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研究生:王偉翰
研究生(外文):WANG,WEI-HAN
論文名稱:超額薪酬對股價崩盤風險之影響兼論集團企業
論文名稱(外文):The Effect of Managers' Excess Compensation on Stock Price Crash Risk: the Examination between Group and Non-Group Enterprises
指導教授:樓雍儀樓雍儀引用關係
指導教授(外文):LOU,YUNG-YI
口試委員:樓雍儀王登仕吳幸蓁
口試委員(外文):LOU,YUNG-YIWANG,TENG-SHIHWU,XING-ZHEN
口試日期:2020-06-19
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:靜宜大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:35
中文關鍵詞:超額薪酬股價崩盤風險集團企業
外文關鍵詞:Group EnterprisesCrash RiskExcess Compensation
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
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  • 下載下載:46
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高階主管薪酬一直以來都是受重視之研究議題。本文探討高階主管薪酬與企業股價崩盤風險間之關聯性,作者利用台灣經濟新報資料庫(TEJ)中所獲得數據,以上市上櫃公司2011~2016年之企業高階主管薪酬資料以及股價資訊,檢視高階主管薪酬與股價崩盤風險是否呈現正相關顯著。並探討集團企業在是否自身具有較高之股價崩盤風險,以及在超額薪酬情況下,集團企業較非集團企業具有較高之股價崩盤風險。
實證結果顯示,(1)企業之管理階層超額薪酬與股價崩盤風險呈正相關顯著;(2) 集團企業相較於非集團企業具有較高股價崩盤風險;(3)集團企業相較於非集團企業管理階層超額薪酬影響股價崩盤風險程度較高。

After the outbreak of the financial crisis, it highlights the problem that many poorly performing company still pay high compensation to their managements. This paper investigates how managers' excess compensation affect stock price crash risk between group and non-group enterprises in Taiwan stock market to acquire knowledge about the relationship. We use a sample of listed firms from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database 2011 to 2016 to test our research hypotheses. The empirical results show that (1) for both group and non-group enterprises, there’s positive significant relationship between the managers' excess compensation and the stock price crash risk; (2) group companies have a greater risk of crash than non-group companies; (3) there exists more significant difference in the relationship between excess compensation and stock price crash risk between group and non-group businesses. That is, excess compensation does have a significantly positive impact on stock price crash risk at group firms, group companies with more chances of tunneling through related party transactions, and that group businesses have more positive significant relationship than non-group firms. Overall, the results provide special evidence of managers' excess compensation affect stock price crash risk. The main contribution of this paper is the significant results of positive relationship between excess compensation and stock price crash risk in group business which is the firstly documented and fills out the gap of relevant literature.
誌謝 I
摘要 II
Abstract III
目錄 IV
表目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻探討 4
第一節 超額薪酬 4
第二節 股價崩盤風險 6
第三節 集團企業 10
第四節 總結 11
第三章 研究方法與假說建立 13
第一節 假說建立 13
第二節 樣本選擇與數據來源 14
第三節 模型建立 15
第四章 實證結果 19
第一節 敘述性統計 19
第二節 超額薪酬對股票崩盤之影響 20
第三節 多元統計模型之迴歸結果 22
第四節 敏感性分析 26
第五章 結論 28
參考文獻 29


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