主。

This research mainly focuses on Taiwan's financial holding companies from 2009 to 2018 and we use the salary classifications of Hill and Hansen (1989), Lin and Dong (2017) to explore the impact of executive skills on the salary relationship. The empirical results found that the executive of Taiwan's financial holding companies have three different types of compensation: total compensation, non-incentive compensation, and incentive compensation, all of which are related to the three skills of MASTER variable, BUSY variable, and PRESS variable. It shows that executive with a master's degree, part-time job or more, and ranked in business reviews have positive effects on their total salary, non-incentive compensation and incentive compensation.
Our study further analyzes the proportion of non-incentive compensation and incentive compensation of high-level executive with different skills and finds that for executive with master's degrees and BUSY variables, the increase in salary is mainly from the incentive compensation.

目　　錄
第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機及背景
第二節 研究目的
第三節 研究架構
第二章 文獻探討
第一節 薪酬文獻
第二節 薪酬影響文獻
第三節 技能影響文獻
第三章 研究方法
第一節 資料來源及樣本分析
第二節 假說建立
第三節 迴歸模型建立
第四章 實證結果與分析
第一節 敘述性統計分析
第二節 相關係數分析
第三節 高階經理人技能與薪酬之迴歸結果
第五章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結論
第二節 研究建議
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