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研究生:陳偉銘
研究生(外文):ROBIN
論文名稱:獨立董事獨立嗎?獨立董事貪污文化的證據
論文名稱(外文):Is Independent Director Independent? Evidence from Corruption Culture of Independent Director
指導教授:黄嘉威羅懷均羅懷均引用關係
指導教授(外文):HUANG, CHIA-WEILO, HUAI-CHUN
口試委員:何柏欣林智勇莊惠菁
口試委員(外文):HO, PO-HSINLIN, CHIH-YUNGCHUANG, HUI-CHING
口試日期:2019-10-18
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:元智大學
系所名稱:管理學院博士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2019
畢業學年度:108
語文別:英文
論文頁數:71
中文關鍵詞:貪污文化
外文關鍵詞:Corruption culture
ORCID或ResearchGate:orcid.org/0000-0002-0397-1844
IG URL:robinchenweiming
Facebook:www.facebook.com/robin.weiming
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  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:233
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Table of Contents
Title Page i
Letter of Approval ii
Abstract in Chinese iii
Abstract in English iv
Acknowledgements v
Table of Contents vi
List of Tables viii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 10
2.1 Independent director: bright side and dark side 10
2.2 Independent director’s corruption culture and CEO turnover-performance
sensitivity 11
2.3 Independent director’s corruption culture and corporate innovation 11
2.3.1 Independent director’s corruption culture and innovation input 11
2.3.2 Independent director’s corruption culture and innovation output 12
2.3.3 Independent director’s corruption culture and innovation efficiency 12
2.4 Independent director’s corruption culture and compensation of independent
director 13
2.5 Independent director’s corruption culture and compensation of CEO 14
Chapter 3 Data and Summary Statistics 16
3.1 Data 16
3.2 Descriptive of the independent variable 16
3.3 Descriptive of the dependent variables 17
3.4 Control variables 18
3.5 Summary statistics 19
Chapter 4 Empirical Results 21
4.1 Independent director’s corruption culture and CEO turnover-performance
sensitivity 21
4.2 Independent director’s corruption culture and corporate innovation 22
4.2.1 Independent director’s corruption culture and R&D expenditures 22
4.2.2 Independent director’s corruption culture and patent 24
4.2.3 Independent director’s corruption culture and citation 25
4.2.4 Independent director’s corruption culture and innovation efficiency 26
4.3 Independent director’s corruption culture and compensation 27
4.3.1 Independent director’s corruption culture and excess compensation of
independent director 27
4.3.2 Independent director’s corruption culture and cash compensation 28
4.3.3 Independent director’s corruption culture and excess compensation of CEO 29
4.3.4 Independent director’s corruption culture and CEO risk-taking incentives 30
4.4 Endogeneity concerns 31
4.4.1 Difference-in-Differences (DiD) methodology 31
4.4.2 A propensity-score-mathing (PSM) methodology 34
4.5 The effect of external corporate governance mechanisms 35
4.6 Robustness tests 36
4.6.1 A potential trend control and systematic changes in independent
director’s corruption culture 36
4.6.2 Controlling for CEO’s corruption culture 37
Chapter 5 Conclusion 38
References 39
Appendix 68

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