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研究生:陳廷晞
研究生(外文):CHEN, TING-XI
論文名稱:非家族總裁繼任後,董事會權力和高階管理團隊重組如何影響家族先前不佳的企業績效:以台灣家族企業為例
論文名稱(外文):How the Board Power and TMT Restructuring Influence the Poor Performance after Non-family CEOs Succession: The Case of Taiwanese Family Business
指導教授:李振宇李振宇引用關係
指導教授(外文):LEE, CHENG-YU
口試委員:吳學良翁鶯娟李振宇
口試委員(外文):WU, HSIAO-LIANGWENG, YING-CHUANLEE, CHENG-YU
口試日期:2021-01-20
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:南臺科技大學
系所名稱:全球經營管理碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2021
畢業學年度:109
語文別:英文
論文頁數:113
中文關鍵詞:首席執行官繼任家族企業公司治理策略管理領導力挑戰
外文關鍵詞:CEO SuccessionFamily BusinessCorporate GovernanceStrategic ManagementLeadership Challenge
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To explore a better corporate governance mechanism in Taiwan, the object of this study is to analyze how non-family CEO succession, TMT restructuring and board power will influence family businesses’ performance after the poor performance occurred in the family business. This Master’s Thesis’ main assumption are as follows: When a poor performance occurs in family businesses, a family business is likely to appoint a non-family CEO; Hiring a new non-family CEO after a poor performance occurred in family businesses will have a positive effect on corporate performance in terms of financial performance; The restructuring of top management team will influence the family businesses’ performance positively in terms of financial performance after CEO succession; Board power can moderate corporate performance after the non-family CEO succession. The higher level the family control is (more inside directors involved in the board), the higher degree the board intervene the management decision will be, and the lower the performance will increase.

This study contributes to family business, strategic management, and corporate governance research by suggesting the following three results. First, a family corporate is likely to appoint a non-family CEO when a poor performance occurs. This finding assures that as an outsider who has more managerial skills, capabilities, knowledge, and competencies can overcome the difficulties and influence the corporate’s development positively especially in terms of financial performance. Second, board power can moderate corporate performance after the non-family CEO succession in family business. Though the finding is different from the prior research which indicate that the rise of the degree of “board independence” may influence corporate’s performance positively. However, the third finding shows that the higher level the family control is (the more inside directors involved in the board), the higher degree the board intervene the management decision will be, and the lower the performance will increase. The result of the moderating effect on non-family CEO and board power indicates that board power and board independence is crucial on moderating the succession in family business.
To explore a better corporate governance mechanism in Taiwan, the object of this study is to analyze how non-family CEO succession, TMT restructuring and board power will influence family businesses’ performance after the poor performance occurred in the family business. This Master’s Thesis’ main assumption are as follows: When a poor performance occurs in family businesses, a family business is likely to appoint a non-family CEO; Hiring a new non-family CEO after a poor performance occurred in family businesses will have a positive effect on corporate performance in terms of financial performance; The restructuring of top management team will influence the family businesses’ performance positively in terms of financial performance after CEO succession; Board power can moderate corporate performance after the non-family CEO succession. The higher level the family control is (more inside directors involved in the board), the higher degree the board intervene the management decision will be, and the lower the performance will increase.

This study contributes to family business, strategic management, and corporate governance research by suggesting the following three results. First, a family corporate is likely to appoint a non-family CEO when a poor performance occurs. This finding assures that as an outsider who has more managerial skills, capabilities, knowledge, and competencies can overcome the difficulties and influence the corporate’s development positively especially in terms of financial performance. Second, board power can moderate corporate performance after the non-family CEO succession in family business. Though the finding is different from the prior research which indicate that the rise of the degree of “board independence” may influence corporate’s performance positively. However, the third finding shows that the higher level the family control is (the more inside directors involved in the board), the higher degree the board intervene the management decision will be, and the lower the performance will increase. The result of the moderating effect on non-family CEO and board power indicates that board power and board independence is crucial on moderating the succession in family business.
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. I
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... II
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ III
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... V
List of Figures ................................................................................................................. VI
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... VII
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 12
1.1. Problem Statement ..................................................................................... 12
1.2. Objectives of the Thesis ............................................................................ 15
1.3. Research Questions ................................................................................... 17
1.4. Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................... 18
Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................... 19
2.1 Overview of Firm, Family Business and General Background of Taiwanese Enterprises ................................................................................................. 19
2.1.1 Concept of Firm and Entrepreneur ......................................... 20
2.1.2 Definition of Family Business ................................................ 24
2.1.3 The Stage of developments and the Performance of Family Business .................................................................................. 30
2.1.4 Family Management and Corporate Government in Asia ...... 32
2.1.5 Separation of Ownership and Management ............................ 34
2.1.6 Agency Theory ....................................................................... 35
2.1.7 Stewardship Theory ................................................................ 38
2.1.8 Relationship Conflict in Family Business .............................. 40
2.1.9 CEO Dismissal in Family Business ........................................ 41
2.2 Top Management Team Restructuring ...................................................... 46
2.2.1 Top Management Team .......................................................... 46
2.2.2 Upper Echelon Theory ............................................................ 47
2.2.3 Group diversity ....................................................................... 49
2.2.4 Transformational Leadership and Organizational Culture ..... 51
2.2.5 CEO Succession and Top Management Team in Family Business .................................................................................. 55
2.2.6 Power Circulation Theory and the Loyalty to Incumbent New CEO ........................................................................................ 58
2.2.7 TMT Restructuring and Firm Performance after CEO Succession............................................................................... 61
2.3 Board Power .............................................................................................. 62
2.3.1 Overview of the influence of board power on firm’s performance and Supervision in corporate governance.......... 63
2.3.2 Board Power in family business and the influence on CEOs succession ............................................................................... 65
2.3.3 The influence of Board Power on Research & Development and firm’s performance in family business ................................... 68
Chapter 3 RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY ............................................... 70
3.1 Data and sample collection ......................................................................... 70
3.2 Measurement ............................................................................................. 71
3.2.1 Dependent variables ................................................................ 72
2.3.4 Independent variables ............................................................. 73
2.3.5 Control variables ..................................................................... 74
Chapter 4 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH RESULTS ...................................... 76
4.1 Sample Analysis ......................................................................................... 76
4.2 Research Hypothesis Analysis .................................................................... 80
4.2.1Correlation analysis .................................................................. 80
4.2.2 Hypotheses analysis ................................................................ 80
Chapter 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ............................................................ 87
5.1 Summary of findings ................................................................................. 87
5.2 Limitations and Future Outlook ................................................................. 90
5.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 90
Chapter 6 REFERENCES ............................................................................................... 92
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