摘要 3
1. 緒論 6
1.1 研究動機與目的 6
1.2 文獻回顧 7
網路外部性之相關文獻回顧 7
混合寡占之相關文獻 9
技術授權之相關文獻 10
1.3 研究方法 13
1.4 本文架構 14
2. 基本模型 15
2.1 模型設定 15
2.2 模型的均衡與解法 16
2.3 探討議題 17
3. 混合寡占與技術授權 18
3.1 廠商1不授權之下的市場均衡 18
3.2 廠商1授權給廠商0(部分民營化廠商) 26
3.3 在混合寡占市場結構下廠商1的最適授權策略 38
3.4 小結 48
4. 技術授權與民營化決策 49
4.1無技術授權下的民營化政策 49
4.2技術授權下的民營化政策 52
4.3 小結 58
5. 結論 59
參考文獻 61

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