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研究生:常瀞方
研究生(外文):Chang, Jing-Fang
論文名稱:日月光與矽品併購案—以尖點巨變模型分析
論文名稱(外文):The Merger & Acquisition of ASE and SPIL: An Application of the Cusp Catastrophe Model
指導教授:毛治國毛治國引用關係
口試日期:2020-01-17
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立交通大學
系所名稱:經營管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2020
畢業學年度:109
語文別:中文
論文頁數:57
中文關鍵詞:尖點巨變模型敵意併購
外文關鍵詞:Cusp Catastrophe ModelHostile Takeover
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:165
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公司透過併購可以整合資源,實現先前無法實現的目標,因此許多公司會選擇以併購方式強化公司。在台灣少數的併購案中,封測代工產業的日月光與矽品的併購案對各方影響深廣,本研究以尖點巨變模型探討日月光與矽品雙方董事會與股東會在併購過程,探討兩者從相互對抗的走向,從穩健的狀態,到經歷併購所産生的混沌狀况,而最後雙方達成共組控股公司平衡狀態。
Through mergers and acquisitions (M&A), companies will integrate resources to achieve previously unachievable goals. Therefore, many companies will choose to strengthen their company through this method. Among the few M&A cases in Taiwan, the case of Advanced Semiconductor Engineering (ASE) and Siliconware Precision Industries Co. L.td(SPIL) which both are giants in semiconductor packaging and testing industry has a significant impact on all parties. The research applies Cusp Catastrophe Model to explore the merger process of the board of directors and shareholders of ASE and SPIL. To discuss the trend of the confrontation between ASE and SPIL, from a stable state to the chaotic situation, and finally get other stable state that reaching a consensus to set up a holding company.
摘要 i
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
圖目錄 vi
表目綠 vii
一、緒論 1
1.1  研究背景 1
1.2  研究動機 3
1.3  研究目的 4
1.4 研究方法 4
1.5 研究流程 5
二、文獻回顧 6
2.1 併購文獻探討 6
2.1.1 併購類型 6
2.1.2 併購過程 11
2.1.3 股權結構因素 16
2.2  尖點巨變模型理論 18
三、個案描述 23
3.1  產業大事簡介 23
3.2 研究對象與範圍 25
3.3 個案公司介紹 26
3.3.1 日月光半導體公司 26
3.3.2 矽品公司精密工業股份有限公司 28
3.3.3 兩個案公司財務狀況比較 29
3.4 併購發生前的矽品 31
3.5 日月光與矽品的併購過程與反併購過程 36
四、個案分析 43
4.1 競爭型尖點巨變模型說明 43
4.2 以競爭型尖點巨變模型分析 45
4.3 日月光控股公司成立 48
五、結論與建議 52
5.1 研究結論 52
5.2 研究限制與建議 53
六、參考文獻 54
6.1  中文 54
6.2  英文 55
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