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研究生:林筱臻
研究生(外文):LIN, HSIAO-CHEN
論文名稱:資本支出決策與股權結構關聯性暨公司績效與資本支出、董監經理人薪酬關聯性
論文名稱(外文):Correlation between Capital Expenditure Decision and Equity Structure & Company Performance , Capital Expenditure, and Compensation of Directors and Supervisors
指導教授:汪青萍汪青萍引用關係
指導教授(外文):WANG, CHING-PING
口試委員:汪青萍林淑瑜許智文
口試委員(外文):WANG, CHING-PINGLIN, SHU-YUHSU, CHIN-WEN
口試日期:2020-06-26
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄科技大學
系所名稱:財政稅務系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財政學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:50
中文關鍵詞:資本資出決策股權結構董監事與經理人薪酬公司績效
外文關鍵詞:Capital decision-makingownership structurecompensation of directorssupervisors and managerscompany performance
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本研究探討內容為兩部分,第一部分探討資本支出決策對股權結構相關性,及重大資本支出對公司績效相關性,第二部分則探討董監事與經理人薪酬對公司績效的影響。研究樣本為2015至2019年台灣上市櫃公司,及排除海外回台上市櫃公司(KY)或海外存託(TDR)公司、剔除遺漏數值的樣本,資本支出決策公司樣本觀察值計7,928筆,重大資本支出的公司樣本觀察值計1,092筆,董監事與經理人薪酬及董監事質押的公司樣本觀察值計8,020筆。
本研究使用Logit迴歸與一般迴歸模型,加入股權結構、公司績效與價值、資本支出等相關變數等進行實證分析。資本支出決策與股權結構實證結果顯示,獨立董事設置、經理人持股、董監持股比、外部法人持股比為顯著正相關、董監席次為顯著負相關,而董事兼任經理人與內部人持股則為不顯著;重大資本支出對公司績效實證結果顯示,資本支出比率與相對股東權益報酬率與相對資產報酬率為顯著正相關,而投資機會則不顯著。第二部分董監事與經理人薪酬對公司績效實證結果顯示,股東權益報酬率與資產報酬率對董監事薪酬為正相關;股東權益報酬率與經理人薪酬為負相關,資產報酬率則為經理人薪酬為正相關。綜合而言,公司資本支出不會因董事會的董監席次越多而有更好的投資計畫,一切仍須廣納董監事、外部法人等各方面的建議,慎重的考量公司需求後,為公司量身決定投資計畫,該方式就是良好的公司治理行為,好的投資決策不只會對公司帶來正面的效益,更能為企業創造正面形象。

This study is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the relevance of capital Expenditure decision-making to equity structure and the relevance of major capital expenditure to corporate performance, the second part discusses the impact of directors, supervisors and managers'compensation on corporate performance. For the sample of Taiwan listed companies from 2015 to 2019, the observation value of the sample of capital expenditure decision making companies was 7,928, the observed value of the company sample with significant capital expenditure was 1,092, and that of the company sample with Director's and manager's remuneration and director's
supervisor's pledge was 8,020.
This study uses Logit regression model and general regression model, adding the ownership structure, corporate performance and value, capital expenditure and other related variables for empirical analysis. The empirical results of the capital expenditure decision and the ownership structure show that the independent director setting, the manager holding, the director-supervisor holding ratio, the external legal person holding ratio are significantly positive, and the number of directors and supervisors is significantly negative, the empirical results show that the ratio of capital expenditure to company performance is positively correlated with the ratio of return on equity and the ratio of return on assets, investment opportunities were not significant. In the second part, the empirical results show that the rate of return on shareholders'equity and the rate of return on assets are positively related to the compensation of directors and supervisors, and the rate of return on shareholders'equity is negatively related to the compensation of managers, the rate of return on assets is positive correlation with manager's salary. To sum up, the capital expenditure of a company will not be better because the board of directors and supervisors have more seats on the board of directors and there will be better investment plans. All this still needs to be done with the advice of directors, supervisors, external legal persons, etc. . After careful consideration of the needs of the company, good corporate governance behavior is the way to make investment plans for a company. Good investment decisions not only bring positive benefits to the company, but also create a positive image for the company.


中文摘要 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- i
英文摘要 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ii
誌謝 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii
目錄 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- iv
表目錄 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- v
圖目錄 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- vi
第一章 緒論-------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
第一節 研究背景與動機---------------------------------------------------- 1
第二節 研究架構-------------------------------------------------------------- 3
第三節 研究目的-------------------------------------------------------------- 4
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展---------------------------------------------- 5
第一節 股權結構及代理問題對資本支出決策的影響-------------- 5
第二節 資本支出決策對公司價值的影響------------------------------ 8
第三節 董監事經理人薪酬、資本支出對公司績效影響----------- 9
第三章 研究方法-------------------------------------------------------------- 12
第一節 變數衡量-------------------------------------------------------------- 12
第二節 模型設計-------------------------------------------------------------- 19
第三節 研究樣本統計-------------------------------------------------------- 21
第四章 實證結果分析-------------------------------------------------------- 27
第一節 樣本敘述統計分析------------------------------------------------- 27
第二節 相關係數分析-------------------------------------------------------- 30
第三節 實證結果分析-------------------------------------------------------- 33
第五章 結論--------------------------------------------------------------------- 44
參考文獻 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46

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