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研究生:廖育霆
研究生(外文):LIAO,YU-TING
論文名稱:董監事薪酬水準與企業經營失敗之關聯性研究
論文名稱(外文):Compensation Level of Directors and Supervisors and Business Failure
指導教授:謝永明謝永明引用關係
口試委員:齊德彰廖益興
口試日期:2020-06-05
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東吳大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:67
中文關鍵詞:企業經營失敗董監事薪酬超額董監薪酬
外文關鍵詞:Business FailureDirectors and Supervisors' Compensation
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
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  • 下載下載:18
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中央研究院於106年發布《臺灣經濟競爭與成長策略 政策建議》中提到 臺灣經濟情勢 正 面臨極大挑戰,於整體經濟 環境舉步維艱 ,企業經營失敗的可能性也隨之增加,然企業處變幻莫測的環境中,如何保持自身 營運的穩定及快速因應環境之衝擊 這 成為所有企業的課題。若企業經營不善,將可能導致公司股東、債權人、員工甚至是上、下游廠商蒙受巨大損害。而OECD於公司治理準中提及企業 在公司治理架構下應確保公司策略方針、董事會對管理階層之監控以及董事會對公司和股東的責任。其 公司治理準則 中建議董事會應有對公司策略、風險政策進行審查和指引 並 設定績效目標 及 監督企業績 效及政策之 執行 以 及 監督管理階層並在必要時更換 高階 管 理階層 並持續監督繼任計劃。而 於 去 年,華映及綠能下市,當時 新聞版面 中 出現下市公司董事照發百萬薪 酬 及每年都有公司於發生虧損 情況下仍然照發千萬薪酬,因而 讓投資大眾直呼不合理, 故 使本研究 欲 從董監事薪酬角度探討董監事薪酬與企業經營失敗 之 關聯。本研究於實證結果中發現過高之董監事薪酬會使董監事 產生消極作為之情況 ,因而造成監督力道不足進而使企業經營績效不佳,最後導致企業經營失敗以及失敗公司超額薪酬存在於非誘因性薪酬中,代表就算董監事未領取公司 之盈餘分配 ,其薪酬已超過正常水準,使董監事可能 在即使未盡其職責亦能獲得可觀之報酬的情況下,產生董監事不作為之情事,而使企業經營績效不佳或未能改善,最終導致企業經營失敗。
The Academia Sinica issued the "Taiwan Economic Competition and Growth Strategy and Policy Recommendations" in 106. It mentioned that Taiwan's economic situation is facing great challenges. If the enterprise is not doing well, it may cause great damage to the company's shareholders, creditors, employees, and even upstream and downstream manufacturers. Last year, Huaying(CPT) and Lvneng(GET) went out of the market. At that time, the directors of the listed companies issued a million salary and the company still issued 10 million salary every year in the event of a loss, which made the investment public call it unreasonable. Therefore, this study wants to explore the relationship between directors and supervisors' compensation and business failure from the perspective of directors and supervisors'compensation. This study found in the empirical results that excessively high compensation for directors and supervisors can lead to negative behaviors of directors and supervisors, resulting in insufficient supervisory power, which in turn leads to poor business performance of the enterprise, and ultimately leads to the failure of the enterprise's operation and the excessive compensation of the failed company. In non-inducing compensation, the representative’s compensation has exceeded the normal level even if the directors and supervisors have not received the company’s surplus distribution, so that the directors and supervisors may receive considerable compensation even if they have not fulfilled their duties. And the business performance of the enterprise is poor or fails to improve, which ultimately leads to the failure of the business operation.
摘要.........................................................................I
Abstract....................................................................II
目錄.......................................................................III
表目錄......................................................................IV
圖目錄.......................................................................V
第一章、緒論..................................................................1
第一節、研究背景與研究動機.....................................................1
第二節、研究目的..............................................................3
第三節、研究貢獻..............................................................4
第四節、研究流程..............................................................5
第五節、研究結構..............................................................6
第二章、文獻探討..............................................................7
第一節、公司董監事薪酬揭露之相關法令規範........................................7
第二節、代理問題、公司價值及公司績效之相關文獻回顧..............................8
第三節、董監事薪酬之相關文獻回顧..............................................11
第四節、企業經營失敗之相關文獻回顧............................................13
第三章、研究方法.............................................................17
第一節、研究假說.............................................................17
第二節、實證模型.............................................................19
第三節、變數衡量.............................................................23
第四節、研究樣本之選取與資料來源..............................................25
第四章、實證結果.............................................................30
第一節、敘述性統計...........................................................30
第二節、相關係數表...........................................................34
第三章、迴歸結果分析.........................................................37
第四節、增額測試.............................................................40
第五章、結論及建議...........................................................46
第一節、研究結論.............................................................46
第二節、研究限制與建議.......................................................47
參考文獻、..................................................................48
附表一、終止上市公司.........................................................53
附表二、全額交割公司.........................................................55
附表三、變數定義.............................................................58
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