跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(44.210.149.205) 您好!臺灣時間:2024/04/16 18:58
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:陳文厚
研究生(外文):TRAN, VAN-HAU
論文名稱:以最佳化分數模型改善越南留學代辦之選校問題
論文名稱(外文):An Optimizing Score Model to Improve The Performance of School Choice for Vietnam’s Overseas Study Consultancy Agencies
指導教授:蕭俊彥
指導教授(外文):SHIAU, JIUN-YAN
口試委員:郭幸民陳育欣項衛中蕭俊彥
口試委員(外文):GUO, SHIN-MINGCHEN, GARY YU-HSINSHIANG, WEI-JUNGSHIAU, JIUN-YAN
口試日期:2020-05-21
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄科技大學
系所名稱:運籌管理系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:行銷與流通學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:82
中文關鍵詞:留學代辦機構滿意度函數選校問題最佳化分數模型
外文關鍵詞:Study abroad agencySatisfaction degreeSchool choice problemOptimized score model
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:173
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
因應全球化趨勢及其所帶來之衝擊、提升教育之國際競爭力及學生的國際觀,越南及台灣的教育部致力於推動國際化教育政策以及相關計畫措施。作為國際文教推動者之一,留學代辦機構的出現有其必要性。能讓成千上萬的學生找到心儀的學校,在此同時也能幫助學校招收優良的外籍學生是留學代辦機構的選校及招生服務之重要關節。以現行與學校招生合作模型及所提供給學生的選校服務,留學代辦機構容易產生失範行為的問題,而影響到學生的利益及學校的聲譽。
為了能夠在同業競爭中脫穎而出,同時滿足雙邊市場學生及學校的滿意度,本文針對典型三種雙邊匹配演算法進行探討及研究並發現每種演算法只能滿足一邊市場的滿意度,使得學生滿意度很高如波士頓機制 (Boston mechanism)或最優交易循環機制(TopTrading Cycles Mechanism),或是學校的滿意度很高如延遲接受演算法(Deferred Acceptance algorithm)及其另外一邊的滿意度將會較低。因此,考慮到學生及學校雙邊滿意度達到一個平衡,創造新的配對及選校方法,本文透過最佳化分數模型來研究與分析。這個模型有別於三個典型演算法是一個最佳化雙邊的志願分數而不是使用志願排序建構而成,可以在滿足學生之最佳滿意度的同時保持學校的滿意度不變得更差。這模型有助於留學代辦機構可以改善選校問題並提升自己的招生服務品質,讓學生成功選擇到心儀中的學校,同時學校也可以評估自己的招生效率。
In response to the trend of globalization and its impact, to enhance the international competitiveness of education and the international outlook of students, the Ministry of Education of Vietnam and Taiwan commit to promoting international education policies and related planning measures. As one of the promoters of international culture and education, the emergence of study abroad agencies has its necessity. Allowing thousands of students to find their favorite schools, and allowing countless schools to receive foreign students of good quality are important joints for school choice and admissions services of study abroad agencies. The current enrollment cooperation model with school and the school choice service provided to students, the study abroad agency is prone to anomie behavior, which affects the interests of students and the reputation of the school.
In order to stand out from the competition and meet the satisfaction of students and schools in the two-side market, this paper studies three canonical school choice mechanism and found that each mechanism can only meet the highest satisfaction of one side market, making the high student satisfaction such as the Boston or TopTrading Cycles algorithm, or the high school satisfaction such as the Deferred Acceptance algorithm and the satisfaction on the other side will be lower. Therefore, considering that the two-side satisfaction between students and schools has reached a balance, creating new matching and school choice methods, this paper studied and analyzed by optimizing the satisfaction score model. This model is different from the three typical algorithms. It is an optimization of two-side satisfaction scores which is not constructed by using choice-priority. It can meet the high satisfaction of students while maintaining the school's satisfaction. This model helps study abroad agencies to improve their enrollment and school choice services, allowing students to freely choose their favorite school, and schools can also evaluate their own enrollment efficiency.

目錄
摘要 i
ABSTRACT iii
致謝 v
圖目錄 viii
表目錄 ix
第一章 緒論 1
1.1研究背景 1
1.2研究問題 2
1.3 研究目的與範圍 2
1.4 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
2.1 教育留學代辦機構的角色及失範行為 5
2.1.1 教育留學代辦機構的角色 5
2.1.2 教育留學代辦機構的作用 6
2.1.3教育留學代辦機構失範行為表現 7
2.1.3.1失實行為 7
2.1.3.2替換行為 8
2.2 雙邊匹配選校問題 9
2.2.1 選校問題 9
2.2.2 大學錄取機制的特性 11
2.2.3 滿意度函數 12
2.3 三大典型大學錄取演算法 13
2.3.1延遲接受演算法 13
2.3.1.1延遲接受演算法之流程 14
2.3.1.2延遲接受演算法之實例分析 15
2.3.2最優交易循環機制 21
2.3.2.1最優交易循環機制之流程 22
2.3.2.2最優交易循環機制之實例分析 24
2.3.3志願優先機制 27
2.3.3.1志願優先機制之流程 27
2.3.3.2 志願優先機制之實例分析 29
第三章 最佳化分數模型建構 31
3.1研究問題的定義 31
3.2 研究模型之建構 32
第肆章 最佳化分數模型驗證結果與分析 317
4.1 最佳化分數模型相關資料及參數 37
4.2結果分析 44
第五章 結論與建議 51
參考文獻 53
附錄 55
附錄一 測試範例LINGO13.0程式碼 55
附錄二 實例2的答案及運算流 57

圖目錄
圖2-1 雙邊匹配模型圖 10
圖2-2 Deferred Acceptance algorithm 流程 15
圖2-3 實例1延遲接受演算法之流程 19
圖2-4最優交易循環機制流程 23
圖2-5 實例1的最優交易循環算法之流程 25
圖2-6志願優先機制 28
圖2-7志願優先演算法之實例1流程 29
圖2-8留學代辦機構選校機制示意圖 32
圖3-1 LINGO求解結果畫面 (學校的分散式評分) 42
圖3-2 LINGO求解結果畫面 (學校的集中式評分) 43
圖3-3 LINGO求解結果畫面 (學校的混合式評分) 44
表目錄
表2-1學生的偏好 16
表2-2學生排名 16
表2-3實例1延遲接受演法算簡易流程表 19
表2-4實例1延遲接受算法答案說明 20
表2-5 實例1最優交易循環算法答案說明 26
表2-6實例1志願優先演算法流程之簡易表 29
表3-1 學生給學校的評分 38
表3-2 學校的分散式評分 38
表 3-3 學校的集中式評分 39
表 3-4 學校的混合式評分 39
表3-5 學校的分散式評分之合併 41
表3-6 學校的集中式評分之合併 41
表3-7 學校的混合式評分之合併 41
表3-8 實例1之最佳化滿意度結果分析 45
表3-9實例3之最佳化滿意度結果分析 48
Abdulkadiroglu, A., & Sonmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. American Economic Review, 93(3), 729-747.
Alcalde, J. and S. Barberà (1994). "Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems." Economic Theory 4(3): 417-435.
Chen, Y. and T. Sönmez (2006). "School choice: an experimental study." Journal of Economic Theory 127(1): 202-231.
Dubins LE, Freedman DA. (1981). Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Am. Math. Mon.88:485–94
El-Khawas, E. (1997). The role of intermediary organizations. In M. W. Peterson, D. D. Dill & L. A. Mets (Eds.), Planning and management for a changing environment (pp. 66–87). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Fan, Z.-P., et al. (2018). "Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents." Soft Computing 22(21): 7227-7241.
Gale, D. and L. S. Shapley (1962). "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage." The American Mathematical Monthly 69(1): 9-15.
Kesten O. 2009. Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? J. Econ. Theory 144:2209–26.
Pathak, P. A. (2011). The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment. Annual Review of Economics,3(1), 513–536.
Pathak, P. A. (2011). The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment. Annual Review of Economics, 3(1), 513–536.
Roth, Alvin E. (1982a), “The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives”, Mathematics of Operations Research, 7(4): 617-628.
Shapley, L., & Scarf, H. (1974). On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1(1), 23–37.
Tsai, Y., Trang, L.T., & Kobori, K. (2017). Factors Influencing International Students to Study at Universities in Taiwan. International Journal for Innovation Education and Research. Vol:5 No-01, 2017.
Yue, Q. (2012). A method for the two-sided matching with scores. 2012 9th International Conference on Fuzzy Systems and Knowledge Discovery.


電子全文 電子全文(網際網路公開日期:20250630)
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top