臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究使用男子職業網球(Association of Tennis Professional, ATP)2014年至2019年四大滿貫的資料探討異質性以及獎勵誘因對於努力程度的影響。透過普通最小平方法(Ordinary Least Squares, OLS)和固定效果模型(Fixed Effect Model, FE)發現異質性對努力為負向顯著，當球員之間的異質性越大，比賽的強度會降低，而獎勵誘因對個人得分以及比賽時間為正向顯著，當輸贏間的獎金差距越大，選手們將更投入於比賽之中。由於原先的賽制使球員們的負擔過重，2018年底澳洲網球公開賽(Australia Open)和溫布頓錦標賽(Wimbledon)進行賽制改革，我們透過差異中的差異(Difference-in-Difference, DiD)探討改革後對球員的影響，研究結果發現賽制改革後，2019年的澳網、溫網的比賽時間、總局數、總得分相較於2014年至2018年的賽事皆下降，代表賽事改革成功減輕選手們的負擔。

This research uses the data of the Grand Slams of the Association of Tennis Professional(ATP) from 2014 to 2019 to explore the impact of heterogeneity and pecuniary incentives on the degree of effort. Through the Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) and the Fixed Effect Model(FE), we found that heterogeneity is negatively significant for effort. When the heterogeneity between players is greater, the intensity of the game will be reduced. And pecuniary incentives are positively significant for individual points and duration of games. When the prizes gap between winning and losing is greater, players will do more effort in the match. Due to the excessive burden on the players from the original game, the Australian Open and Wimbledon Championships were reformed at the end of 2018. We will discuss the differences of players after reformation through Difference-in-Difference(DiD) method. According to the results, we found that the duration of each game, total number of games and total points of both Wimbledon and Australian Open in 2019 all declined compared to the events from 2014 to 2018, which indicates players' burden reduce successfully due to the reformation.

第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機與目的 6
第三節 研究問題整理 7
第四節 研究範圍與限制 7
第貳章 文獻探討 8
第一節 異質性 8
第二節 獎勵誘因 12
第三節 長盤制 13
第四節 差異中的差異 14
第參章 研究方法與實證模型 16
第一節 研究架構 16
第二節 研究流程 16
第三節 實證方法與模型 17
第四節 研究樣本與敘述統計 21
第肆章 實證結果 27
第一節 迴歸結果分析 27
第二節 小結 42
第伍章 結論 52
參考資料 55

表目錄
表 1 變數定義表 18
表 2 賽制整理 20
表 3 差異中的差異研究設計 21
表 4 敘述統計表 25
表 5 異質性和獎勵誘因對個人得分影響之迴歸結果 28
表 6 異質性和獎勵誘因對比賽時間影響之迴歸結果 31
表 7 異質性和獎勵誘因對個人得分影響之迴歸結果(Panel) 34
表 8 異質性和獎勵誘因對比賽時間影響之迴歸結果(Panel) 37
表 9 賽制改革對總局數影響之迴歸結果 40
表 10 賽制改革對劣勢方翻盤機率之影響迴歸結果 46
表 10.1 賽制改革對劣勢方翻盤機率之影響迴歸結果 48
表 11 實證結果與文獻對照表 50
表 12 賽制改革對比賽總投入減少之百分比 54

圖目錄
圖 1 2019 澳網獎金分配表 5

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