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研究生:吳予瑭
研究生(外文):Yu-Tang Wu
論文名稱:我們需要兩層次知識論嗎?——Sosa的德性知識論再探討
論文名稱(外文):Do We Need a Bi-level Theory of Knowledge?—Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology Revisited
指導教授:鄧敦民鄧敦民引用關係
指導教授(外文):Duen-Min Deng
口試委員:李國揚蔡政宏
口試委員(外文):Kok-Yong LeeCheng-Hung Tsai
口試日期:2020-07-24
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:哲學研究所
學門:人文學門
學類:哲學學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:142
中文關鍵詞:Sosa德性知識論兩層次知識論動物知識省思知識AAA結構觀點論
外文關鍵詞:Sosavirtue epistemologybi-level epistemologyanimal knowledgereflective knowledgeAAA structureperspectivism
DOI:10.6342/NTU202003044
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在本論文中,我對於Ernest Sosa的兩層次知識理論做出批判,指出Sosa的建構並沒有成功達到他心目中帶有內在論色彩的知識圖像。
  Sosa的德性知識論——兩層次知識論,是當代知識論上極具開創性的嶄新理論,在知識論的各項議題上都帶來非常大的影響與貢獻;尤其在懷疑論的討論上,提供了令人怦然、眼睛為之一亮的回答。於是首兩章我以懷疑論作為開端,尤其聚焦在Sosa對於「外在世界懷疑論」與「循環問題」的解法。在端視Sosa的回答的過程中,Sosa帶有內在論色彩的兩層次知識輪廓也會逐步呈現,然而同時Sosa所做建構的缺陷也會隨之浮現。
  在第三章,我旨於提出一套對於Sosa的詮釋。我認為Sosa歷來對於他的兩層次知識理論的不盡相同的描述,可以歸納成兩套不同的刻畫方式:「觀點論」的刻畫方式,以及「AAA結構」的刻畫方式。其中前者所構築出的,是Sosa心目中的知識論圖像,在這個圖像中,Sosa描繪了他對於知識的期望,包含達到融貫與理解、知道來源的可靠性,以及擁有內在論式的資源以回應懷疑論的挑戰;而後者則可以視為Sosa對於他心目中的知識論圖像所做的明確建構,在這個建構中,Sosa定義了「適切」的概念,再從這個概念來建構出兩層次的知識,而如此建構的目的便是要達到他在觀點論中所描繪的期望。
  再接下來的兩章,我對於Sosa的兩層次理論做出更進一步的批判。我先是探討Kornblith對於Sosa所提出的兩個攻擊,並從中擷取出關於內外在論議題的靈感,發展出我自己對於Sosa的一套批評。而我的批評會呼應到我在首章所預告的:我們之所以會認為懷疑論是個挑戰,是因為光是在實際的層面上指出「我們實際上沒有在作夢、實際上也沒有惡魔在欺騙我們,因此我們的確擁有知識」是不夠的,實際上我們當然有可能是醒著的、也有可能是在作夢,這些狀況當然都是有可能發聲的,顯然實際上如何並不是知識論上所關注的,我們所追求的是要站在更高層次「去說我擁有知識」,是要認知到自己處在對的環境、認知到自己的能力可靠。然而,雖然Sosa為了避免直接用「實際上條件適當」作為回答方式,提出了兩層次知識理論以描述我們如何得知條件適當,可是根據他的刻畫結果,決定我們是否擁有(省思)知識的,卻還是「實際上」條件是否適當——這只不過是把原先的問題往後退一步而已,同樣的問題依然存在。
  最後一章,我對Sosa兩層次理論的建構進行再思,探討可能的修正方向。首先我從對於Sosa的SSS能力理論的分析發現到,若是將二階能力與二階條件作修正,強調認知主體是要在「出問題時會有徵兆」的條件下行使「對於徵兆有所反應」的能力,似乎可以一定程度地緩解我所提出的批評,原因是這麼一來就得以不再淪為由二階環境的實況來「保證」我們可以預設一階環境適當,而是可以讓我們「透過徵兆」去對環境有所認知。於是接著,我便運用此修正,對於二階能力做出更詳盡的刻畫,以說明我們是如何行使二階能力來對於能力可靠、狀態適當、情境適當等有所認知,而如此一來便能如Sosa在觀點論所述的:達到某種知性觀點,得到省思知識。然而我認為,這份修正依然沒有真正解決Sosa的刻畫所遇到的問題,除了有懷疑論劇本尚待解決之外,還會面臨無限後退難題:雖然我所提出的批評在表面上獲得緩解,但其實在新的層次上又會再度出現類似的問題。我的結論是:Sosa的建構並沒有成功達成他所追求的觀點論圖像;而末尾我也提供了下一步的可能發展方向:或許建構之所以會出問題,是因為錯誤地將第一層次與第二層次之間刻畫成線性的;而如果將觀點論中所勾勒出的融貫的網狀結構作為藍圖,或許可以得到回應無限後退難題的理論資源。
In this thesis, I challenge Ernest Sosa’s bi-level theory of knowledge by arguing that he does not successfully incorporate the insight of internalist epistemologies into virtue reliabilism.
  In chapter one and two, I introduce Sosa’s theory by discussing two forms of skepticism, dream skepticism and the problem of criterion. Sosa distinguishes two sorts of knowledge: the animal versus the reflective. Animal knowledge only requires that the believer gets truth through competence rather than just luck. Reflective knowledge goes beyond that by requiring that the believer understands that their competence is reliable and the ambient situation is appropriate through meta-competence. After outlining Sosa’s theory and his responses to skepticism, I point out some problems with his theory, and will elaborate them in detail in chapters four and five.
  In chapter three, I find that in his writings over several decades, Sosa has employed different ways to characterize the bi-level theory of knowledge. I then argue that there are at least two ways of characterization: “perspectivism” and “AAA structure”. The former can be viewed as the picture he pursues in epistemology, which includes gaining coherence and understanding, being aware of the reliability of our competences and having resources to respond to the skeptical threats. The latter is the construction of the theory and the means to achieve the goals. More specifically, he defines two sorts of knowledge, animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, in terms of the notion of aptness, so as to attain his perspectivism.
  In chapters four and five, I examine Hilary Kornblith’s criticisms, and argue that he misunderstands Sosa’s theory thereby. In addition, I provide my criticism of Sosa’s theory. Sosa grants that the reason why we think skepticism would pose threats is that if we only appeal to our “in fact” not being in a dream, our “in fact” not being deceived by an evil demon, our “in fact” not being BIVs etc. to justify our “in fact” having knowledge, then the reply is superficial. What we want to explore is not what actually happens but to say we have knowledge at a higher level. Sosa prima facie avoids this problem by appealing to the bi-level theory of knowledge; however, according to his construction, whether we have reflective knowledge or not also appeals to the idea that we are “in fact” in the appropriate second-order condition. Therefore, Sosa’s theory only postpones the problem rather than solving the problem.
  In the last chapter, I revisit Sosa’s theory and try to find a way out for him. To start, I modify the account of second-order competence and second-order conditions. From Sosa’s SSS competence theory, on the one hand, I found that we should underline that second-order competence is constituted by responsiveness to warning signs such as the missing of the first-order skill/shape/situation. On the other hand, we should emphasize that the second-order conditions are that the present or absence of such first-order skill/shape/situation is not hidden. If these are the cases, then Sosa’s theory dodges my criticism. This is because we acquire understanding through the warning signs. Also, our knowledge of first-order conditions is no longer determined by the fact of second-order conditions. However, the modification does not succeed on the grounds that it is subject to skeptical scenarios, and the regress problem. Therefore, I conclude that Sosa’s construction of bi-level epistemology does not succeed. Nevertheless, I think that Sosa’s theory is not sentenced to death, so I provide a possible approach to develop his construction.
口試委員會審定書 i
中文摘要 ii
英文摘要 iv
第一章 外在世界懷疑論與兩層次知識論 1
第一節 外在世界懷疑論與安全性條件 1
第二節 Sosa的兩層次知識理論 4
第三節 解決夢的懷疑論 8
第四節 適當條件與不適當條件 11
第五節 理論困難 14
第二章 循環問題與Sosa的觀點論知識圖像 19
第一節 問題背景 19
第二節 Sosa的解法 21
2.2.1. 分析拔靴帶論證 21
2.2.2. 涉及理由的能力與不涉及理由的能力 23
2.2.3. 次人的概念 24
2.2.4. 融貫的觀點論圖像 26
第三節 分析與診斷 30
2.3.1. 動物知識作為基礎知識 30
2.3.2. 拔靴帶論證的出現 32
第四節 解法重建 33
2.4.1. 如何阻止拔靴帶論證出現 33
2.4.2. 真正適用於兩層次知識論的解法 35
第三章 兩層次理論的兩套刻畫方式:AAA結構與觀點論 39
第一節 Sosa的兩套刻畫方式 39
3.1.1. 觀點論 39
3.1.2. AAA結構 43
第二節 兩套刻畫方式間的關係 53
第三節 細看AAA結構的刻畫方式 55
3.3.1. 條件(C) 55
3.3.2. 後設適切 57
3.3.3. 判斷與引導 60
第四章 省思知識是否更有價值? 63
第一節 Kornblith的批評一 63
第二節 初步探討 67
4.2.1. 過度誇大心理學理論 67
4.2.2. 省思知識的價值 68
第三節 進一步分析 73
4.3.1. 唯有能提升可靠度才更有價值? 73
4.3.2. 知識的價值問題 77
第五章 兩層次理論的崩解 81
第一節 Kornblith的批評二 81
5.1.1. 動物知識做兩次 81
5.1.2. 內在論與外在論 85
第二節 初步探討 87
第三節 Sosa建構的失敗 90
5.3.1. 建構目標 90
5.3.2. 建構的失敗 93
第六章 兩層次理論再探討 97
第一節 問題重述 97
第二節 能力理論 100
6.2.1. SSS能力理論 100
6.2.2. 能力測試 103
第三節 以觀點論為核心的建構修正 113
6.3.1. 邁向觀點論 113
6.3.2. 深談二階能力 115
第四節 懷疑論所帶來的困境 121
6.4.1. 極端懷疑論 121
6.4.2. 夢的懷疑論 125
第五節 兩層次知識論的困境與展望 129
6.5.1. 無限後退難題 129
6.5.2. 觀點論的兩層次知識 132
結論 135
參考文獻 141
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Carter, J. Adam (2020). De Minimis Normativism: a new theory of full aptness. Philosophical Quarterly.
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Kornblith, Hilary (2012). On Reflection. Oxford University Press.
Kornblith, Hilary (2019) "Don’t Think Twice, It’s Alright," Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 48: No. 1, Article1.
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Sosa, Ernest (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, Ernest (1997). Reflective knowledge in the best circles. Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):410-430.
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Sosa, Ernest (2019). Animal Versus Reflective Orders of Epistemic Competence. In Luca Tateo & Waldomiro Silva-Filho (eds.), Thinking About Oneself. Springer Verlag.
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米建國(2014)。〈書評:Ernest Sosa, Knowing Full Well(《知之完好》)〉,《哲學與文化》:德性理論與中國哲學專題,第41卷第3期,第143頁~152頁。
米建國 (2019)。〈德性知識論〉,《華文哲學百科》(2019 版本),王一奇(編)。URL=http://mephilosophy.ccu.edu.tw/entry.php?entry_name=德性知識論。
何宗興(2018)。〈知識的價值〉,王一奇(編),《華文哲學百科》(2019 版本)。URL=http://mephilosophy.ccu.edu.tw/entry.php?entry_name=知識的價值。
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