臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

經理人及董事年資與公司治理效能息息相關，隨著年資增加，經理人及董事的經驗及產業特有知識可以累積，但對公司績效的影響則是待實證的議題。本研究旨在探討董事年資、經理人年資對公司監督與績效之關聯性。
實證結果發現，董事、經理人年資與平均會議出席率皆呈現正向關連性，顯示年資越長，對公司責任感上升，而其會議出席率越高。董事年資、經理人年資與會議次數皆呈現負向關連性，顯示年資越長，對公司財務狀況更加清楚，而其會議次數下降。董事、經理人年資與公司績效皆呈現正向關連性，顯示年資越長，企業會計績效越好。

The seniority of managers and directors is closely related to the effectiveness of corporate governance. With the increase of seniority, the experience of managers and directors and industry-specific knowledge can be accumulated, but the impact on the company's performance is an issue to be proved. The purpose of this study is to explore the relevance of directors 'years and managers' years to company supervision and performance.
The empirical results found that the seniority of directors and managers and the attendance rate of the meeting are positively related, showing that the longer the seniority, the greater the sense of responsibility for the company, and the higher the attendance rate of the meeting. The seniority of directors, the seniority of managers and the number of meetings are all negatively correlated, indicating that the longer the seniority, the clearer the company's financial situation and the decrease in the number of meetings. The seniority of directors and managers is positively related to company performance, showing that the longer the seniority, the better the accounting performance of the enterprise.

目 錄 III
圖目錄 IV
表目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 1
第三節 研究架構及流程 1
第二章 文獻探討 4
第一節 董事會的功能 4
第二節 董事年資對董事會監督效力的影響 5
第三節 經理人年資對董事會監督效力的影響 6
第四節 年資對公司績效的影響 8
第三章 研究方法 9
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 9
第二節 實證模型與變數之衡量 9
第四章 實證結果 14
第一節 敘述性統計與相關係數分析 14
第二節 實證結果 17
第三節 進一步分析 23
第五章 結論 25
第一節 研究結論 25
第二節 研究限制 26
第三節 研究建議 26
參考文獻 27

中文部分：
李建然、陳信吉、湯麗芬，2013，客戶重要性與審計品質-從簽證會計師角度分析，當代會計，14 (2)：147-174。
陳建良、鍾惠民、周幼珍，(2012)，董事會努力程度及專業性對股價報酬波動度的影響-以金融危機為例，http://hdl.handle.net/11536/71849。
湯麗芬、廖秀梅、李建然，2014，董監事暨重要職員責任保險對管理階層盈餘管理行為之影響，經濟論文，42 (3)：331-368。
葉旻其，2008，公司治理機制對企業績效與董監薪酬之影響，政治大學會計研究所學位論文：1-108。
英文部分：
Adams, R. B., and D. Ferreira. 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of financial economics 94 (2):291-309.
Aghion, P., and J. Tirole. 1997. Formal and real authority in organizations. Journal of political economy 105 (1):1-29.
Al‐Najjar, B. 2010. The determinants of the frequency of board meetings: evidence from categorical analysis. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, forthcoming.https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1733224#references-widget
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K. J. Murphy. 1999. Informal authority in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics, and organization 15 (1):56-73.
Baysinger, B., and R. E. Hoskisson. 1990. The composition of boards of directors and strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy. Academy of Management review 15 (1):72-87.
Boone, A. L., L. C. Field, J. M. Karpoff, and C. G. Raheja. 2007. The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis. Journal of financial economics 85 (1):66-101.
Brick, I. E., and N. Chidambaran. 2010. Board meetings, committee structure, and firm value. Journal of corporate finance 16 (4):533-553.
Brickley, J. A., J. L. Coles, and R. L. Terry. 1994. Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. Journal of financial economics 35 (3):371-390.
Bryne, J. 1996. Listen up: the National Association of Corporate Directors' new guidelines won't torelate inattentive, passive, uninformed board members. Business week 25:256-279.
Byrd, J. W., and K. A. Hickman. 1992. Do outside directors monitor managers?: Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of financial economics 32 (2):195-221.
Chen, C. X., H. Lu, and T. Sougiannis. 2012. The agency problem, corporate governance, and the asymmetrical behavior of selling, general, and administrative costs. Contemporary Accounting Research 29 (1):252-282.
Chhaochharia, V., and Y. Grinstein. 2007. Corporate governance and firm value: The impact of the 2002 governance rules. the Journal of Finance 62 (4):1789-1825.
Chih, H.-L., C.-H. Shen, and F.-C. Kang. 2008. Corporate social responsibility, investor protection, and earnings management: Some international evidence. Journal of business ethics 79 (1-2):179-198.
Chou, H.-I., H. Li, and X. Yin. 2010. The effects of financial distress and capital structure on the work effort of outside directors. Journal of Empirical Finance 17 (3):300-312.
Conger, J. A., D. Finegold, and E. E. Lawler. 1998. Appraising boardroom performance. Harvard business review 76:136-164.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of financial economics 51 (3):371-406.
Council, F. R. 2003. Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) London: FRC.
Dalton, D. R., C. M. Daily, A. E. Ellstrand, and J. L. Johnson. 1998. Meta‐analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic management journal 19 (3):269-290.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary accounting research 13 (1):1-36.
Dey, A., and X. Liu. 2011. CEO tenure, board composition and innovation. SSRN e-Library. http://www.scienpress.com/Upload/JAFB%2FVol%203_5_14.pdf
Donaldson, L., and J. H. Davis. 1991. Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of management 16 (1):49-64.
Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of political economy 88 (2):288-307.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. The journal of law and Economics 26 (2):301-325.
Fracassi, C., and G. Tate. 2012. External networking and internal firm governance. the Journal of Finance 67 (1):153-194.
Goodstein, J., K. Gautam, and W. Boeker. 1994. The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change. Strategic management journal 15 (3):241-250.
Hermalin, B. E., and M. S. Weisbach. 1998. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review:96-118.
Hill, C. W., and P. Phan. 1991. CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO pay. Academy of Management journal 34 (3):707-717.
Hung, H. 1998. A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards. Corporate Governance: An International Review 6 (2):101-111.
Hwang, B.-H., and S. Kim. 2009. It pays to have friends. Journal of financial economics 93 (1):138-158.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. the Journal of Finance 48 (3):831-880.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics 3 (4):305-360.
Krishnan, G. V., and G. Visvanathan. 2007. Does the SOX definition of an accounting expert matter? The association between audit committee directors' accounting expertise and accounting conservatism. Available at SSRN 866884.https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=866884
Lin, Y.-f., Y. M. C. Yeh, and F.-m. Yang. 2014. Supervisory quality of board and firm performance: a perspective of board meeting attendance. Total Quality Management & Business Excellence 25 (3-4):264-279.
Lipton, M., and J. W. Lorsch. 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. The business lawyer:59-77.
Loebbecke, J. K., M. M. Eining, and J. J. Willingham. 1989. Auditors experience with material irregularities-frequency, nature, and detectability. Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory 9 (1):1-28.
Lorsch, J. W., and E. Maciver. 1989. Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's Corporate Boards (Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA).
Muth, M., and L. Donaldson. 1998. Stewardship theory and board structure: A contingency approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review 6 (1):5-28.
OECD, O. 2004. The OECD principles of corporate governance. Contaduría y Administración (216).
Perry, T. 2000. Incentive compensation for outside directors and CEO turnover. Paper read at Tuck-JFE Contemporary Corporate Governance Conference.
Pfeffer, J., and R. Gerald. 1978. Salancik. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective: New York: Harper & Row.
Pozen, R., and T. Hamacher. 2015. The trend towards board term limits is based on faulty logic. Financial Times.
Raghunandan, K., and D. V. Rama. 2007. Determinants of audit committee diligence. Accounting Horizons 21 (3):265-279.
Raheja, C. G. 2005. Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate boards. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 40 (2):283-306.
Ryan, H. E., L. Wang, and R. A. Wiggins. 2009. Board-of-director monitoring and CEO tenure. Available at SSRN 992857.
Salancik, G. R. 1977. Commitment and the control of organizational behavior and belief. New directions in organizational behavior 1:54.
Shekshnia, S. 2018. How to be a good board chair. Harvard business review 96 (2):96-105.
Shen, W. 2003. The dynamics of the CEO-board relationship: An evolutionary perspective. Academy of Management review 28 (3):466-476.
Stobaugh, R. B. 1996. Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on director professionalism.
Vafeas, N. 1999. Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of financial economics 53 (1):113-142.
Vafeas, N. 2003. Length of board tenure and outside director independence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 30 (7‐8):1043-1064.
Weisbach, M. S. 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of financial economics 20:431-460.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of financial economics 40 (2):185-211.