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研究生:林宣佑
論文名稱:雙邊平台最適兩部定價:從量與從價
指導教授:林燕淑林燕淑引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yan-Shu Lin
口試委員:孔令傑郭平欣施姵全林燕淑
口試委員(外文):Ling-Chieh KungPing-Sing KuoPei-Cyuan ShihYan-Shu Lin
口試日期:2020-06-23
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立東華大學
系所名稱:經濟學系
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:56
中文關鍵詞:雙邊市場最適二部定價交叉網路外部性從量與從價交易費用
外文關鍵詞:two-sided marketoptimal two-part tariffcross-network externalityrevenue base transaction feetransaction base transaction fee
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本文討論外送平台對上平台雙邊(消費者與餐廳)如何訂定最適的二部定價策略(固定進入費用與每次交易費用)。模型中將餐廳邊分為兩種不同交叉網路外部性餐廳,且交易費用為抽成(從價交易費用);而消費者邊皆為同質具有相同交叉網路外部性,且交易費用為從量收費。主要結論發現,在平台為獨占時,我們以一般式的效用函數證得平台對雙邊定價策略符合Lerner Indices定價原則。消費者邊固定進入費用與每次交易費用為線性重合,但餐廳邊的兩部定價可得單一解,均衡的抽成原則為平台對兩種不同交叉網路外部性餐廳的邊際收益相同。當平台有競爭時,我們以Hotelling的線性空間模型得到消費者邊的二部定價為線性重合,雙占Single homing平台對餐廳邊均衡抽成為零,雙占Competitive bottleneck平台對餐廳邊均衡抽成為1/2。當政府管制平台定價時,其定價原則為價格等於邊際成本,在獨占平台與雙占Competitive bottleneck平台對餐廳邊最適抽成均為零,但在雙占Single homing平台時則為任意值。最後,本文討論平台因收集消費者資訊以後,可以對個別的消費者採個人化定價時的最適定價策略。
We study how delivery platform determine the optimal two-part tariff (fixed entry fee and transaction fee) on both sides (consumer and restaurant). In the model, the restaurant side is divided into two different cross-network externalities, and platform charge revenue base transaction fee; while the consumer side is homogeneous and has the same cross-network externalities, and platform charge transaction base transaction fee. The main conclusion is that when the platform is monopoly, we use a general utility function to prove that the platform’s monopoly pricing strategy complies with the Lerner Indices. The fixed entry fee and transaction fee on the consumer side are linear dependent, but the two-part tariff on the restaurant side can get a single solution, and the equilibrium revenue base transaction fee is that the platform has the same marginal revenue form two restaurants with different cross-network externality. When there is competition on the platform, we use Hotelling model to obtain the two-part tariff of the consumer side is linear dependent. The Single homing platform has a zero revenue base transaction fee for the restaurant side, and the competitive bottleneck platform has a 1/2 revenue base transaction fee on restaurant side. When the government regulates the price of the platform, the pricing principle is that the price equals the marginal cost. The optimal revenue base transaction fee for the restaurant side is zero on the monopoly platform and the competitive bottleneck platform, but it is arbitrary when it's single homing platform. Finally, this article discusses the optimal pricing strategy that the platform can use to personalize individual prices after collecting consumer information.
第一章 前言 1
第二章 獨占平台 7
2.1消費者行為 7
2.2餐廳行為 8
2.3外送平台決策 9
2.4 消費者帶給餐廳交叉網路外部性分為N種 13
2.5 政府管制 15
2.6 以n_i=(u_i/t)^k為例 17
第三章 雙占平台(Single homing) 21
3.1消費者行為 21
3.2餐廳行為 22
3.3外送平台決策 24
3.4政府管制 27
第四章 雙占平台(Competitive bottleneck) 29
4.1消費者行為 29
4.2餐廳行為 30
4.3外送平台決策 32
4.4政府管制 35
第五章 平台個人化定價 38
5.1 獨占平台 40
5.2 雙占(SINGLE HOMING)平台個人化定價 44
第六章 結論 49
參考文獻 51
附錄 53
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