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研究生:陳玲娜
研究生(外文):CHEN, LING-NA
論文名稱:公司治理與財務報表品質關聯性之研究 —以獨立董事角色探討
論文名稱(外文):A Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Quality—Explore the Role of Independent Directors
指導教授:黃劭彥黃劭彥引用關係
指導教授(外文):HUANG, SHAIO-YAN
口試委員:紀信義翁慈青林岳喬吳貞慧卓佳慶黃劭彥
口試委員(外文):CHI, HSIN-YIWENG, TZU-CHINGLIN, Y.C. GEORGEWu, CHEN-HUICHO, CHIA-CHINGHUANG, SHAIO-YAN
口試日期:110年5月21日
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:會計與資訊科技研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2021
畢業學年度:109
語文別:中文
論文頁數:80
中文關鍵詞:獨立董事獨立董事任期財務報表品質
外文關鍵詞:Independent DirectorIndependent Director TenureFinancial Reporting Quality
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本研究從獨立董事角色探討公司治理與財務報表品質的關聯性,以我國2002年至2019年上市(櫃)公司為研究樣本,檢視2002年引進獨立董事制度後,對財務報表品質的影響;另就我國獨立董事制度採取逐步接軌模式,進一步探討2002年以後首次成立的上市(櫃)公司,在不同法令規範下,區分有無設置、自願或強制設置獨立董事等情況,對財務報表品質的影響。
實證研究發現,自願設置獨立董事的上市(櫃)公司,會有較佳的財務報表品質;2002年以後首次上市(櫃)且獨立董事為持續設置的公司,相較於受規範強制設置者,自願或持續設置獨立董事會有較佳的財務報表品質;但在2002年以後首次上市(櫃)但獨立董事呈現中斷性設置的公司,相較於未設置者,依法令規範而強制設置獨立董事,其會有操縱盈餘管理的行為,反而無法提升財務報表品質。再者,本研究發現獨立董事平均任期與財務報表品質呈現非線性關係,當公司獨立董事平均任期長於10年,財務報表品質會受到影響,此結果符合我國目前獨立董事任期規範。
上述各項假說實證結果,在使用不同財務報表品質衡量指標、兩階段評估模式、正向裁決性流動應計數、IFRS實施前後、考量全面強制性設置獨立董事的影響等加以分析,大致呈現一致性結果。

This paper investigates the relationship between independent director and financial reporting quality. Use the data collected from the Taiwan capital market since 2002-2019. The empirical results show that voluntary appointment of independent directors are positively associated with financial reporting quality. Moreover, this study also finds that the non-linear relationship between tenure of independent directors with financial reporting quality. Once the tenure of independent directors more than 10 years that will erode director independence, thus lower financial reporting quality. These results are robust after implement the numerous sensitivity test.
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景 1
1.2 研究動機 6
1.3 研究目的 10
1.4 研究架構 12
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 14
2.1 獨立董事制度相關法令規定 14
2.2 財務報表品質定義及相關研究 17
2.3 獨立董事與財務報表品質之相關研究 19
2.4 研究假說 20
第三章 研究方法 27
3.1 變數定義 27
3.2 實證模型之建立 32
3.3 研究期間與資料來源 35
第四章 實證結果與分析 39
4.1 敘述性統計 39
4.2 相關係數 41
4.3 迴歸分析 45
4.4 額外性測試 51
第五章 結論與建議 70
5.1 研究結論 70
5.2 研究貢獻 72
5.3 研究限制與建議 74
參考文獻 76

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