臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文處理的是虛構名稱的問題。為了處理這個問題，筆者認為本文應包含這幾個部分：說明虛構名稱的問題為何、討論既有的理論、反省以及對虛構名稱問題的回應。首先，在文中我嘗試著透過構作悖論的方式來刻劃虛構名稱的問題。接著我討論對於虛構名稱問題的一些解決方案，這些解決方案分為三個部分：早期的解決嘗試、麥農主義、反麥農主義。我試著透過我所提出的問題刻劃架構來說明這些不同的理論是如何解決虛構名稱的問題。除此之外，關於麥農主義，我企圖釐清麥農主義的主張內容，並建議將麥農論旨作為麥農式理論核心的觀念。反麥農主義的立場意味著這個陣營的觀點是拒絕麥農論旨，但這並不意味著這個陣營中的理論與麥農主義差異極大。這些解決問題的嘗試都共同從給出指涉對象下手。假裝理論的出發點與給出指涉對象的進路非常不同，我試著說明假裝理論雖然也不令人滿意，但是從人們使用語言的行動來回應虛構名稱的問題這一點是可靠的。我嘗試提出一種折衷的方案，從一種脈絡主義式的進路回應虛構名稱的問題。在不同的脈絡中，我們會設定承認不同的對象。在談論真實對象的脈絡中，我們不會承認有虛構名稱指涉的對象，但是，在談論虛構作品的內容時，我們則會認為我們使用虛構名稱談論某些對象。

My main concern here is the problem of fictional names. To approach the problem, this dissertation is supposed to cover the characterization of the problem, discussions about existing views, reflections on those views, and my reply to the problem. The problem lies in our acceptance of three imcompatible statements about fictional names. I then turned to discuss theories providing solutions to the problem of fictional names. These theories can be divided into two groups: Meinongianism and anti-Meinongianism. Of Meinongianism, different Meinongians characterize the theory differently. The core idea of different Meinongian views is the Meinongian thesis, which Anti-Meinongianism rejects. These theories solve the problem by offering some theories of object. Pretense theory suggested an action theory approach. I argued that although pretense theory is not satisfactory, this approach is plausible. I then suggested an eclectic view. I adopted a contextualistic approach. One sentence has different truth value in different contexts. This explains why we sometimes accept that Holmes is a detective but sometimes not.

Preface 1
Ch.1 The problem of Parmenides’s paradox 5
1.1 Is there anything wrong with our common sense? 5
1.2 Varieties of empty names 11
1.3 Frege’s solution 14
1.4 Russell’s solution 22
1.5 Naïve Meinongian view 29
Ch.2 Something does not exist 37
2.1 What is Meinongianism? 37
2.2 The distinction between realism and anti-realism 41
2.3 Sansbury’s “realism” 49
2.4 Independence, existence, and actuality 53
2.5 Crane’s objects of thought 56
2.6 Is it just a label? 62
Ch.3 Everything exists 65
3.1 Two ways to have referents of fictional names 65
3.2 Possibilia view: possible worlds and fictional names 67
3.3 Possibilia view: possibilia view and Meinongianism 70
3.4 Possibilia view: reflections on the Lewisian view of fictional names 76
3.5 Abstracta view: abstract objects 81
3.6 Abstracta view: reflections on van Inwagen’s abstracta view 89
Ch.4 How do we use fictional names? 94
4.1 Reconsidering Russell’s robust sense of reality 94
4.2 Why should we focus on reality? 98
4.3 Action theory and ontology 104
4.4 Toward an explanation of the uses of fictional names 108
4.5 Explaining some cases 115
4.6 The identity of fictional “objects” 123
Conclusion 128
References 130

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