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研究生:張善絜
研究生(外文):CHANG, SHAN-CHIEH
論文名稱:雙重股權結構與董事獨立性對關係人交易之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Dual Class Structure and Director Independence on Related Party Transactions
指導教授:陳一如陳一如引用關係
指導教授(外文):CHEN, I-JU
口試委員:羅懷均陳彥行
口試委員(外文):LUO,HUAI-JYUNCHEN,YAN-SING
口試日期:2020-05-27
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:元智大學
系所名稱:財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:一般商業學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:108
語文別:中文
論文頁數:43
中文關鍵詞:雙重股權結構關係人交易董事獨立性
外文關鍵詞:dual-class ownership structurerelated party transactionboard independence
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本論文旨在探討雙重股權結構與董事獨立性對關係人交易之影響,過去研究認為關係人交易大多發生在股權結構集中的公司中,當公司的股權集中於少部分的內部股東,內部大股東較有權力以及影響力進行關係人交易(Peng, Wei, and Yang, 2011),這些關係人交易很容易形成內部人利用自己的職位來進行有利於自己而非對公司有利的交易之弊端(Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012);然而也因為控制權的集中及提高,公司被收購的機率降低,管理階層也較可以做使公司利益最大化的長期的策略性計畫(Fischel, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Stein, 1988),而進行有效率的關係人交易以最大化公司利益。然而過去沒有相關文獻探討雙重股權結構與關係人交易之間的關係,故本研究之研究成果著重探討此方面之研究。本研究顯示在雙重股權結構下,關係人交易金額與交易數較高,然而相較於非雙重股權結構,當公司為雙重股權公司且有關係人交易,對公司價值並沒有顯著的影響;此外我們也進一步探討獨立董事在雙重股權結構公司對關係人交易的影響,研究結果發現不管董事獨立性高低與否,雙重股權公司進行關係人交易對公司價值的影響沒有顯著差異。
This study is to explore the association between dual-class ownership structure, board independence, and related party transaction. Pervious literature suggests that most of the related party transactions occur in the companies with concentrated ownership structures. When the companies’ equities are concentrated, the internal large shareholders have more power and influence to conduct related party transactions (Peng, Wei, and Yang, 2011). These related-party transactions may be harmful to companies. It is because insiders may use their positions to conduct transactions that benefit themselves rather than the company (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2012). On the other hand, because of the concentration of control rights, the probability of the company being acquired is relatively low. It may induce insiders more willing to make long-term strategic plans such as carrying out efficient related party transactions to maximize the company's interests (Fischel, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Stein, 1988). Compared with non-dual class share companies, dual class firms that insiders control the company with limited cash flow rights are usually the ones with concentrated equity structure. Therefore, we expect that dual class firms more often involve in related party transactions than non-dual class firms. Few previous studies explore the relationship between ownership structure and related party transactions. This study aims to fill in this gap. The empirical results of the study show that the amount and frequency of related parties transactions of dual class firms are significantly higher than non-dual class firms. However, compared to the non-dual class firms, when the company is a dual class ownership structure and conducting related party transactions, there is no significant impact on the company's value. In addition, we also explore the impact of board independence on related party transactions for dual class firms. We find that no matter director's independence is high or low, the negative effect of business related party transaction on firm value of dual class firms is insignificant.
書名頁 i
論文口試委員審定書 ii
中文摘要 iii
英文摘要 iv
誌謝 v
目錄 vi
表目錄 vii
第一章、前言 1
第二章、文獻回顧 3
第一節 雙重股權介紹 3
第二節 雙重股權的優點與缺點 3
壹、優點 3
貳、缺點 4
第三節 關係人交易介紹 5
壹、優點 5
貳、缺點 6
第四節 獨立董事介紹 6
壹、優點 7
第三章、研究假說 8
第四章、數據及研究方法 11
第一節 樣本資料來源 11
第二節 研究變數定義 11
第三節 樣本分布 13
第四節 樣本敘述統計量 13
第五節 相關係數表 14
第五章、實證結果 15
第一節 單變量分析 15
第二節 初步實證結果 16
第三節 考慮內生性問題 19
第六章、結論與貢獻 21
第七章、參考文獻 22
附錄 25



表目錄
表1 26
表2 27
表3 28
表4 31
表5 32
表6 34
表7 36
表8 38
表9 40
表10 41
表11 42
表12 43


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