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研究生:劉思儀
研究生(外文):LIU,SSU-YI
論文名稱:高管薪酬與股利僵固性之關聯性
論文名稱(外文):The Association Between Executive Compensation and Dividend Stickiness
指導教授:陳光政陳光政引用關係
指導教授(外文):CHEN,GUANG-ZHENG
口試委員:翁慈青盧鈺欣
口試委員(外文):WENG,TZU-CHINGLU,YU-HSIN
口試日期:2020-05-12
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:逢甲大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:50
中文關鍵詞:僵固性股利薪酬支付政策
外文關鍵詞:StickinessCompensationDividendsPayout Policy
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:166
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本研究以2005-2018年之台灣上市公司為研究對象,探討高管薪酬與股利僵固性之關聯性。過去文獻指出,誘因薪酬契約會影響高階主管股利政策的制定,超額薪酬可能誘使管理人員維持穩定的股利以避免市場懲戒。然而,超額薪酬亦可能反應代理成本和管理人員的利益榨取,從而減少股利發放。實證結果顯示,超額薪酬與股利僵固程度呈正相關,表示高階主管領取超額薪酬會傾向維持穩定的股利,以滿足股東並維持公司股價。額外分析顯示,超額薪酬與股利僵固性的正向關聯性,在家族企業與公司治理較佳的公司特別的顯著。本研究釐清高管薪酬是股利決策的影響因素,同時有助於主管機關與投資人制定管理與投資決策。
This study examines the association between executive compensation and dividend stickiness for Taiwanese listed firms from 2005 to 2018. Prior literature suggests that top executives will take incentive compensation contracts into account when making dividend policy decisions. Excessive compensation may induce executives to maintain a steady stream of dividends to avoid market discipline. However, excessive compensation could reflect agency cost and rent extraction by top executives and thus reduce dividend payments. The results show that excessive compensation is positively associated with the degree of dividend stickiness. This indicates that top executives receive excessive compensation tend to keep dividends unchanged so as to satisfy shareholders and to support the share price. Additional analyses show that the positive association between excessive compensation and dividend stickiness is more pronounced for family firms or firms with better corporate governance. This study sheds light on other antecedents of dividend decision, in particular, executives’ compensation. This study might be useful for regulators and investors to formulate their respective regulation and investment decisions.
第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機與背景 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構與流程 4
第四節 研究貢獻 5
第二章 文獻探討
第一節 現行薪酬規範 6
第二節 高階經理人薪酬文獻 8
第三節 董監事薪酬文獻 10
第四節 股利僵固性文獻 12
第三章 研究設計
第一節 假說發展 15
第二節 超額薪酬衡量 16
第三節 實證模型 17
第四章 實證結果與分析
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源 19
第一節 敘述統計分析 20
第二節 相關係數分析 23
第三節 迴歸分析 25
第四節 額外分析 28
第五節 敏感性分析 33
第五章 結論
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