本研究以NBA為例，利用2003-2020年的資料，探討球員表現與平均年薪之關係。我們利用混合迴歸估計法和追蹤資料 （Panel Data） 控制固定效果估計法進行分析，並檢視2011年勞資糾紛前後，球員表現與薪資關係是否有所變動。混合迴歸估計之結果顯示，在合約簽訂前一年之表現越好的球員，簽約合約的平均年薪也越高，而且在2011年勞資糾紛後，此相關性更高。而在追蹤資料 （Panel Data） 控制固定效果估計法中，同一名球員在合約簽訂前一年之表現變動與簽約之平均年薪變動為顯著之負相關，但在勞資糾紛後，球員表現變動與薪資變動為則轉為正相關。這可能是由於在勞資談判前，明星球員高薪低就，未打出符合薪資變動的表現；非主力球員表現成長時，也未必能領取符合的薪資變動，因此觀察到負相關，成為促使勞資談判的可能原因之一。在勞資經過談判協商之後，訂立符合雙方利益的條約，明星球員和非主力球員都能拿到符合表現的合約，使得同一球員的表現變動與薪資變動轉為正相關。

This research uses NBA’s data from 2003 to 2020 to explore the relationship between wage and performance of a player. We also examine whether the relationship between wage and performance changed before and after the labor dispute in 2011. Our results of the Pooled OLS regression estimation show that players with better performance in the year before signing a new contract received higher average annual wage in their new contracts, and the relationship became stronger after the labor dispute in 2011. Using fixed-effect panel data method, we find that before the labor dispute, performance of a player was negatively statistically significantly correlated with his average annual salary. However, the relationship was positive after the labor dispute. A possible explanation is that before the labor dispute, some All-star players’ performance did not match their high salary, while the improvement of some role players’ performance didn’t get them paid more. The observed negative relationship might result in the labor dispute. The negotiation led to a new contract which is beneficial for players and employers. All-star players and role players are able to obtain contracts that depend on their performance. The new contract may be the reason that turn the relationship between performance and wage from negative to positive.

致謝詞........................................................i
摘要.........................................................ii
Abstract....................................................iii
目錄.........................................................iv
第一章. 前言...................................................1
第二章. 文獻探討...............................................7
2.1 績效和薪資.........................................7
2.2 運動產業...........................................8
第三章. 發展背景...............................................9
3.1 發展歷程...........................................9
3.2 勞資爭議..........................................11
第四章. 資料和研究方法.......................................14
4.1 資料.............................................14
4.2 研究方法.........................................16
4.2.1 混合迴歸模型...................................16
4.2.2 追蹤資料之固定效果模型........... .............17
第五章. 實證結果.............................................19
5.1 樣本敘述性統計...................................19
5.2 混合迴歸估計結果.................................21
5.3 追蹤資料定效果之估計結果... .....................23
5.4 結果討論.........................................25
結論.........................................................28
參考文獻.....................................................30
附錄.........................................................32

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