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研究生:黃柏雄
研究生(外文):HUANG, PO-HSIUNG
論文名稱(外文):Industry Concentration, Corporate Innovation, Institutional Ownership, and Firm Life Cycle
指導教授:王元章王元章引用關係
指導教授(外文):WANG, YUNG-JANG
口試委員:王元章陳安行莊益源詹家昌張永和
口試委員(外文):WANG, YUNG-JANGCHEN, AN-SINGCHUANG, I-YUANCHAN, CHIA-CHUNGCHANG, YUNG-HO
口試日期:2021-04-22
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:財務金融系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2021
畢業學年度:109
語文別:英文
論文頁數:84
中文關鍵詞:公司生命週期產業集中度公司創新動態行為機構所有權
外文關鍵詞:Firm life cycleIndustry concentrationCorporate innovationDynamic behaviorInstitutional ownership
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The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis claims that higher industrial concentration helps to increase the interconnectedness of various firms, which results in higher market power for all of the companies involved. In this even more fiercely competitive global environment, it is imperative that we do everything we can to build the core competitiveness across industries. While R&D and innovation develops a firm’s core competitiveness, they also play a vital role in determining the failure or success of a firm. Companies at various business life cycle stages are exposed to different operational risks, and tend to employ different investment strategies and financing solutions, in order to address a broad range of operational risks and wisely choose the most appropriate investment and financing options when they move through these stages. Previous research indicates that a firm’s success depends on many factors including: 1) the industry’s degree of concentration, 2) the managers’ focus on corporate innovation, and 3) the firm’s life cycle stage. Yet, previous research has not examined how all three of these factors drive the relative value of Taiwanese firms.
The first chapter examines the influence of industrial concentration and innovation on business valuation at different life cycle stages. More specifically, it compares the effects of industrial concentration and R&D across different stages with empirical data, measures the interaction between the two factors, and explores the Granger causality relationship of panel VAR. I find that all three variables play a key role. For example, I find that greater industry concentration (IC) has the most positive impact on relative firm value for firms in the decline stage followed by the growth, introduction or shakeout, and maturity stages. On the other hand, I find that greater investments in research and development expenses (RD), which I use as a proxy for corporate innovation activities, have the most positive impact on relative firm value when firms are in the maturity stage followed by the growth or shakeout, decline and introduction stages. Panel VAR Granger causality tests indicate a unidirectional effect from RD to IC. I conclude that a careful analysis of a firm’s innovation activities, industry structure, and life cycle stage are critical factors when developing corporate strategy, making investment decisions, or setting government policy.
As a management mechanism, corporate governance is mainly employed to protect the rights of shareholders and loaners of a firm, decrease the occurrence of a conflict of interest between investors and the management, help to maintain the firm’s stability of business operations, and sharpen the firm’s competitive edges within the industry. As pointed out by prior studies, institutional investors are strongly motivated to supervise a firm’s performance and would take actions to increase enterprise value. Why is the study of these issues important in the context of Taiwanese firms? In the 1980s Taiwan’s government began to promote economic growth. The effort was successful as shown by the growth in Taiwan’s economy. Taiwan’s GDP has already surpassed USD 20,000 in 2011, whereas its PPP estimates have surpassed USD 30,000, almost equivalent to some major advanced countries at that time. According to statistics released in 2016, Taiwan was the 22nd largest economy in the world. These issues are still relevant today given the Taiwan government’s continued emphasis on improving corporate governance and increasing economic growth.
The second chapter measures the influence of institutional ownership on business valuation at different life cycle stages. Also, it compares the effects of both foreign and domestic institutional ownerships and bank and trust fund ownerships across different stages with empirical data, examines the interaction effects, and explores the Granger causality relationship of panel VAR. The annual closing prices and trading data at Taiwan Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2020 were included for analysis. To identify the correlation between the risks a firm is facing and market opportunities for business growth, I opted for Tobin's Q to measure a firm’s value. Then I utilized Dickinson’s (2011) method to distinguish the life cycle stages. Risks associated with empirical modeling were addressed with sensitivity analysis to ensure the robustness of the models. I find that firms in the growth and maturity stage generally have higher levels of institutional ownership, higher Tobin’s Q ratios, and are more likely to remain in their life cycle stage over the subsequent six-year period. Further analysis indicates that the interaction between foreign and domestic institutional ownership has a positive relation with company value regardless of a firm’s life cycle stage. However, the relation between a firm’s Tobin’s Q ration and the interaction of bank and trust fund ownership is negative. Finally, I find that the feedback effect between domestic and foreign institutional ownership, and I also find a unidirectional Granger causality running from trust fund ownership to bank ownership. I conclude that Taiwan’s government has been successful in its efforts over the last 20 years to increase economic growth, strengthen corporate governance, and improve the country’s capital markets.

Table of contents

Abstract …......…………………………………………………………………......2

I.Industry Concentration, Corporate Innovation, Firm Life-Cycle Stage, and the Relative Value of Taiwanese Firms
1. Introduction ……...………………………………………………………………7
2. Literature review and hypotheses development ....………………………………9
2.1. The relation between Tobin’s Q and industrial concentration across the firm life cycle...….……………………………………………………………….9
2.2. The relation between Tobin’s Q and corporate innovation across the firm
life cycle ..…………………………………………………………………12
2.3. Interaction effects, Granger causality tests and robustness tests .…….……15
3. Research method ……………………………………………………………….16
3.1. Sample and data …………………………………………………………...16
3.2. Empirical model …………………………………………………………...17
4. Results ………………………………………………………………………….19
4.1. Descriptive statistics ……………………………………………………….19
4.2. Regression results ………………………………………………………….20
4.2.1. The determinants of Tobin’s Q ……………………………………..20
4.2.2. The determinants of life cycle stage ………………………………..22
4.2.3. Industry concentration and the stationarity of mature-stage firms …23
4.2.4. Corporate innovation and the stationarity of introduction and mature-stage firms …………………………………………………………23
4.2.5. The interaction effect between industrial concentration and corporate innovation ………………………………………………………….24
4.2.6. Panel VAR Granger causality tests ………………………………….25
4.2.7. Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks ………………………….26
4.2.8. Endogeneity …………………………………………………………26
5. Conclusions ……………………………………………………………………..27
6. Tables ..….………………………………………………………………………30
7. Appendix ..………………………………………………………………………43
8. References ...…………………………………………………………………….44
II. Dynamic Behavior of Institutional Ownership and Firm Life Cycle: Evidence from Taiwan
1. Introduction .…………………………………………………………………….50
2. Literature review and hypotheses development ……….………………………. 52
2.1. Stages of the firm life cycle and institutional ownership …………….…….52
2.2. Relative firm value and institutional ownership ….………………………...53
2.3. Panel VAR Granger causality test ………………………………………….55
3. Research design.………………………………………………………………...55
3.1. Sample and data..…………………………………………………………...55
3.2. Defining the stages of a firm’s life cycle..………………………………….56
3.3. Empirical model..…………………………………………………………...56
4. Empirical Results………………………………………………………………..58
4.1. Descriptive statistics ………………………………………………………..58
4.2. Regression analysis ...………………………………………………………58
4.2.1. Firm life cycle stage and institutional ownership ....…………………59
4.2.2. Firm life cycle stage persistence and institutional ownership ……….60
4.2.3. Tobin’s Q, life cycle stage, and institutional ownership: a pair-wise
analysis ..……………………………………………………………60
4.2.4. Tobin’s Q, life cycle stage, and institutional ownership: interaction
Effects ……………………………………………………………….61
4.2.5. Panel VAR Granger causality tests ………………………………….61
4.3. Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks ..……………………………….62
4.3.1. Institutional ownership and firm life cycle stage ...………………….62
4.4. Endogeneity ...………………………………………………………………62
5. Conclusions .......………………………………………………………………...63
6. Tables ……………………………………………………………………………65
7. Appendix ....……………………………………………………………………...79
8. References ……………………………………………………………………….81




List of Tables

I. Industry Concentration, Corporate Innovation, Firm Life-Cycle Stage, and the
Relative Value of Taiwanese Firms
Table 1: Industry sales and industry concentration (IC) in Taiwan ..……………….30
Table 2: Descriptive statistics ………………………………………………………31
Table 3: Determinants of Tobin’s Q: A pairwise comparison of firms at different
life cycle stages ……………………………………………………………33
Table 4: Determinants of a firm’s life-cycle stage ..………………………………...35
Table 5: Industrial concentration and its correlation with life cycle development in
the subsequent six years ....………………………………………………...37
Table 6: Innovation and its correlation with life cycle development in the
subsequent six years ...……………………………………………………38
Table 7: Interaction Effects …………………………………………………………39
Table 8: Results of panel VAR Granger causality test .……………………………..40
Table 9: Different industrial concentration and R&D in different life cycle stages ..41
Table 10: The determinants of Tobin’s Q: Corporate innovation, industrial
concentration, and interaction effects using the 2SLS method ..………….42

II. Dynamic Behavior of Institutional Ownership and Firm Life Cycle: Evidence
from Taiwan
Table 1: Descriptive statistics ...…………………………………………………….65
Table 2: Empirical results for multinomial logistic regression models with the shake-
out stage as the benchmark period …………………………………………67
Table 3: Institutional ownership and firm life cycle stage persistence ..……………69
Table 4: Association between institutional ownership and firm life cycle …………71
Table 5: Empirical results on the interaction between domestic institutional
ownership (bank) and foreign institutional ownership (trust fund) with
respect to the valuation of companies in various life cycle stages ………...73
Table 6: Results of panel VAR Granger causality test ……………………………...75
Table 7: Robustness checks on alternative model specifications and life cycle …....76
Table 8: Instrumental variable approach ...………………………………………….78

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