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研究生:吳建緯
研究生(外文):Jian-WeiWu
論文名稱:物聯網之安全及隱私保護身分認證機制
論文名稱(外文):A Secure Identity Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Scheme for IoT
指導教授:林輝堂林輝堂引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hui-Tang Lin
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立成功大學
系所名稱:電腦與通信工程研究所
學門:工程學門
學類:電資工程學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:英文
論文頁數:78
中文關鍵詞:物聯網身分認證物理不可仿造功能隱私保護
外文關鍵詞:Internet of thingsidentity authenticationphysical unclonable functionprivacy-preservation
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物聯網(IoT)的出現帶來了許多的利益與應用,使得物聯網設備廣泛地被使用並且被設置在生活周遭。但是物聯網設備的一些特性產生了一些安全議題,並使得傳統網路的身份驗證不適合用於物聯網。這些安全議題分別是設備缺少隱私保護以及會遭受物理攻擊(physical attack)和克隆攻擊(cloning attack)。如果在身分認證中未考量這些問題,這將會導致在這個環境下的成員遭受攻擊。因此在物聯網的環境下設計新穎的身份認證方案是一項重大挑戰。
為了解決這個問題,我們提出了一種基於物理不可克隆功能(PUF)的物聯網之安全及隱私保護身分認證機制。安全分析表明我們的方法對各種安全問題具有較強的強健性。性能分析則表明我們的方法可以符合物聯網設備資源受限的需求。
The development of the Internet of Things (IoT) has brought many benefits and applications, and these IoT devices are used and set around our lives widely. However, these characteristics of IoT devices generate some security issues for IoT. These security issues make the identity authentication of traditional networks be unsuitable for the IoT. The security issues are lack of privacy-preservation and the occurrence of physical attack and cloning attack, respectively. If identity authentication doesn't consider these security issues, the attacker will crack the identity authentication scheme and then cause the IoT to be attacked. Therefore, design of novel identity authentication scheme is a significant challenge.
To address these issues, we propose a secure identity authentication and privacy-preserving scheme based on physical unclonable function (PUF). The security analysis shows that it is robust against different security issues. The performance analysis shows our scheme can meet the resource-constrained IoT device.
摘要......I
Abstract......II
Acknowledgements......I
Contents......IV
List of Figures......VII
List of Tables......IX
Chapter 1......1
Introduction......1
1.1 Overview......1
1.2 Identity authentication......3
1.3 Internet of Things......4
1.4 IoT Architecture......5
1.4.1 Perception Layer......5
1.4.2 Network Layer......6
1.4.3 Application Layer......6
1.5 Security Issues in the IoT......6
1.6 Physical Unclonable Function......7
1.7 CRPs Leak Problem......8
1.8 Motivation......9
1.9 Objective......10
1.10 Thesis Outline......10
Chapter 2......11
Related Works......11
2.1 Network Environment......12
2.2 Identity Authentication......12
2.2.1 Mutual authentication in IoT systems using physical unclonable functions......13
2.2.2 Lightweight and Privacy-Preserving Two-Factor Authentication Scheme for IoT Devices......14
2.2.3 Two-Factor Authentication for IoT with Location Information......17
Chapter 3......20
A Secure Identity Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Scheme for IoT......20
3.1 Network Environment......21
3.2 Assumption......21
3.3 Registration......23
3.4 Proposed Scheme......23
3.4.1 Normal procedure......24
3.4.1.1 Protocol 1: Identity authentication for new device......24
3.4.1.2 Protocol 2: CRP update......27
3.4.1.3 Protocol 3: Identity authentication for firmware update......30
3.4.2 Resynchronizing procedure......36
3.4.2.1 Protocol 1: Identity authentication for new device......36
3.4.2.2 Protocol 2: CRP update......38
Chapter 4......40
Security Analysis......40
4.1 BAN Logical......41
4.1.1 Notation......41
4.1.2 Postulates......41
4.1.3 Analysis of the identity authentication for new devices......42
4.1.4 Analysis of CRP update......45
4.1.5 Analysis of identity authentication for firmware update......48
4.2 Security Comparison with existing authentication protocols based on PUF......52
Chapter 5......54
Performance Analysis......54
5.1 Computational Cost......55
5.2 Computational Complexity......56
5.3 Communication Overhead......57
5.4 Storage Overhead......59
Chapter 6......60
Experiment......60
6.1 Experimental environment......61
6.2 Protocol 1: Identity authentication for new device......61
6.3 Protocol 2: CRP update......65
6.4 Protocol 3: Identity authentication for firmware update......68
Chapter 7......73
Conclusion......73
Bibliography......75
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