本研究主要為探討財務限制下董監事責任保險對投資效率的影響，也就是投保董監事責任保險是否可以改善財務限制所導致投資不足的情形。實證結果顯示，財務限制確實會造成投資不足，且財務限制越大，投資不足的情形越明顯。而投保董監事責任保險，可以有效的降低投資不足的情況。在財務限制下時，董監事責任保險也能夠改善財務限制所導致投資不足的情況；且當董監事責任保險投保金額愈高，愈可以改善投資不足的狀況。

The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of Directors' and officers' liability insurance and investment efficiency under financial constraints, that is, whether Directors' and officers' liability insurance can improve the situation of under-investment due to financial constraints. The empirical results show that financial constraints do cause under-investment, and the greater the financial constraints, the more obvious the underinvestment situation. The insurance of Directors' and officers' liability insurance can effectively improve the situation of under-investment. Under financial constraints, Directors' and officers' liability insurance can also improve the situation of under-investment caused by financial constraints; and the higher the amount of insurance for Directors' and officers' liability insurance, the situation of under-investment becomes better.

目　　錄
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機及背景 1
第二節 研究問題 3
第三節 研究目的 3
第四節 研究架構及流程 4
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 6
第一節 投資效率 6
第二節 財務限制與投資效率 7
第三節 董監事責任保險與投資效率 9
第四節 財務限制、董監事責任保險與投資效率 11
第三章 研究設計與實施 13
第一節 資料來源 13
第二節 實證模型 14
第三節 變數定義 15
第四章 實證結果與分析 19
第一節 敘述性統計 19
第二節 相關係數分析 20
第三節實證結果分析 21
第五章 結論與建議 24
第一節 研究結論 24
參考文獻 26

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