臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文在實驗室中探究單一語言社會的產生和維持。在單純協調的傳訊賽局中， 傳訊者知道電腦賦予他的狀態，據此傳遞訊息給兩位接收者。接收者學習理解訊 息的意義，試圖選擇匹配傳訊者狀態的決策。在實驗中，每位受試者同時擔任傳 訊者與接收者，重複許多回合之後學會如何用「聽」和「講」跟同組另兩位組員 溝通。同時，我們在實驗中詢問受試者完整的策略，也就是他們在不同的狀態下 傳送訊息的整個計畫。我們提供報酬鼓勵同組組員的訊息計畫相同。這樣的設計 使得我們可以在實驗室中觀察到「單一語言社會」與「多語言社會」。為了促使受 試者使用結構性語言，我們在正式實驗前先讓受試者進行十回合簡化的實驗，讓 可能出現的狀態只剩下一半。實驗組先看到的那一半是剩下的那一半旋轉九十度， 但對照組則否。我們在實驗組的確觀察到了更多有結構的語言。而且，接收者猜 對新狀態的成功率，有結構的語言比沒有結構的語言高一至二倍。經過四十回合 的重複，22 組中有 17 組形成「單一語言社會」。接著，我們讓其中一個組員遷移 到另外一組再重複二十回合實驗，觀察「移民」學習「當地 (單一) 語言」的過程， 發現語言有結構會讓移民學得更快。

We investigate the emergence and persistence of monolingualism in the lab. In a sender­receiver game with no conflict of interest, the sender sends a message (without prior meaning) regarding a privately observed state to two other receivers who need to choose actions to match that state. Subjects simultaneously play both roles of sender and receiver in a three­member society. Through repeated play, they learn how to “speak” and “listen” to their group members. We also employ the strategy method for senders to elicit the message for each state and incentivize the use of a same language. This design allows us to observe “multilingualism” and “monolingualism” in the lab.
To induce convergence to structural languages, we introduce half of the states first for 10 rounds before introducing the rest, which are 90­degree transposes of the initial states for the treatment group. The treatment groups indeed converge to structural lan­ guages more often. Receiver matches the true state twice as often when the language is structural, compared to non­structural. 17 out of 22 three­member societies converge to monolingualism in 40 rounds. After the same language emerges, we observe the learning process of “immigrants"who move to another society. Results show that immigrants learn faster in societies with more structural languages.

Page Verification Letter from the Oral Examination Committee I
Acknowledgements iii
摘要 v
Abstract vii
Contents ix
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Experimental Design 5
2.1 Coordination Games .......................... 5
2.2 Experimental Design.......................... 6
2.3 Language Structure........................... 9
2.4 ExperimentalProcedures........................ 14
Chapter 3 Results 15
3.1 AggregateCommunicationResult................... 15
3.2 InitialLanguageStructure ....................... 16
3.3 ImpactofLanguageStructureonLearning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4 OtherLinguisticPhenomenon ..................... 22
3.4.1 Loanword............................... 22
3.4.2 ImmigrantChangetheSociety .................... 23
Chapter 4 Conclusion 25
References 27
Appendix A — Language Structure 31
A.1 OtherWaytoDefineStructure..................... 31
A.2 InitialLanguageStructureinMainStage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix B — Instruction 45
B.1 實驗說明................................ 45

A. Blume. A learning­efficiency explanation of structure in language. The­ ory and Decision, 57(3):265–285, 2004. URL https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11238-005-0280-1.
A. Blume, D. V. DeJong, Y.­G. Kim, and G. B. Sprinkle. Experimental evidence on the evolution of meaning of messages in sender­receiver games. The American Economic Review, 88(5):1323–1340, 1998. ISSN 00028282. URL http://www.jstor.org/ stable/116874.
C. F. Camerer. Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction, chapter 7. Princeton university press, 2003.
D. L. Chen, M. Schonger, and C. Wickens. otree—an open­source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimen­ tal Finance, 9:88–97, 2016. ISSN 2214­6350. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef. 2015.12.001. URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S2214635016000101.
V. P. Crawford and J. Sobel. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50 (6):1431–1451, 1982. ISSN 00129682, 14680262. URL http://www.jstor.org/ stable/1913390.
F. De Saussure. Course in general linguistics. Columbia University Press, 1916, 2011.
B. Greiner. Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with orsee. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(1):114–125, 2015. URL https: //doi.org/10.1007/s40881-015-0004-4.
E. Haugen. The analysis of linguistic borrowing. Language, 26(2):210–231, 1950. ISSN 00978507, 15350665. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/410058.
F. Hong and X. Zhao. The emergence of language differences in artificial codes. Ex­ perimental Economics, 20(4):924–945, 2017. URL https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10683-017-9518-3.
F. Hong, W. Lim, and X. Zhao. The emergence of compositional grammars in artifi­ cial codes. Games and Economic Behavior, 102:255–268, 2017. ISSN 0899­8256. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.009. URL https://www.sciencedirect. com/science/article/pii/S0899825617300040.
D. Houser and Y. Yang. Learning language: An experiment. Working Papers 1079, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, 2020. URL https: //EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gms:wpaper:1079.
A. Rubinstein. Economics and language: Five essays. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
R. Selten and M. Warglien. The emergence of simple languages in an experimen­ tal coordination game. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(18): 7361–7366, 2007. ISSN 0027­8424. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0702077104. URL https: //www.pnas.org/content/104/18/7361.
Álvaro Félix Bolaños. Until these people switch to our language or all of us to theirs... early hispanism’s urgency and the homogenization of indigenous cultural diversity. South Atlantic Review, 74(4):11–54, 2009. ISSN 0277335X, 23257970. URL http://www. jstor.org/stable/41337715.