臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去公司治理相關研究在探討機構投資人對其之影響時，多以持股比例作為衡量變數，然而持股比例的大小並不能完全反應機構投資人的監督效果，因此本研究改以機構投資人持股穩定性來進行衡量，以台灣上市櫃公司作為研究對象，探討機構投資人持股穩定性與企業績效關聯性，是否機構投資人會發揮其監督功能，使公司價值及績效提升。而本研究實證結果顯示，在台灣資本市場下以全體機構投資人監督效果確實存在，其持股穩定性與企業績效呈顯著正相關聯。

除此之外，本研究進一步探討機構投資人之異質性，將機構投資人區分為主動監控與被動監控型機構投資人，其實證結果發現，在主動監控型機構投資人組合下，其持股穩定性與企業績效間關聯性更強，其產生之監督效果更為明顯，其原因可能為該組合之機構投資人因無與其公司存在潛在業務關係，故具較高誘因監督公司管理層，進而降低代理成本提高企業績效。

The purpose of the study is to assess the association between stability of institutional ownership and corporate firm performance within a simultaneous equation model. The results are consistent with the view with the view that stable institutional investors play an effective role in monitoring. We find that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership stability and firm performance.

In addition, we also investigate the heteroscedasticity of the institutional investors. When we divide institutional investors into two groups: active monitor and passive monitor categories, we find that stable shareholding of each group has a larger positive impact on performance in pressure-insensitive group and the reason is that the active-monitoring institutional investors that are free of conflicts of interests would have greater incentives and abilities to monitor the management.

第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 3
1.3 研究架構與流程 5
第二章 文獻回顧 7
2.1 機構投資人與代理問題 7
2.2 機構投資人與企業績效之關聯性 8
第三章 研究方法與模型 12
3.1 資料來源與樣本選取 12
3.2 本文假說建立 13
3.3 實證模型與變數定義 14
第四章 實證結果 22
4.1 敘述性統計分析 22
4.2 全體機構投資人持股穩定性與企業績效之實證結果 26
4.3 高低持股組合下，其持股穩定性與企業績效之實證結果 28
4.4 主動監控與被動監控法人，其持股穩定性與企業績效之實證結果 31
4.5 穩健性測試 33
第五章 結論與建議 37
5.1 結論 37
5.2 研究限制與建議 38
參考文獻 39

國內文獻
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張淨瑄(2016)，「三大法人持股穩定性與盈餘管理之關聯 - 以台灣上市櫃公司為例」，國立中正大學財務金融所碩士論文。

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