臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要貢獻為探討台灣近二十年上市櫃公司其控制權轉變的原因。本研究定義控制權轉變為一公司變更最終控制者，或是公司最終控制者增加，或是控制持股變動百分之十以上且變動後小於百分之二十，或是席次控制在一年的變動高於百分之十且變動後小於百分之五十。本研究發現公司的股票表現、公司規模及槓桿度高度影響最終控制者的決策，而此外公司過去有無傳承、董事長之內部化與否以及最終控制者的股權偏離亦是重要的決策影響因素。
台灣公司控制權主要集中在家族成員手中。本研究樣本取自1996至2017年底之台灣上市櫃公司，參考La Porta et al.（1999）最終控制權股東之衡量方法，最終判定篩選出406家上市櫃公司。
實證結果顯示，公司規模小、財務槓桿大、過去擁有較高股票報酬、公司過去無傳承交接、董事長非為內部人、且股權偏離程度低的公司，傾向於轉換公司控制權轉換。這些結果除了符合過去研究公司控制者出脫手中持股原因之研究，本研究設計的公司有無繼任者、董事長內部化與否及公司股權偏離程度等變數更是本研究的貢獻之處，能反應公司決策與公司長遠且持續的計畫有重大的關係。

The main contribution of this study is to find out the reasons for the change in the control of Taiwan's listed companies in the past two decades. This study defines that the control right is transformed when a company's final controller loses control of the board, or the number of the control power is decentralized, or the control right of the controller change more than 10% and becomes less than 20% after one year, or the board member change more than 10% and becomes less than 50% after a one year change. The study found out that the company's stock performance, company size and leverage highly influences the decision of the final controller. In addition, whether a member in the company has inherited in the past, whether the chairman is internalized or the final controller's equity deviation is also an important decision-making factor.
The control right of Taiwanese companies is mainly concentrated in the hands of family members. The sample of this study was taken from the Taiwan listed companies from 1996 to the end of 2017. With reference to the measurement method of the final controlling shareholders of La Porta et al. (1999), it was finally determined that 406 listed companies were selected.
The empirical results show that companies with small scale, large financial leverage, high stock returns in the past, no inherits in the past, no internalization of the chairman, and low equity deviations tend to lose corporate control right. Not only these results are in lines with the past researches on the reasons why do firms become widely held, the following newly designed variables — whether having inherits of family member, the internalization of the chairman, and the degree of deviation of the company's equity, are the contributions of this research, which shows that the Corporate decision-making factors has a major bearing on the company's long-term and ongoing plans.

摘要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 - 1 -
1.1 研究背景與動機 - 1 -
1.2 研究目的與貢獻 - 2 -
1.3 研究流程 - 3 -
第二章 文獻回顧 - 4 -
2.1公司持股分散化原因 - 4 -
2.2台灣公司控制類型 - 5 -
2.3公司控制型態與營運績效 - 7 -
第三章 研究方法 - 10 -
3.1資料來源與變數定義 - 10 -
3.2研究方法 - 15 -
3.3實證回歸模型 - 17 -
第四章 資料分析與實證研究 - 20 -
4.1樣本資料分析 - 20 -
4.2敘述統計分析 - 22 -
4.3平均差異檢定 - 26 -
4.4迴歸分析 - 30 -
4.5強韌性檢定 - 34 -
4.6控制權轉變公司營運績效變化 - 35 -
第五章 結論 - 37 -
5.1本文結論 - 37 -
5.2後續研究方向與建議 - 37 -
第六章 參考文獻 - 38 -
附錄 - 42 -
附錄一 公司下市原因 - 42 -
附錄二 變更前為家族控制類型之控制權轉變迴歸分析 - 42 -
附錄三 樣本I迴歸分析加入資產報酬率解釋變數 - 43 -

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