租稅優惠以減少稅收的途徑間接地構成政府支出，因此被稱為「稅式支出」（tax expenditures）。相對於透過預算過程的「直接支出」（direct expenditures），稅式支出具有行政效率、隱匿、穩固等優勢，使其獲得政治人物的偏愛。這些優勢加上現行稅式支出管理的不足，可能有助於立委追求其偏好的政策。據此，本文意在研究立委稅式支出提案的內容、動機以及影響通過與否的因素，藉此瞭解立委如何運用此一政策工具及立法過程。
本文首先回顧稅式支出及立法通過因素的相關研究，並以代理人理論與官僚極大化模型作為理論架構，闡述代議政治的委託－代理關係中，稅式支出如何滿足不同行為者的利益且通過；接著藉由次級資料分析法與內容分析法，彙整第二屆至第九屆第五會期之間立委提出的稅式支出條款，分析其內容與提案動機；最後利用邏輯斯迴歸模型（logistic regression model）分析立法通過的影響因素。
根據分析結果，立委提出的稅式支出集中於社會福利與產業政策，民進黨立委偏重前者，國民黨立委則偏重後者。動機方面，受限於會議記錄的內容，本文無法確定立委是否考量稅式支出的優勢而提案。最後，影響立委稅式支出提案通過與否的主因為行政部門的意見與立委的學經歷，提案者屬於多數聯盟未必有利於提案通過，仍需考慮提案策略對通過與否的潛在影響。整體而言，本文的研究發現呼應官僚在委託－代理關係中的優勢，且財政部為立法過程的關鍵角色。
基於上述發現，本文認為除了過去研究關注的產業稅式支出，也需要檢視我國社會福利稅式支出的運用情形。此外，基於過去稅式支出管理的不足，評估機制的改善、稅式支出的成效與影響，亦為後續研究值得探討的議題。

Tax expenditures indicates government expenditures spent through tax relieves. It is more politically attractive compared to direct spending since it has administrative efficiency, low level of visibility, and high level of stability. Therefore, legislators might opt to use tax expenditures to pursue policies they preferred. This thesis aims at analyzing tax expenditure bills initiated by legislators to explore the contents of those bills and determinants of legislative success.
The data is composed of tax expenditure bills and verbatim records of committee deliberation from February, 1993 to July, 2018. Using content analysis and logistic regression analysis, this thesis finds that tax expenditures are used mostly for social welfare and industrial development policies, and DPP initiate the former more than KMT, whereas KMT tends to initiate more for the latter. Results of logistic regression indicate that the opinion, in terms of tax relieves, of the executive branch contribute the most to legislative success is. This finding is in line with “the information advantages of bureaucracy” suggested by the agency theory. In addition, the professional background of a legislator serves as the second-important determinant. Finally, "majority party” does not increase the legislative success, and this might be because legislators’ strategical proposing-- to propose a bill similar to the executive branch’s that gains higher support while confronting lower conflict. Suggestions for future research are presented in the final section of the thesis.

口試委員審定書 I
謝 辭 III
中文摘要 V
英文摘要 VII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究目的與問題 4
第二章 文獻回顧 7
第一節 稅式支出的概念 7
第二節 制定稅式支出的誘因 9
第三節 稅式支出的負面影響 12
第四節 立法通過的因素 17
第五節 小結 23
第三章 研究設計 25
第一節 理論架構 25
第二節 研究假設 30
第三節 方法、範圍與資料 34
第四節 研究設計 38
第四章 稅式支出與提案動機 49
第一節 提案概況 49
第二節 提案內容 51
第三節 立委提出稅式支出的動機 61
第五章 稅式支出的通過因素 67
第一節 模型設置與變數 67
第二節 邏輯斯迴歸分析 69
第三節 結果討論 77
第六章 結論與建議 83
第一節 研究發現 83
第二節 研究限制與建議 86
參考文獻 89

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