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研究生:陳連欽
研究生(外文):CHEN, LIEN-CHIN
論文名稱:敵對性公共財之二維度競租分析
論文名稱(外文):The Analysis of Two-Dimensional Rent-Seeking for Rival Public Goods.
指導教授:翁仁甫翁仁甫引用關係
指導教授(外文):UENG, ZEN-FU
口試委員:翁堃嵐歐俊男翁仁甫
口試委員(外文):UENG, KUN-LANOU, JIUN-NANUENG, ZEN-FU
口試日期:2021-01-28
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺北大學
系所名稱:財政學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財政學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2021
畢業學年度:109
語文別:中文
論文頁數:53
中文關鍵詞:政府遊說二維度經費競租敵對性公共財競租浪費
外文關鍵詞:Government LobbyingTwo-Dimensional Rent-Seeking ModelRival Public GoodsRent-Seeking Waste
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觀察台灣現實社會的競租過程,發現地方政府除了彼此相互爭取上級政府補助經費之使用權,來提供具有敵對性的地方公共財,同時也會試圖遊說上級 政府提高補助經費之額度。考量上述現實狀況,本文藉由延伸 Faria et al.(2014)所建立的二維度競租模型,在地方政府同時透過二維度競租努力爭取上級政府經費補助,並且經費係用於提供具有敵對性之地方公共財的情況下,建立一個競租標的為敵對性公共財的二維度競租模型,從事標的為擁擠性公共財的二維度競租分析。分析焦點在探討地區居民人數規模大小以及人數分配等因素,對於競租活動的影響效果。本文分析結果顯示:(一)在兩區域居民人數總和固定的情況下,擴大租利努力投入水準、相互競租努力投入水準和整體競租投入水準三者,將會隨著兩區域居民人數趨向越不平均而逐漸增加。(二)隨著任一區域居民人數增加,而使得兩區域居民總人數增加的情況下:(1)擴大租利努力投入水準之增減,取決於兩區域居民人數之相對大小。(2)相互競租努力投入水準及整體競租投入水準之增減,則與上級政府補助經費彈性值大小有關。
有別於傳統單維度擁擠性公共財競租分析,在兩區域總人數固定下,兩區域的人數分配不會影響競租浪費的分析結果,本文發現當兩區域人數分配愈平均時,競租所造成的社會浪費愈小。

By observing the process of rent-seeking in Taiwan's real society, we find that local governments not only strive for the right to use the subsidy funds from the superior government to provide rival local public goods, but also try to lobby the higher government to increase the amount of subsidy funds. To investigate the above reality, this paper extends the two-dimensional rent-seeking model established by Faria et al. (2014), and establishes a two-dimensional rent-seeking model for rival public goods. The focus of the analysis is to explore the impact of the number of people and the distribution of people size between regions on rent-seeking activities. The results show that:
I. Under the condition that the total number of residents in the two regions is fixed, the expenditure of expanding rent, the expenditure of rent-seeking and the expenditure of overall rent-seeking will increase as the distribution of number of residents in the two regions tends to be more uneven.
II. With the increase of the number of residents in any region, the total number of residents in the two regions will increase: (1) the increase or decrease of the level of the effort to expand rent depends on the relative size of the number of residents in the two regions. (2) The increase or decrease of the level of effort input and the overall rent-seeking expenditure depends on the elasticity of subsidy from the higher government.
Different from traditional one-dimensional rival public goods rent-seeking studies’ finding about the distribution of the number of people in the two regions will not affect rent-seeking waste. Our finding shows that more even the distribution of people size between two regions, the less social waste caused by rent-seeking.

章節目錄

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機與目的 4
第三節 本文架構 7

第二章 文獻回顧 8
第一節 傳統競租理論的發展 8
第二節 考慮異質性之競租投入分析相關文獻 11
第三節 租利內生之相關文獻 16
第四節 多維度競租投入之相關文獻 18
第五節 租利為擁擠性及外溢性公共財之相關文獻 20
第六節 小結 25

第三章 理論模型架構與均衡推導 27
第一節 研究方法 27
第二節 理論模型架構 27
第三節 均衡解推導 30

第四章 比較靜態分析 36
第一節 兩區域居民總人數固定下,區域間人數分配對競租活動影響 36
第二節 兩區域內居民人數增加下,區域間人數分配對競租活動影響 42

第五章 結論 47
第一節 研究貢獻 47
第二節 研究限制與建議 49

參考文獻 50

一、中文部分
翁仁甫(2006),「標的為擁擠性公共財的競租分析」,《經社法制論叢》,第38期,pp. 211-235。
徐偉初、歐俊男、謝文盛(2021),《財政學》,第5版,台北:華泰文化,pp.188-189。
蔡攀龍、張寶塔(2015),《個體經濟學》,第2版,台北:華泰文化。

二、英文部分
Ahrens, J., Hoen, H. W., & Ohr, R. (2005). Deepening Integration in An Enlarged EU: A Club–Theoretical Perspective. Journal of European integration, 27(4), 417-439.
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Allard, R. J. (1988). Rent-Seeking with Non-identical Players. Public Choice 57(1), 3-14.
Amegashie, J. A. (1999). The Number of Rent-Seekers and Aggregate Rent-Seeking Expenditures: An Unpleasant Result. Public Choice 99(1-2), 57-62.
Arbatskaya, M. and Mialon, H. M. (2012). Dynamic Multi-activity Contests. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 114(2), 520-538.
Baik, K. H. (1994). Effort Levels in Contests with Two Asymmetric Players. Southern Economic Journal 61(2), 367-378.
Bergstrom, T. C., & Goodman, R. P. (1973). Private Demands for Public Goods.
The American Economic Review, 63(3), 280-296.
Borcherding, T. E., & Deacon, R. T. (1972). The Demand for The Services of Non-federal Governments. The American economic review, 62(5), 891-901.
Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica, 32(125), 1-14.
Cheikbossian, G. (2008). Rent-Seeking, Spillovers and The Benefits of Decentralization. Journal of Urban Economics, 63, 217-228.
Chowdhury, S. M. and Sheremeta, R. M. (2011). A Generalized Tullock Contest. Public Choice 147(3-4), 413-420.
Chung, T.Y. (1996). Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts. Public Choice 87(1-2), 55-66.
Clark, D. J. and Konrad, K. A. (2007). Contests with Multi-tasking. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109(2), 303-319.
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L. and Konrad, K. A. (2008). 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking, Springer Science & Business Media.
Dixit, A. K. (1987). Strategic Behavior in Contests. American Economic Review 77(5), 891-898.
Epstein, G. S., Nitzan, S. and Schwarz, M. E. (2008). Efforts in Two-Sided Contests. Public Choice 136(3-4), 283-291.
Faria, J. R., Mixon, Jr., F. G., Caudill, S. B. and Wineke, S. J. (2014). Two- Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony. Games 5(2), 116-126.
Harberger, A. C. (1954). Monopoly and Resource Allocation. American Economic Review 44(2), 77-87.
Hillman, A. L. and Riley, J. G. (1989). Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers. Economics & Politics 1(1), 17-39.
Katz, E. and Tokatlidu, J. (1996). Group Competition for Rents. European Journal of Political Economy 12(4), 599-607.
Kohli, I. and Singh, N. (1999). Rent Seeking and Rent Setting with Asymmetric Effectiveness of Lobbying. Public Choice 99(3-4), 275-298.
Krueger, A. O. (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. American Economic Review 64(3), 291-303.
Lorz, O. (2001). On The Effects of Capital Mobility on Local Infrastructure Policy and Rent-seeking. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 31, 319-337.
Nitzan, S. (1991a). Collective Rent Dissipation. The Economic Journal, 101(409), 1522-1534.
Nitzan, S. (1991b). Rent-seeking with Non-identical Sharing Rules. Public Choice, 71(1-2), 43-50.
Nti, K. O. (1999). Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations. Public Choice 98(3- 4), 415-430.
Nupia, O. (2013). Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods: Wealth and Group's Size Heterogeneity. Economics and Politics 25(3), 496-514.
Posner, R. A. (1975). The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation. Journal of Political Economy 83(4), 807-827.
Riaz, K., Shogren, J. F. and Johnson, S. R. (1995). A General Model of Rent Seeking for Public Goods. Public Choice 82(3-4), 243-259.
Stein, W. E. (2002). Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants. Public Choice 113(3-4), 325-336.
Tullock, G. (1967). The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Western Economic Journal 5(3), 224-232.

三、網路資料
財政部國庫署、行政院主計總處(2021),「中央統籌分配稅款(含短少補助)分配各地方政府明細表」
https://www.nta.gov.tw/singlehtml/67?cntId=nta_827_67
統籌分配款怎麼分?擺不平! 臺北市說沒多拿、桃園怨分最少
聯合新聞網 / 記者施鴻基、林麗玉、鄭維真、陳秋雲、蔡孟妤、張裕珍(2020-07-27)
https://udn.com/news/story/6656/4733330


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