臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究導入Khan and Watts（2009）發展出的會計穩健性衡量指標C-SCORE以及董事會相關結構特性，對於公司股價報酬率進行探究。研究實證顯示，公司穩健程度與董監事持股比率越高，越能夠獲得較佳的股價報酬，並且獲得擊敗大盤與MSCI加權平均指數之超額報酬；然而，若以公司治理100指數以及臺灣50指數成分股作為調節項，結果發現成分股對於股價報酬的關係並不顯著。因此，對於以公司會計穩健性以及董監事持股比率作為選股標的的投資人而言，可以避免同時以該二指數之成分股作為選股策略。

This research introduces accounting robustness measurement indicators “C-SCORE” and related structural characteristics of the board of directors to explore the company's stock price return. Empirical research shows that the higher the company’s soundness and the ratio of directors and supervisors’ shareholdings, the better stock prices can be obtained, and the excess returns that beat the broader market and the MSCI weighted average index. However, if the constituent stocks of the Corporate Governance 100 Index and the Taiwan 50 Index are used as adjustment items, it turns out that the relationship between constituent stocks and stock price returns is not significant. Therefore, for investors who use the company's accounting stability and the ratio of directors and supervisors as stock selection targets, they can avoid using the constituent stocks of the two indexes as stock selection strategies at the same time.

目　錄 II
第一章 研究動機與目的 1
1.1 研究動機 1
1.2 研究目的 5
第二章　文獻回顧與研究假說建立 6
2.1 文獻回顧 6
2.1.1 穩健會計與股價報酬的關係相關文獻 7
2.1.2 董事會結構與股價報酬的關係相關文獻 9
2.2 研究假說之建立 12
2.2.1 假說一：採取穩健會計的公司有較高的股價報酬 12
2.2.2 假說二：董監事持股比率越高的公司有較高的股價報酬。 13
2.2.3 假說三：「公司治理100指數」以及「台灣50指數」成分股且採取穩健會計的公司有較高的股價報酬。 13
2.2.4 假說四：「公司治理100指數」以及「台灣50指數」成分股且董監事持股比率越高的公司有較佳的股價報酬。 14
第三章 研究方法與資料收集 15
3.1 變數衡量 15
3.1.1 穩健會計的衡量變數(C-SCORE) 15
3.1.2 董事會結構特性衡量變數 17
3.2 資料來源與樣本選擇 20
3.2.1 研究期間及研究樣本 20
3.2.2 資料來源 20
3.3 實證模型 20
3.3.1 研究模型一 20
3.3.2 研究模型二 21
3.3.3 研究模型三 23
第四章 實證結果與分析 24
4.1 敘述性統計量分析 24
4.2 相關性分析 27
4.3 迴歸結果分析 29
4.3.1 模型一迴歸分析結果：以年報酬率為應變數 29
4.3.2 模型二迴歸分析結果：以公司治理100成分股為調節效果 33
4.3.3 模型三之迴歸分析結果：以台灣50成分股作為調節效果 38
第五章 結論 43
參考文獻 44
中文部份 44
英文部份 46

中文部份
1.林美鳳、金成隆與林良楓，2009，股權結構，會計保守性與信用評等關係之研究，臺大管理論叢，第20卷第1期：289-329。
2.李馨蘋、莊宗憲，2007，公司治理機制與公司績效之實證研究，東吳經濟商學學報，第57期：1-27。
3.陳昭蓉、許崇源，2014，穩健會計與員工認股權，會計評論，第59期：39-42。
4.王泰昌、林修葳、許文馨、陳漢鍾、劉嘉雯，2017，會計穩健性：基於亞洲國家資料研究之回顧，臺大管理論叢，第27 卷第4 期：1-26。
5.王貞靜、潘虹華與戚務君，2012，以C-Score 衡量會計穩健性在臺灣的適用性，會計審計論叢，第2卷第2期：1-31。
6.林宛瑩、許崇源、戚務君、潘虹華，2012，穩健會計對員工分紅之影響，會計評論，第55期：37-75。
7.李建然、劉正義，2014，穩健會計對於企業股權融資的影響：臺灣實證研究，當代會計，第15卷第2期：1-34。
8.余俊憲、黃瓊慧、陳靜宜、潘榮男，2020，內控品質與穩健會計關係之研究－以初次公開發行公司為例，企業管理學報，第45卷第1期：1-27。
9.林玟廷、陳律睿、姚芮安，2016，台灣中小企業成長與董事會結構之關係：成長節奏之調節效果，管理評論，第35卷第4期：1-19。
10.王綺楓 ，2010，自願設立獨立董事的決定因子及其對研發投資與公司績效的影響，組織與管理，第4卷第2期：79-105。
11.林穎芬、馮軒綾、洪鈺浩，2018，機構投資人、董事會結構、薪酬與關係人交易，中華會計學勘，第14卷第1期：1-29。
12.洪榮華、陳香如、王玉珍，2005，公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係—股權結構與董事會特性的觀點，輔仁管理評論，第12卷第3期：23-40。
13.劉韻僖、林玉娟，2008，董事會規模與獨立性對董事會功能影響之研究，東海管理評論，第10卷第1期，187-224。
14.王媛慧、許順旺、蔡玉琴、黃美珠、徐達光，2015，董事會特徵對食品業經營績效之影響，輔仁民生學誌，第21卷第1期，15-29。
15.林昌旻，2013，以會計穩健原則衡量退撫基金自行經營投資標的，國防大學管理學院財務管理學系未出版碩士論文。
16.楊義龍，2013，盈餘穩健性與財務預測之關聯性研究，朝陽科技大學會計系未出版碩士論文。
17.翁碧辰，2014，獨立董事之職責及專業度與投資決策基礎下之盈餘品質，東吳大學會計學系未出版碩士論文。
18.吳承翰，2016，基金風險值與績效評估－以台灣50ETF與國內封閉型基金為例，國立屏東商業技術學院國際企業研究所未出版碩士論文。
19.林佳穎，2016，我國財務報表穩健特性及穩健原則攸關價值之研究，國立成功大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。

英文部份
1.Ahmed, A. S., B. K. Billings, R. M. Morton, and M. Stanford-Harris. 2002. The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing debt costs. The Accounting Review 77(October): 867-890.
2.Watts, R. L. 2003b. Conservatism in accounting part II: Evidence and research
opportunities. Accounting Horizons 17 (December): 287-301.
3.Ball, R., and L. Shivakumar. 2005. Earnings quality in U.K. private firms: Comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (February): 83-128.
4.Ball, R. 2001. Infrastructurer equirements for an e conomically efficient s ystem of p ublic if inancial r eporting and d isclosure. Bookings Wharton Papers on Financial Services(127-169)
5.Bandyopadhyay, S., C. Chen, A. Huang, and R. Jha. 2010. Accounting conservatism and the temporal trends in current earnings’ ability to predict future cash flows versus future earnings: Evidence on the trade-off between relevance and reliability. Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (2): 413-460.
6.Bhagat, S. & Black B. (2002). The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27, 231–274.
7.Bhagat, S. & Bolton, B. (2013). Director Ownership, Governance, and Performance. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 48, 105-135.
8.Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (1997). Large Shareholders. Monitoring. and the Value of the Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 693-728.
9.Chen, C. J. P., & Jaggi, B., (2000). Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 19, 285-310.
10.Cochran, P. L., Wartick, S. L., & Wood, R. A. (1984). The average age of boards and financial performance, revisited. Quarterly Journal of Business & Economics, 23, 57-63.
11.Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S. & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48, 35-54.
12.Fama, E. F. & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Low & Economics, 26, 301-325.
13.Hu, Y. & Izumida, S. (2008). The Relationship between Ownership and Performance: A Review of Theory and Evidence. International Business Research 1, 72-81.
14.Hui, K. W., S. Klasa, and P. E. Yeung. 2012. Corporate suppliers and customers and accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (February-April): 115-135.
15.Hsu, A., J. O’Hanlon, and K. Peasnell. 2011. Financial distress and the earnings sensitivity difference measure of conservatism. Abacus 47 (3): 284 314.
16.Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48 (3), 831-880.
17.Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
18.Jenkins, D., G. Kane, and U. Velury. 2009. Earnings conservatism and value relevance across the business cycle. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 36 (9-10): 1041-1058.
19.Kim, M., and W. Kross. 2005. The ability of earnings to predict future operating cash flows has been increasing not decreasing. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (5): 753-780.
20.LaFond, R.R., and R. Watts. 2008. The information role of conservati sm. The Accounting Review 83 ( 2): 447 478.
21.LaFond, R., and R. L. Watts. 2008. The information role of conservatism. The Accounting Review 83 (March): 447-478.
22.Lara, J. M. G., B. G. Osma, and F. Penalva. 2009. Accounting conservatism and corporate governance. Review of Accounting Studies 14 (March): 161-201.
23.Lorsch, Jay and Jack Young (1990), “Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America’s Corporate Boards,” Academy of Management Executive, 4(4), 85-87.
24.Mehran, H., (1995). Executive compensation structure, ownership and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 163−184.
25.Mehran, H., (1995). Executive compensation structure, ownership and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 163−184.
26.Minichilli, Alessandro and Cathrine Hansen (2007), “The Board Advisory Tasks in Small Firms and The Event of Crises,” Journal of Management and Governance, 11(1), 5-22.
27.McConnell, J. J. & Servaes, H. (1990). Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 595-612.
28.Pound, J. (1988). Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 237-265.
29.Qian, Cuili, Qing Cao, and Riki Takeuchi (2013), “Top Management Team Functional Diversity and Organizational Innovation in China: The Moderating Effects of Environment,” Strategic Management Journal, 34(1), 110-120.
30.Raheja, Charu G. (2005), “Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 40(2), 283-306.
31.Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488.
32.Watts, R. L. 2003a. Conservatism in accounting part I: Explanations and implications. Accounting Horizons 17 (September): 207-221.
33.Wiersema, Margarethe and Karen Bantel (1992), “Top Management Team Demography and Corporate Strategic Change,” Academy of Management Review, 35(1), 91-121.
34.Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185-211.
35.Zhang, J. 2008. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45 (March): 27-45