跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(34.226.244.254) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/08/01 04:11
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:吳陳翰
研究生(外文):WU, CHEN-HAN
論文名稱:董監事股票質押對銷貨基礎關係人交易之影響
論文名稱(外文):Effects of Shares Pledge on Related Party Sales in the Affiliated Groups
指導教授:陳慶隆陳慶隆引用關係王翰屏王翰屏引用關係
指導教授(外文):CHEN, CHING-LUNGWANG, HANN-PYNG
口試委員:范宏書呂明哲陳慶隆王翰屏
口試委員(外文):FAN, HUNG-SHULU, MING-CHECHEN, CHING-LUNGWANG, HANN-PYNG
口試日期:2021-05-30
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱:會計系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2021
畢業學年度:109
語文別:中文
論文頁數:50
中文關鍵詞:董監事股票質押銷貨基礎關係人交易效率契約投機性假說監督假說
外文關鍵詞:Shares pledge of directors and supervisorsRelated party salesEfficient contractsOpportunistic hypothesisMonitoring hypothesis
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:14
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
隨著許多重大財務弊案的發生,公司內部人員的行為及集團公司間的關係人交易受到很大的重視。公司可使用關係人交易進行績效管理為股東謀取利益,也可以私下進行利益輸送賺取超額報酬,損害股東權益。董監事股票質押會惡化公司控制股東的代理問題,相關文獻指出,有董監事股票質押公司之股東所承擔之代理風險較未有董監事股票質押公司之股東高。本研究以2005年至2018年間我國上市(櫃)公司為研究對象,將公司之銷貨基礎關係人交易區分為因編製合併報表被消除的關係人交易及未被消除的關係人交易兩種類型,以混合資料型態(pooling data)進行實證分析,探討董監事股票質押對公司使用銷貨基礎關係人交易決策之影響。實證結果顯示:董監事股票質押與兩種類型之銷貨基礎關係人交易之間的關係皆呈現顯著負相關。本研究推測因在我國關係人交易資訊揭露程度高,若董監事將股票質押,其後續的動作就會受到債權人(銀行)及股東的監督,因此未被消除之銷貨基礎關係人交易的使用將大大的降低。另外,在被消除之銷貨基礎關係人交易下,因為無法賺取超額報酬也會使利用關係人交易來實行盈餘管理的意願大幅降低。本研究亦進行若干敏感性測試,顯示實證結果具有相當穩固性。
The related transactions in the affiliated groups have received great attention in Taiwan capital markets. Firms can use related party transactions to either improve earnings performance to benefit shareholders or to earn excess remuneration, thereby damage wealth of shareholders. The shares pledge of directors and supervisors can cause agency problems between the company’s controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Prior literature evidenced that the shares pledge is associated with higher financial risk. Based on the listed firms in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2018, this study divides the related party sales in the affiliated groups into that will be eliminated and that not be eliminated related party sales, which in turn, examines whether shares pledge of directors and supervisors impacts on the related party sales in the affiliated groups. The empirical results show that the shares pledge of directors and supervisors is negatively associated with related party sales in the affiliated groups for the two types of sales. This study conjectures this result to some extent can be attributed to the further monitoring functions of creditors (financial institutions) and shareholders This study runs several diagnostic checks and reveals the results are robust to some examinations.
摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第壹章、緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第貳章、文獻探討 6
第一節 董監事股票質押 6
第二節 銷貨基礎關係人交易 8
第參章、研究設計 10
第一節 研究假說 10
第二節 研究期間與樣本篩選 13
第三節 變數定義 18
第四節 實證模型 20
第肆章、實證結果分析 22
第一節 敘述性統計與相關性分析 22
第二節 實證結果 26
第伍章、敏感性測試 29
第一節 以銷貨基礎關係人交易進行盈餘管理之測試 29
第二節 排除董監事及經理人之親屬後衡量董監事股票質押與銷貨基礎關係人交易關係 33
第三節 追蹤資料(Panel Data)型態之測試 36
第陸章、研究結論與限制 39
第一節 研究結論 39
第二節 研究限制 40
參考文獻 41


辛沛翰、吳欽杉、呂婉寧,2008,最適質押比率、公司績效與Granger因果性,Journal of Data Analysis,第3卷第1期,97-112。
高蘭芬,2002,董監事股權質押之代理問題對會計資訊與公司績效之影響,國立成功大學會計研究所博士論文。
陳安琳、高蘭芬、陳怡凱、陳烷鈺,2013,董監事股權質押與公司治理之研究,中山管理評論,第21卷第2期,299-337。
陳慶隆、陳仲佑、高鈺琳、王翰屏,2017,董監事股票質押對公司股票買回決策的影響-資訊競爭調解角色之檢測。商管科技季刊,第18卷第2期,143-174。
楊傑涵,2016,關係人交易與財務績效,國立雲林科技大學會計研究所碩士論文。
陳孟賢,2009,集團公司關係人交易與公司會計績效之關聯性研究-從資源分配角度探討,國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
熊大中,2000,我國公司財務危機與董監股權質押關聯性之研究,國立成功大學會計研究所碩士論文。
劉育徐,2007,公司治理下董事會特性與關係人交易之關聯,國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., and Mullainathan, S. 2002. Ferreting out tunneling: An application to Indian business groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 121-148.
Coase, R. H. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386-405
Chang, S. J., and Hong, J. 2000. Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea: Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transaction. The Academy of Management Journal, 43(3), 429-448.
Chen, J.J., Cheng, P., and Xiao, X. 2011. Related party transactions as a source of earnings management. Applied Financial Economics, 21(3), 165-181.
Chen, Y., and Hu, S.Y. 2007. The controlling shareholder's personal leverage and firm performance. Applied Economics, 39(8), 1059-1075.
Cheung, Y.L., Rau, P.R., and Stouraitis, A. 2006. Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Economics, 82(2), 343-386.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., and Lang, L. H. P. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporation. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 81-112.
Gordon, E. A., Henry, E., Louwers, T. J., and Reed, B. J. 2007. Auditing related party transactions: A literature overview and research synthesis. Accounting Horizons, 21(1),81-102.
Holmström, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74-91.
Hsu, W.H., and Pourjalali, H.2015. The impact of IAS No. 27 on the market’s ability to anticipate future earnings. Contemporary Accounting Research, 32(2), 789-813.
Jensen, M., and Meckling, W.H.1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Jensen, M.C., and Ruback, R.1983. The market of corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50.
Jian, M., and Wong, T. J.2010. Propping through related party transactions. Review of Accounting Studies, 15(1), 70-105.
Johnson, S., Porta, R.L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. 2000. Tunneling. American Economic Review, 90(2), 22-27.
Kao, L., Chiou, J.R., and Chen, A. 2004. The agency problems, firm performance and monitoring mechanisms: The evidence from collateralised shares in Taiwan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 89-402.
Lee, T.S., and Yeh, Y.H. 2004. Corporate governance and financial distress: Evidence from Taiwan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 378-388.
Li, W., Zhou, J., Yan, Z., and Zhang, H. 2020. Controlling shareholder share pledging and firm cash dividends. Emerging Markets Review, 42, 100671.
Liu, Q., and Lu, Z.J. 2007. Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5), 881-906.
Lo, A.W.Y., Wong, R.M.K., and Firth, M. 2010. Can corporate governance deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(2), 225-235.
Porta, R.L., Florencio, L.D.S., and Shleifer, A. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517.
Ryngaert, M., and Thomas, S. 2012. Not all related party transactions (RPTs) are the same: Ex ante versus ex post RPTs. Journal of Accounting Research, 50(3), 845-882.
Seyhun, H.N. 1986. Insiders' profits, costs of trading, and market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics, 16(2), 189-212.
Williamson, O.E. 1975. Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications: A study in the economics of internal organization. New York, NY, The Free Press.
Williamson, O.E. 1964. The economics of discretionary behavior: Managerial objectives in a theory of the firm. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

電子全文 電子全文(網際網路公開日期:20240731)
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top