跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(44.192.94.177) 您好!臺灣時間:2024/07/16 23:48
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:謝旻家
研究生(外文):XIE, MIN-JIA
論文名稱:董事會多樣性與審計調整數之關聯性
論文名稱(外文):The Influence of Board Diversity on Audit Adjustments
指導教授:邱秀清邱秀清引用關係
指導教授(外文):CHIU, HSIU-CHING
口試委員:薛富井顏怡音邱秀清
口試委員(外文):SHIUE,FU-JIINGYEN,YI-YINCHIU, HSIU-CHING
口試日期:2020-06-23
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中國文化大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:58
中文關鍵詞:董事會多樣性審計調整數盈餘品質公司治理
外文關鍵詞:Board diversityAudit AdjustmentsEarnings QualityCorporate Governance
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:274
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
在所有權與經營權分離之情況下,管理階層有可能因為代理問題而產生損害股東利益的情況,因此建立有效之監督機制為當前公司治理最主要目標之一。依據資源依賴理論,當企業面臨外在環境挑戰時,董事會之應變能力與危機處理能力愈顯重要。當董事會中成員之經驗與資源愈多元,能提供經理人更多元經驗和觀點,降低取得資源的不確定性,提升企業的經營效率及決策判斷能力。
本研究之樣本期間為2012至2018年。本研究利用審計調整數作為盈餘品質的替代變數,藉由董事會獨立性、專業性、忙碌性、性別、年資及教育程度來了解董事會多樣性是否影響盈餘品質。研究結果顯示,董事會專業性、忙碌性及教育程度愈高愈能夠有效縮短審計調整數;董事會獨立性、性別及年資則未達顯著影響。

The main purpose of corporate governance is create an efficiency monitor mech-anism, because manage will harm shareholder due to self-interest. According to re-source dependence theory, when companies face external challenges, if board members have more diverse, they can provide managers with more diversified experi-ences and opinions, reduce the uncertainty of obtaining resources, and improve the operating efficiency and decision-making judgment of the enterprise.
We collected data from Taiwan Economic Journal since 2012 to 2018. We use au-dit adjustment as proxy of earnings quality, using board independent, profession, bus-yness, gender, tenure, education to measure board diversity. Empirical result present that board professional, busyness and education can reduce the audit adjustment; board independent, gender and tenure are no significant impact.

中文摘要 ..................... iii
英文摘要 ..................... iv
誌謝辭  ..................... v
內容目錄 ..................... vi
表目錄  ..................... viii
圖目錄  ..................... ix
第一章  緒論................... 1
  第一節  研究背景與動機............ 1
  第二節  研究問題............... 3
  第三節  研究架構與流程............ 4
  第四節  論文架構............... 5
第二章  文獻探討................. 7
  第一節  董事會多樣性............. 7
  第二節  審計調整數與自結盈餘......... 14
第三章  研究方法................. 16
  第一節  研究架構............... 16
  第二節  研究假說............... 17
  第三節  變數定義與衡量............ 21
  第四節  實證模型............... 29
  第五節  樣本選取與資料蒐集.......... 30
第四章  實證結果與分析.............. 31
  第一節  敘述性統計.............. 31
  第二節  相關係數分析............. 34
  第三節  迴歸分析............... 37
第五章  結論與建議................ 40
  第一節  研究結論............... 40
  第二節  研究建議............... 41
  第三節  研究限制............... 41
參考文獻 ..................... 42

一、中文文獻
丁秀儀,陳于欣(2010),公司獨立董事為何忙碌,管理學報,27(3), 291-318。
李建然(2000),影響台灣上市公司自願性盈餘預測頻率之研究,會計評論,(32),49-79。
沈文華、林曉玟、梁瑜玲與陳振翔(2009),會計師簽證客戶產業多樣性與審計品質關係之研究,行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫(國科會,NSC 98-2410-H-151-016-),台北:行政院國家科學委員會。
林欣美,郭麗華,蘇迺惠(2008),國際化程度、董事會結構、精練法人監督對盈餘管理之影響:以台灣資訊電子業爲例,臺大管理論叢,19(1),157-186。
林嬋娟,張哲嘉(2009),董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性,會計評論,(48),1-33。
范宏書,陳慶隆,李淑華,謝永明(2008),總審計調整數對公司財務報表公佈時效性之影響,輔仁管理評論,15(1), 73-105。
倪連成(2010),董事會資源對資訊揭露之影響—以臺灣上市公司電子業為例。高雄第一科技大學財務管理所未出版之碩士論文。
張元,王筱瑩(2016),董事會及高階管理階層的性別多樣性與企業社會責任的關聯,亞太經濟管理評論,20(1),1-44。
張元,葉清雄(2014),忙碌董事、風險承擔與債務資金成本,兩岸金融季刊,2(3),1-54。
張金鈴(2001),自行結算盈餘與公告盈餘差異影響之研究,東吳大學會計學系未出版之碩士論文。
張森河,黃劭彥,王登仕,康照宗(2018),經理人過度自信與審計能力對自結盈餘資訊接露決策的影響,管理與系統, 25(2),145-188。
張雅婷(2017),審計調整數對盈餘品質之影響—以台灣為例。政治大學會計學系未出版之碩士論文。
粘季為,張元,許敏政(2017),公司董事會多樣性是否有助於降低公司風險?,兩岸金融季刊,5(3),69-111。
郭翠菱,王志洋(2017),公司治理如何影響家族企業之績效?長期縱貫分析,會計評論,(64),61-111。
陳彥旭(2006),自結盈餘與公告盈餘差異對會計師更換影響之研究,輔仁大學會計學系碩士班未出版之碩士論文。
陳瑞斌,許崇源(2007),公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究. 交大管理學報,2,55-109。
傅碧軼,楊雅智,黃鼎喬(2019),會計師產業專精與審計報告時間落差:中國證據,會計審計論叢,9(1),75-117。
曾慈恩(2016),導入IFRS前後自結營收審計調整之比較,東吳大學會計學系未出版之碩士論文。
楊孟萍,林瑞青,盧怡倫(2004),自結盈餘與公告盈餘間差異之影響因素研究,臺大管理論叢,14(2),135-160。
楊朝旭,蔡柳卿,陳家慧,廖思婷(2012),董事會特性與實質盈餘管理,台大管理論叢,23(1),363-399。
廖益興(2010),董事會組成、股權結構與年報資訊揭露水準,臺大管理論叢,20(2),209-249。
廖益興,楊清溪(2007),公司治理機制與財務報表品質之關聯性研究,財務金融學刊,15(3),67-112。
盧怡倫(2002),自行結算盈餘準確性之影響因素研究,東吳大學會計學系未出版之碩士論文。
賴思蓉(2015),董事會任期與公司績效—論外部競爭之角色,高雄應用科技大學財富與稅務管理系未出版之碩士論文。
蘇裕惠,楊孟萍,許聖偉(2018),公司增加獨立董事席次及設置審計委員會與盈餘品質之研究—法規擴大強制範圍之影響,當代會計,19(2),241-268。

二、英文文獻
Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., & Peters, G. F. (2004). Audit committee characteristics and restatements. A Journal of Practice and The-ory, 23(1), 69-87.
Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., & Presley, T. J. (2012). Female board pres-ence and the likelihood of financial restatement. Accounting Ho-rizons, 26(4), 607-629.
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of finan-cial economics, 94(2), 291-309.
Adams, R. B., Gray, S., & Nowland, J. (2010). Is there a business case for female directors? Evidence from the market reaction to all new director appointments. In 23rd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, Sydney, UNSW Sydney
Arranz-Aperte, L., & Berglund, T. (2008). Are busy directors good or bad for firm performance. FMA European, Finland, Helsinki
Bamber, E. M., Bamber, L. S., & Schoderbek, M. P. (1993). Audit structure and other determinants of audit report lag: An empirical analysis. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 12(1), 1-23.
Bantel, K. A., & Jackson, S. E. (1989). Top management and innova-tions in banking: Does the composition of the top team make a difference. Strategic Management Journal, 10(S1), 107-124.
Bathala, C. T., & Rao, R. P. (1995). The determinants of board com-position: An agency theory perspective. Managerial and Deci-sion Economics, 16(1), 59-69.
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting review, 71(4), 443-465.
Bédard, J., Chtourou, S. M., & Courteau, L. (2004). The effect of au-dit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggres-sive earnings management. A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(2), 13-35.
Berle, A., & Means, G. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property Macmillan. New York, 2(3), 45-53.
Bliss, M. A. (2011). Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing. Accounting and Finance, 51(2), 361-380.
Boeker, W., & Goodstein, J. (1993). Performance and successor choice: The moderating effects of governance and ownership. Academy of Management journal, 36(1), 172-186.
Boyd, B. (1990). Corporate linkages and organizational environment: A test of the resource dependence model. Strategic management journal, 11(6), 419-430.
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Terry, R. L. (1994). Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. Journal of financial Economics, 35(3), 371-390.
Buchanan, B. (1974). Building organizational commitment: The so-cialization of managers in work organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 19(4),533-546.
Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992). Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(2), 195-221.
Carpenter, M. A., & Westphal, J. D. (2001). The strategic context of external network ties: Examining the impact of director ap-pointments on board involvement in strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 639-660.
Celikyurt, U., Sevilir, M., & Shivdasani, A. (2014). Venture capital-ists in mature public firms. The Review of Financial Studies, 27(1), 56-101.
Chapple, L., Kent, P., & Routledge, J. (2012). Board gender diversity and going concern audit opinions. Financial Markets and Cor-porate Governance Conference (pp. 1-31), Social Science Re-search Network (SSRN).
Chiang, H. T., & He, L. J. (2010). Board supervision capability and information transparency. Corporate Governance: An Interna-tional Review, 18(1), 18-31.
Chung, H., Judge, W. Q., & Li, Y. H. (2015). Voluntary disclosure, excess executive compensation, and firm value. Journal of Cor-porate Finance, 32, 64-90.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., & Lang, L. (2000). Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia. Policy Re-search Working Paper 2000, The World Bank
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm per-formance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371-406.
Darmadi, S. (2013). Board members' education and firm performance: evidence from a developing economy. International Journal of Commerce and Management, 23(2), 113-135.
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981). Auditor independence,‘low balling’, and dis-closure regulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3(2), 113-127.
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Ac-counting Research, 13(1), 1-36.
DeFond, M. L., Hann, R. N., & Hu, X. (2005). Does the market value financial expertise on audit committees of boards of directors? Journal of Accounting Research, 43(2), 153-193.
DeZoort, F. T., & Salterio, S. E. (2001). The effects of corporate gov-ernance experience and financial-reporting and audit knowledge on audit committee members' judgments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice, 20(2), 31-47.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57-74.
Fairchild, L., & Li, J. (2005). Director quality and firm performance. Financial Review, 40(2), 257-279.
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 327-349.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1087-1111.
Fich, E. M. & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective mon-itors? The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 689-724.
Fich, E. M. & Shivdasani, A., (2007). Financial fraud, director reputa-tion, and shareholder wealth, Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2), 306-336.
Fich, E. M. (2005). Are some outside directors better than others? Evidence from director appointments by Fortune 1000 firms. The Journal of Business, 78(5), 1943-1972.
Forker, J. J. (1992). Corporate governance and disclosure quality. Accounting and Business Research, 22(86), 111-124.
Fracassi, C., & Tate, G. (2012). External networking and internal firm governance. The Journal of Finance, 67(1), 153-194.
Francis, J. R., & Krishnan, J. (1999). Accounting accruals and auditor reporting conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16(1), 135-165.
Gîrbină, M. M., Albu, N., & Albu, C. N. (2012). Corporate govern-ance disclosures in Romania. In Board directors and corporate social responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 122-141.
Groysberg, B., & Connolly, K. (2013). Great leaders who make the mix work. Harvard Business Review, 91(9), 68-76.
Gul, F. A., Hutchinson, M., & Lai, K. M. (2013). Gender-diverse boards and properties of analyst earnings forecasts. Accounting Horizons, 27(3), 511-538.
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. (1994). Competing for the future. Har-vard business review, 72(4), 122-128.
Harris, I. C., & Shimizu, K. (2004). Too busy to serve? An examina-tion of the influence of overboarded directors. Journal of Man-agement Studies, 41(5), 775-798.
Hashim, U. J., & Abdul Rahman, R. (2011). Audit report lag and the effectiveness of audit committee among Malaysian listed com-panies. International Bulletin of Business Administration, 10, 50-61.
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corpo-rate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empiri-cal disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1-3), 405-440.
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm per-formance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspec-tives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 383-396.
Hitt, M. A., & Tyler, B. B. (1991). Strategic decision models: Inte-grating different perspectives. Strategic Management Journal, 12(5), 327-351.
Ho, S. S., & Wong, K. S. (2001). A study of the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary dis-closure. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Tax-ation, 10(2), 139-156.
Hsieh, Y. M., & Y. C. Tsai.(2005,Aug 7). Aggregate audit adjust-ments and discretionary accruals: Further evidence on the rela-tion between audit quality and earnings management. American Accounting Association 2005 Annual Meeting (New Scholars Concurrent Session), San Francisco, California, USA.
Hunton, J. E., Libby, R., & Mazza, C. L. (2006). Financial reporting transparency and earnings management. The Accounting Review, 81(1), 135-157.
Hwang, B. H., & Kim, S. (2009). It pays to have friends. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(1), 138-158.
Ittonen, K., & Peni, E. (2012). Auditor's gender and audit fees. Inter-national Journal of Auditing, 16(1), 1-18.
Kaplan, S. E., & Ravenscroft, S. P. (2004). The reputation effects of earnings management in the internal labor market. Business Eth-ics Quarterly, 14(3), 453-478.
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2006). Multiple directorships and corporate performance in Australian listed companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(6), 530-546.
Kim, H., & Lim, C. (2010). Diversity, outside directors and firm valu-ation: Korean evidence. Journal of Business Research, 63(3), 284-291.
Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Econom-ics, 33(3), 375-400.
Konrad, A. M., & Kramer, V. W. (2006). How many women do boards need. Harvard Business Review, 84(12), 22.
Konrad, A. M., Kramer, V., & Erkut, S. (2008). The impact of three or more women on corporate boards. Organizational Dynamics, 37(2), 145-164.
Krishnan, G. V. (2007). Did earnings conservatism increase for former Andersen clients? Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 22(2), 141-163.
Kumar, K. B., Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1999). What determines firm size? (No. w7208). National bureau of economic research.
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517.
Lennox, C., Wu, X., & Zhang, T. (2016). The effect of audit adjust-ments on earnings quality: Evidence from China. Journal of Ac-counting and Economics, 61(2-3), 545-562.
Mahadeo, J. D., Soobaroyen, T., & Hanuman, V. O. (2012). Board composition and financial performance: Uncovering the effects of diversity in an emerging economy. Journal of Business Ethics, 105(3), 375-388.
Meckling, W. H., & Jensen, M. C. (1976). Theory of the firm: Mana-gerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Miller, T., & del Carmen Triana, M. (2009). Demographic diversity in the boardroom: Mediators of the board diversity–firm perfor-mance relationship. Journal of Management Studies, 46(5), 755-786.
Mizruchi, M. S. (1983). Who controls whom? An examination of the relation between management and boards of directors in large American corporations. Academy of Management Review, 8(3), 426-435.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management own-ership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315.
Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. (1990). Applied linear statistical methods: Regression, analysis of variance, and ex-perimental designs. RD Irwin, Homewood, IL.
Nicholson, G. J., & Kiel, G. C. (2004). A framework for diagnosing board effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(4), 442-460.
Perry, T., & Peyer, U. (2005). Board seat accumulation by executives: A shareholder's perspective. The Journal of Finance, 60(4), 2083-2123.
Pfeffer, J. & G. R. Salancik (1978). The external control of organiza-tions: A resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.
Press, E. G., & J. B. Weintrop. (1990). Accounting-based constraints in public and private debt agreements: Their associations with leverage and impact on accounting choice. Journal of Account-ing and Economics, 12(1-3), 65-95.
Raghunandan, K., Rama, D. V., & Read, W. J. (2001). Audit commit-tee composition,“Gray Directors,” and interaction with internal auditing. Accounting Horizons, 15(2), 105-118.
Reeb, D. M., & Zhao, W. (2013). Director capital and corporate dis-closure quality. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 32(4), 191-212.
Ruback, R. S., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). The market for corporate con-trol: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50.
Sharma, V. D., & Iselin, E. R. (2012). The association between audit committee multiple-directorships, tenure, and financial mis-statements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 31(3), 149-175.
Shivdasani, A. (1993). Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16(1-3), 167-198.
Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999). CEO involvement in the se-lection of new board members: An empirical analysis. The Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1829-1853.
Solomon, I., M. D. Shields, & O. R. Whittington, (1999). What Do Indutry-Specialist Auditors Know. Journal of Accounting Re-search, 37(1), 191-208.
Srinidhi, B., F. A. Gul, & J. Tsui. (2011). Female directors and earn-ings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(5), 1610-1644.
Stewart, J., & Munro, L. (2007). The impact of audit committee ex-istence and audit committee meeting frequency on the external audit: Perceptions of Australian auditors. International Journal of Auditing, 11(1), 51-69.
Vafeas, N. (2000). Board structure and the informativeness of earn-ings. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 19(2), 139-160.
Vafeas, N. (2003). Length of board tenure and outside director inde-pendence. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 30(7‐8), 1043-1064.
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990). On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms. Academy of Manage-ment Review, 15(3), 421-458.
Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 431-460.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1984). Corporate Governance, The Yale Law Journal, 93(7), 1197–1230.
Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings man-agement and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295-316.

電子全文 電子全文(網際網路公開日期:20250721)
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
無相關期刊